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National preparedness doctrine has constantly evolved to address the pressing hazards 
and threats the country faces. Although arguably centered on terrorism, the current status 
of national policy attempts to have an all-hazards focus. While the contemporary version 
provides all tiers of government more guidance and structure than ever before, it still 
remains largely disjointed and lacks an effective overall operational response framework. 
Various components of catastrophe response have been identified, including threat/hazard 
identification, interoperability models, and other broad planning concepts. Absent from 
the federal doctrine is a comprehensive plan for the synchronization of vertical 
intergovernmental response planning. However, there are international frameworks and 
domestic catastrophe response plans developed at the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency regional level that comprehensively close the gap between federal strategy and 
state/local operational necessities. These are presented as a comparison and in case 
studies that are evaluated against the leading catastrophe-response planning criteria from 
government, professional, and academic standards. The conclusion includes 
recommendations for adapting current federal task force models to focus on catastrophe 
planning, improving national emergency-response capacity, and restructuring federal 
homeland security grant funding.  
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National preparedness doctrine has constantly evolved to address the pressing hazards 
and threats the country faces. Although arguably centered on terrorism, currently, 
national policy attempts to have an all-hazards  focus. While the contemporary version 
provides all tiers of government more guidance and structure than ever before, it still 
remains largely disjointed and lacks an effective overall operational response framework. 
Various components of catastrophe response have been identified in the national 
preparedness doctrine, including threat/hazard identification, interoperability models, and 
other broad planning concepts, such as capabilities based planning.  
However, many of these frameworks do not directly apply to national catastrophe 
planning because of the country’s federalist form of government that emphasizes states’ 
rights. As a result, emergency response personnel and resources are decentralized 
requiring interstate compacts and intrastate memorandums of agreement/understanding. 
This contributes to the persistent gap in catastrophe planning and response between state 
and local agencies and the federal government. Absent from the federal doctrine is a 
comprehensive plan for the vertical synchronization of intergovernmental response 
planning.  
Thus, it is difficult to find a single source to guide the drafting of an all-inclusive 
catastrophe response plan. One argument for this is that there are so many possible 
catastrophe scenarios and configurations for emergency service agencies that vary from 
state to state and even vary at the municipal level. However, there are vertically 
synchronized catastrophe response plans that have been developed at the regional level 
that are exemplars of intergovernmental planning that can serve as templates for other 
areas of the country. At a minimum, planners should consider these plans as best 
practices in the emergency management community.  
In addition to these domestic plans, a comparison of New Zealand’s Ministry of 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management’s (MCDEM) groups provide a framework 
that the United States can adapt to instill greater coordination across all tiers of 
government in catastrophe response planning. Once a framework is established to bring 
 xx 
all stakeholders together for planning purposes, the group that has been assembled can 
begin to draft a plan. To assist in doing this, there are governmental, industrial, non-
profit, and academic standards that are specific to catastrophe response planning. From 
the primary standards of each of these fields, common criteria can be extracted and 
established. These can be utilized to create new plans or assess current ones. Within the 
thesis, these standards are used to evaluate case studies of current, domestic, catastrophe, 
response plans that were developed at the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) regional level in conjunction with hundreds of vested state and local 
participants.  
The two plans selected are from different regions of the country and address 
divergent threats. The Southern California Catastrophic Earthquake Plan addresses an 
impending natural hazard and was produced by FEMA Region IX, the California Office 
of Emergency Services, and over 1500 other regional partners, including private sector 
infrastructure owners and volunteer organizations.1 The other plan, the Integrated 
Improvised Nuclear Device Plan: City of Chicago, County of Cook, State of Illinois and 
FEMA Region V  developed by these primary regional partners , and  numerous private 
and non-governmental organizations was drafted to address a potential catastrophic 
terrorist attack in the form of a detonation of an improvised explosive device (IND).2 An 
overview of the New Zealand framework for catastrophe response planning is presented 
first and provides guidance toward improving the United States’ catastrophe response 
planning.3 
When attempting to find comparative national models for catastrophe response 
planning from other countries, it is difficult to find ones that equate well against the 
                                                 
1 Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA] Region IX, and the California Office of 
Emergency Services, Southern California Catastrophic Earthquake Plan, 2010, 
http://www.caloes.ca.gov/PlanningPreparednessSite/Documents/SoCalCatastrophicConops 
(Public)2010.pdf.  
2 Federal Emergency Response Agency [FEMA] Region V, Integrated Improvised Nuclear Device 
Response Plan City of Chicago, County of Cook, State of Illinois and FEMA Region V (Washington, DC 
Federal Emergency Response Agency Region V, 2012).  
3 New Zealand Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management [MCDEM], National Civil 
Defence Emergency Management Strategy (Wellington, New Zealand: New Zealand Department of 
Internal Affairs, 2008), http://civildefence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/publications/national-CDEM-strategy-
2008.pdf.  
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United States’ federalist system of government. Though New Zealand has a centrist form 
of government, its Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management’s groups 
present a model that provides potential for American planning efforts. The MCDEM uses 
a “ground up” organization to solicit input not only from local and regional level 
government agencies but citizens as well. Forums are held to set community risk 
tolerances, emergency response, and resource priorities. The feedback from community 
members is then forwarded to regional Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
(CDEM) groups that are composed of representatives from the emergency services and 
regional, local and national governments. Although the participants are legislatively 
required to be members of these groups, the plans they produce are representative of all 
parties’ perspectives. Once completed, the regional plans are forwarded to the MCDEM 
for inclusion into the comprehensive national CDEM plan.  
New Zealand would have to test this model during the 2011, magnitude 6.3, 
Christchurch earthquake. After action evaluations of the MCDEM plan’s effectiveness 
were overall very positive. This proven model demonstrates the importance of 
synchronizing catastrophe response planning across all tiers of government. Although the 
CDEM group approach cannot be directly replicated in the United States, it can be 
adapted for use in national catastrophe response planning. In order to do so, criteria must 
first be established to develop and evaluate plans.  
There are several standards for catastrophe response planning across government, 
professional, and academic resources. The most prominent of these include the 
Department of Homeland Security’s 2008 National Response Framework (NRF) and 
FEMA’s Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans: Comprehensive 
Preparedness Guide 101 (CPG 101).4 Non-governmental publications include the 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency 
Management and Business Continuity and the Emergency Management Accreditation 
                                                 
4 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2008); Federal Emergency Management Agency, Developing and 
Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans: Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 (Washington, DC: 
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2010).  
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Program (EMAP) Emergency Management Standard.5 From academia, Dr. Enrico L. 
Quarantelli’s scholarly work, Researched Based Criteria for Evaluating Disaster 
Planning and Managing builds upon his extensive research at the University of 
Delaware’s Disaster Research Center.6  
An analysis of these standards reveals a number of criteria that are universal to 
each of them. These criteria can then be used to develop or evaluate response plans. In 
short, using the NRF as the base to evaluate the other standards, the following core 
criteria were established:  
• Acceptability—a plan meets potential scenarios, applicable laws, costs, 
and timeframe requirements 
• Adequacy—planning is valid and relevant and addresses critical tasks 
• Completeness—a plan includes timelines and a concept of operations 
(CONOPS); it addresses major actions, objectives, tasks and timelines and 
all stakeholders, resources and personnel requirements are addressed 
• Consistency and Standardization—a plan applies with other policies, 
standards, and procedures 
• Feasibility—a plan is realistic and achievable with on-hand and/or 
obtainable resources 
• Flexibility—a plan is adaptable and decision making is decentralized and 
allows for delegation  
• Interoperability and Collaboration—a plan has integrated and 
complementary objectives 
The two domestic case studies chosen that meet all these criteria are the Southern 
California Catastrophic Earthquake Plan and the Integrated Improvised Nuclear Device 
Plan: City of Chicago, County of Cook, State of Illinois and FEMA Region V plan. Each 
plan differs in regards to the hazard or threat it addresses as well as the format and 
                                                 
5 National Fire Protection Association, 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and 
Business Continuity, 2013, http://www.nfpa.org/.codes-and-standards/document-information-
pages?mode=code&code=1600; Emergency Management Accreditation Program, The Emergency 
Management Standard (Lexington, KY: The Emergency Management Accreditation Program, 2013), 
http://www.emaponline.org/. 
6 Enrico L. Quarentelli, Researched Based Criteria for Evaluating Disaster Planning and Managing, 
Newark, DE: University of Delaware, 1997), http://www.nifv.nl/upload/179144_668_1168610952796-
quarantelli-1998.pdf.  
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methodology used in planning for the response to the anticipated or potential scenarios. 
Yet, each is an exemplar of vertically synchronized catastrophe response planning. 
The first plan is the Southern California Catastrophic Earthquake Plan. This plan 
relies heavily on empirical, data-based analysis and geographic information systems 
(GIS). As a result, the plan has established a baseline of the pre-event or steady state 
emergency response and support resources. The plan then accounts for the anticipated 
operational losses due to a magnitude 7.8 earthquake. The deficit in emergency service 
assets plus the additional resources needed to respond to the estimated 53,000 injured 
persons, 300,000 damaged structures, 3600 mortalities, 1600 initial fires, and 81 million 
tons of debris required to be cleared can then be calculated. Preparations can then be 
made to fill the gap to make up for the loss of damaged assets and the supplementary 
resources needed for an incident of this scale.7 
Through the use of GIS the southern California plan has devised the concept of 
priority response areas (PRA). Data sets comprising of population concentration, 
structural density, and earthquake shake magnitude have been layered to form these 
PRAs. The result is a geographical representation that identifies the areas that emergency 
service providers need to primarily focus on in order to have the most impact in the 
immediate aftermath of a large-scale earthquake. Another benefit of identifying the PRAs 
prior to a catastrophe allows for first responders to understand where to concentrate their 
efforts, even in the event they lose communications with higher commands or other 
adjacent units.  
The PRA concept has applications beyond earthquake response preparation and 
can be used across all hazards. This can be accomplished by retaining the variables of 
population concentrations and structural density and adding a third variable for the likely 
hazard for a particular region. Examples include height and inland distance of a tsunami 
induced wave, flood zones and plume modeling, or explosive blast radius for industrial 
accidents. The progressive PRA concept is a key strength of the catastrophic earthquake 
                                                 
7 FEMA Region IX, and the California Office of Emergency Services, Southern California 
Catastrophic Earthquake Plan, 59.  
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plan, but it also has a significant level of detail derived from the involvement of hundreds 
of vital stakeholders.  
The second case study that meets the criteria of a well developed, vertically 
synchronized, catastrophe response plan is the Integrated Improvised Nuclear Device 
Plan: City of Chicago, County of Cook, State of Illinois and FEMA Region V. Like the 
southern Californian plan, it also was developed with the contributions of hundreds of 
stakeholders and is well founded with evidence and data-based operational conclusions. 
However, it differs in that it addresses a manmade threat that is not geographically fixed. 
Because of this, its framework varies from the GIS based catastrophic earthquake plan 
and instead uses an innovative “execution checklist” annex as its basis.8  
The execution checklist is a functional matrix that chronologically lists tasks that 
are essential to a successful response to the detonation of an IND within the first 72 
hours. The tasks in the checklist have been pre-determined by the stakeholders and are 
prioritized to insure that the lifesaving actions with the maximum effects are performed at 
the earliest stages. Since the tasks have been agreed upon, this allows for the checklist’s 
immediate use at the onset of a crisis. An additional benefit of the pre-established 
execution checklist is that the sequence of the tasks is synchronized so they complement 
and build upon each other. Furthermore, they can be implemented at any level, without 
direction from higher command in the event communications are lost, as is expected in 
this scenario. The structure of the Chicago plan also has applications to other catastrophes 
and important features that can be replicated in other response plans. 
Both of these plans demonstrate that an extraordinary level of attention to detail 
and an extensive amount of time and effort are needed to develop a plan that will be 
operationally feasible for incidents of this magnitude. Through his extensive research, Dr. 
Quarantelli has concluded that catastrophes differ from smaller scale disasters and crises 
not just quantitatively but qualitatively. Therefore, he advises that catastrophe response 
plans cannot simply be larger scale editions of plans developed for less complex disasters 
and crises.9 Consequently, it is imperative to establish a framework for developing 
                                                 
8 FEMA Region V, Integrated Improvised Nuclear Device Plan, Annex 1.  
9 Quarentelli, Researched Based Criteria, 5.  
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catastrophe response plans among regional stakeholders including federal agencies. The 
plans that are created must meet the established criteria gleaned from the leading 
emergency management standards if they are to be successful.  
In order to do this, the federal government could adapt the task force models it 
currently uses for law enforcement, such as joint terrorism task forces (JTTF) or the 
FEMA urban search and rescue (USAR) teams, to create joint catastrophe planning teams 
(JCPT). These teams would receive federal funding to help organize regional 
stakeholders into groups similar to the New Zealand MCDEM model to develop response 
plans. These regional plans developed by the JCPT would then be incorporated into a 
national catastrophe response plan.  
However, one vital aspect is missing from both of the case studies and the current 
national framework. Like the plans presented in the case studies, the plans developed by 
the JCPTs can establish concepts of operations, pre-designate supply and staging areas, 
and identify potential avenues of ingress and egress. While this answers the “what” 
“where” and “how” of the plans, it does not answer the “who.” This essential information 
is absent from both of the case studies. The plans do mention intrastate mutual aid 
agreements that are in place and the national interstate Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact (EMAC) program. However, the enormity of a true catastrophe will 
immediately exceed the resources allocated in support of these agreements. Federal 
catastrophe response doctrine consistently cites having enough “capability” to address a 
“meta-scenario” or a “maximum of maximums” event, but it does not make the 
distinction of insuring there is enough “capacity” in regards to emergency services and 
other resources. Therefore, the sheer magnitude of catastrophes requires a massive 
response well beyond those that are governed by existing practices.  
Insuring there is enough immediate capacity or inventory of first responders and 
their associated assets to address a national level catastrophe is hindered by the country’s 
federalist form of government. Current agreements to aid other jurisdictions with civilian 
emergency services are all voluntary and are not coordinated nationally to have dedicated 
resources to rapidly respond to catastrophes beyond their immediate region. In order to 
close this gap, federal grants could be given to local agencies to maintain resources and 
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personnel at the county level that are slated for mandatory, rapid response to catastrophes 
anywhere in the country.  
Under this proposed program, participating agencies would receive equipment, 
such as firefighting or emergency medical apparatus, under the grants and would have 
first responders salaries supplemented for training. The equipment would be allowed for 
use on a daily basis by the local agency, but it would be legislatively mandated to 
respond to a catastrophe on short notice when requested. FEMA would then track all of 
the resources provided under the grants on a daily basis, similar to the military’s Defense 
Readiness Reporting System (DRRS), using EMAC as its foundation. As a result, local 
jurisdictions would benefit from the use of federally funded equipment and the nation 
would have a definitive emergency services capacity for immediate response to national 
scale contingencies.  
The evident gap between the federal, state, and local governments is well recognized 
in terms of catastrophe planning. Although this is a complex issue, many of the building 
blocks needed to successfully create a solution already exist. Using the criteria developed 
form the leading emergency management standards and adapting federal task force 
models would create a framework for intergovernmental collaboration. Structuring grants 
to provide incentives for state and local agencies to maintain resources that enhance 
national capabilities and capacities would increase the readily deployable inventory of 
emergency response resource for national catastrophes. Finally, continuing with the 
initiatives and partnerships the FEMA regional offices have developed to create 
catastrophe response plans, like those exemplified in the case studies, are essential to 
bridging the gap between state and local governments and their federal counterparts.  
If collectively implemented, these recommendations will increase collaboration by 
bolstering relationships across all levels of government. Grant funded resources will be 
able to rapidly deploy to catastrophes and will mutually benefit the local region on a daily 
basis and the nation in time of a catastrophe. The fusion of local and federal emergency 
management professionals that follow the criteria established in this thesis will produce 
catastrophe response plans that are significant to all stakeholders’ perspectives, needs, 
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and requirements. As a result, these proposals will merge hometown security with 
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Catastrophe preparedness in the United States faces a considerable disparity 
between local emergency response plans and those for catastrophes requiring a national 
response. There is a significant gap between federal strategic planning doctrine and local 
operational response capabilities and capacities in terms of catastrophe planning. Despite 
the improvements in emergency preparedness since September 11, 2001, problems 
between the various levels of government persist during large scale disasters, as was 
demonstrated during Hurricane Katrina and Super Storm Sandy.  
Catastrophe response planning at the federal level has been mostly limited to a 
horizontal approach incorporating only federal agencies and departments. National 
planning has not integrated state and local first responders thus, excluding a significant 
portion of the emergency response resources and personnel. The numerous publications 
that make up the national response doctrine only offer strategic guidance and do not 
provide specific direction for developing operational plans or a structure to implement 
intergovernmental planning. Therefore, more needs to be done to synchronize federal and 
local catastrophe preparedness efforts in order to create meaningful and actionable 
response plans. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Federal catastrophe response publications focus on strategic coordination through 
the use of frameworks and broad planning concepts, while state and local jurisdiction 
concentrate on the immediate operational needs of the crises that affect their communities 
on a daily basis. A gap is created by the competing priorities of these tiers of government 
and leaves the nation destined to repeat the failures of past intergovernmental catastrophe 
responses.  
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1. Catastrophe Preparedness at the Local Level 
The main causes for the lack of intergovernmental synchronization in catastrophe 
planning are twofold. First, there is a lack of collaboration among the various levels of 
government. Emergency responders at the state and local levels often do not fully 
comprehend the magnitude of destruction, degradation of resources, and the complexity 
of challenges inherent in operating in a truly catastrophic environment. As a result, 
training and planning at the local level fails to prepare first responders for disasters of 
national significance. Conversely, the wealth of experience that local emergency response 
professionals bring to the table is often not incorporated into the national planning 
process. Therefore, plans such as the National Response Framework (NRF) and 
Presidential Policy Directive-8 (PPD-8) remain strategic in nature and only provide 
conceptual guidance to local first responders.1 
2. Federal Preparedness 
Second, current federal doctrine and practices are centered on strategic overviews 
and ambiguously assessed goals. There is an insufficient focus on translating these 
strategic concepts into a structure that incorporates operational necessities and emergency 
resource capacity into the overall national framework. The national catastrophe planning 
doctrine that is comprised of the multitude of federal publications, including the National 
Preparedness Goal,2 the National Response Plan, and the succeeding National Response 
Framework,3 provide guidance as to core capabilities and mission areas. These 
publications fail to impart structures or processes for operational essentials such as 
differentiating priorities, designating logistics hubs, or calculating resource needs.   
                                                 
1 “National Planning Frameworks,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, last modified March 19, 
2015, https://www.fema.gov/national-planning-frameworks; White House, Presidential Policy Directive 8-
National Preparedness (Washington, DC: White House, 2011), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness.pdf.  
2 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The National Preparedness Goal (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2011).  
3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2008).  
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This is fundamentally important to establish, particularly when the overwhelming 
numbers of civilian emergency response resources are maintained at the local level. In the 
words of former Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Administrator 
Michael Brown,  
FEMA doesn’t own fire trucks; we don’t own ambulances; we don’t own 
search-and-rescue equipment. In fact, the only search-and-rescue or 
emergency equipment that we own is a very small cadre to protect some 
property that we own around the country. FEMA is a coordinating agency. 
We are not a law enforcement agency.4  
Furthermore, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not have operational 
authority over these key local assets nor does it have a means to inventory or track them. 
The same issue is also a problem between federal agencies. According to Ithier, 
“Fundamentally, the federal government does not have a viable system for operational 
planning that provides a reasonable assurance that the departments and agencies have, 
and can provide the capabilities required during single or multiple national 
catastrophes.”5 
3. Systemic Problems 
The fact that the nation has gone through several iterations of national strategic 
documents in a relatively short timeframe demonstrates that gaps still exist. It is even 
more concerning that a common operational planning component for catastrophe 
response has yet to be incorporated at the federal level. From the local perspective, many 
jurisdictions train for the threats and hazards they are likely to face, and they are limited 
by time and budgetary constraints. Therefore, it is difficult for local organizations to 
commit personnel to outside planning meetings for potential catastrophes, especially for 
ones that may never materialize. It is even more arduous for departments to deploy 
resources for extended periods to assist in catastrophe relief missions elsewhere in the 
country. This is because long term deployments limit the capacity of the deploying 
                                                 
4 “Former FEMA Director Testifies before Congress,” The New York Times, September 27, 2005, sec. 
National / National Special, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/27/national/nationalspecial/27text-
brown.html.  
5 Jan Ithier, “Synchronizing Federal Operational Planning for National Catastrophes” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2010). 
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agency and requires it to shoulder the financial costs until it is reimbursed by the federal 
government months later.  
As a result, national catastrophe planning lacks a cohesive framework that 
integrates the resources and experience of local first responders with the overall strategic 
vision offered in federal planning documents. This may be due in part to some local 
emergency practitioners’ assumptions that “the feds” will immediately provide resources 
and/or will rapidly take command of a catastrophic incident. Thus, local emergency 
response agencies do not place much effort into planning for contingencies of this scale. 
A review of several state and local multiyear training and exercise programs (MYTEP) 
shows while they concentrate on the building blocks or core capabilities, they do not 
include exercises on a catastrophic level.6 History has shown the flaws of not discerning 
stakeholders’ roles and expectations, as well as not building intergovernmental consortia 
prior to a catastrophe striking. Hurricanes Andrew, Hugo, and Katrina resonate as failures 
where there was little, if any, federal response in the initial hours, which left the depleted 
local authorities to manage as best as they could on their own.7 
The fact remains that the bulk of federal assistance cannot mobilize quickly 
enough in the initial stages of a catastrophe. Also, current doctrine works under the 
                                                 
6 Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA] Region X, Multi-Year Training and Exercise 
Plan, Fiscal Years 2013–2015: Federal Emergency Management Agency Region X (Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, Region X, October 2012); http://www.ak-
prepared.com/Preparedness/Training/Documents/Final_RX_MYTEP_2012.pdf; Utah Division of 
Homeland Security, Multi-Year Training and Exercise Plan: Utah Department of Public Safety, Division of 
Homeland Security (Salt Lake City, UT: Utah Division of Homeland Security, 2010), 
http://dem.utah.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/18/2015/02/Utah_MYTEP_Final2011-2013rev1.pdf; 
Nebraska Emergency Management Agency, and Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA] Region 
VII, Nebraska Multi-Year Training and Exercise Plan 2012–2015 (MYTEP) (Washington, DC: Nebraska 
Emergency Management Agency, and Federal Emergency Management Agency Region VII, 2011), 
http://www.nema.ne.gov/pdf/training/mytep_19dec11.pdf; State of Florida, Division of Emergency 
Management, State of Florida, Division of Emergency Management (FDEM) 2013–2015 Multi-Year 
Training and Exercise Plan (MYTEP) (Tallahassee, FL: State of Florida, Division of Emergency 
Management, 2013); Maryland Emergency Management Agency, State of Maryland 2015–2016 Multi-
Year Training and Exercise Plan (Reisterstown, MD: Maryland Emergency Management Agency, 2015), 
https://news.maryland.gov/mema/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2015/01/2015-2016-Multi-Year-Training-
and-Exercise-Plan-Approved.pdf; Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division, 
State of Washington, 2013–2015 Training and Exercise Plan (Camp Murray, WA: Washington Military 
Department, Emergency Management Division, 2012).  
7 Daniel Franklin, “The FEMA Phoenix,” Washington Monthly, July 2005, 
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2005/0509.franklin.html.  
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assumption that state and local personnel and assets will primarily have to manage an 
incident for at least the first 72 hours until federally owned or coordinated resources 
arrive.8 Additionally, not all jurisdictions know in advance how to integrate both their 
operations and resources for a smooth transition to a joint effort.  
In a true catastrophe, a coordinated response from across the country will be 
needed to obtain sufficient resources to manage the resulting devastation and sustain 
basic human needs. It is important for state and local officials to remember that National 
Guard units from all 50 states, three territories, and the District of Columbia all 
responded and provided assistance to the regions affected by Hurricane Katrina.9 
Therefore, even if a jurisdiction cannot foresee a natural catastrophic event occurring in 
its immediate vicinity, the states, at a minimum, must be prepared to send resources from 
their National Guard cadres.  
States and other jurisdictions that will send personnel to catastrophes outside their 
regular areas of operation must not only prepare and train their personnel for the differing 
operations inherent to a catastrophe zone but also how they fit in the overall national 
organizational structure prior to arriving in a disaster zone. Having a working 
understanding of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident 
Command System (ICS) are the minimum training standards needed to operating at a 
national level. National catastrophe response planning helps prevent self-deployment of 
units, duplication of effort, and counter productivity. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Most jurisdictions will never have to face a major catastrophe in their 
communities. However, with the ever present threat of terrorism and extreme weather 
patterns, many of the nation’s densely populated urban areas have a greater potential than 
ever to face a catastrophic event. International planning frameworks may present 
                                                 
8 “FEMA Funding the First 72 Hours,” Homeland Security Today, June 30, 2006, 
http://www.hstoday.us/channels/fema/single-article-page/funding-the-first-72-
hours/07ac4288d2ecbc6f995722cc8034c088.html, 1. 
9 James A. Wombwell, Army Support during the Hurricane Katrina Disaster, Occasional Paper 29 
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2009), 
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/wombwell.pdf, iii. 
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potential for the United States to prepare for catastrophes. Additionally, some regions of 
the country that cope with the threat of impending, large-scale, natural disasters or are 
more likely to be targeted by terrorists using weapons of mass-destruction, have 
established plans that meet established criteria from the leading emergency management 
standards.   
1. Primary Questions 
Are there examples of well-developed, synchronized, catastrophe response plans 
that have integrated the operational response requirements of state and local emergency 
practitioners and the strategic needs of the federal government? 
What criteria can be used to validate or create catastrophe response plans? 
2. Secondary Question 
What processes assist in the development of well-coordinated, intergovernmental, 
catastrophe response plans?  
D. METHODOLOGY 
Research found the New Zealand Ministry of Civil Defence Emergency 
Management’s CDEM groups provide a planning framework that emphasizes 
synchronization between the various tiers of government that can be adapted for use in 
the United States. One of California’s regional catastrophic earthquake plans and a plan 
to respond to the detonation of an improvised nuclear device in Chicago provide the case 
studies for the thesis. These plans are then compared to the leading government, 
professional, academic, and emergency management standards.    
1. Overview 
The thesis uses a combination of the case study and comparative analysis methods 
to evaluate exemplars of collaborative intergovernmental processes and jointly developed 
operational plans that have potential for improving integration and effectiveness of 
national responses to catastrophes. While researching examples to support the original 
hypothesis that there is a gap between the various levels of government in national 
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catastrophe planning, several examples of well developed, intergovernmental plans were 
discovered. As a result, the case study method was selected to present these examples of 
robust domestic catastrophe response plans that were designed to meet the mutual needs 
of federal strategic goals and local operational considerations.  
Research of alternative international emergency management models revealed a 
comparative study from New Zealand. New Zealand’s Ministry of Civil Defense and 
Emergency Management’s (MCDEM) structure legislatively mandates the incorporation 
of regions into the national planning framework.10 Although it is legally compulsory, 
New Zealand’s regions provide the majority of input for the MCDEM national plan that 
establishes the foundation of the central government’s plan. The mutual process that New 
Zealand uses has some correlations to the United States’ national planning process that 
can be adapted to the American federalist system by adapting models from other 
disciplines that incentivize federal and local collaboration. 
The New Zealand comparative analysis presents a framework that encourages a 
“bottoms up,” collaborative approach between the various levels of government. Whereas 
the domestic case studies of response plans are exemplars of the latest criteria from the 
emergency management field. Together, the comparative analysis of New Zealand’s Civil 
Defense and Emergency Management (CDEM) system and the American case studies 
provide models for other regions to emulate and adapt for their unique circumstances. An 
overview of each follows.  
2. New Zealand Civil Defense and Emergency Management Framework 
New Zealand’s Ministry of Civil Defense and Emergency Management 
(MCDEM) has a legislatively designed framework that mandates the participation and 
coordination of the central and regional governments in developing catastrophe response 
plans. The foundation of the New Zealand model is the CDEM group that integrates 
executives from the emergency services, senior elected officials from the regional and 
                                                 
10 New Zealand Parliamentary Counsel Office, “Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002,” 
2002, http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2002/0033/latest/DLM149789.html.  
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local governments, and members of the health community.11 The members of the CDEM 
group have planning, preparedness, and operational responsibilities. Each CDEM group 
is charged with developing a group plan that begins as a locally developed plan that must 
be socialized throughout the region’s communities to receive input about their level of 
risk tolerance and priorities. Additionally, a group’s plan must be able to acquire the 
resources to support its plan. Once the regional plan has been finalized, it is forwarded 
the MCDEM to be integrated into the national plan. 
The New Zealand comparative study was derived from an analysis of academic 
reviews, online publications from the MCDEM, and legislation from New Zealand’s 
parliament. These include the CDEM act and the CDEM plan. Critiques of the New 
Zealand CDEM model’s effectiveness during the 2011, magnitude 6.3, Christchurch 
earthquake were drawn from government inquiries, academic sources, and media 
accounts covering the event.  
The New Zealand model was chosen after reviews of literature of other 
international emergency management models. Although New Zealand has a centrist form 
of government and national police and fire services, it surprisingly does not have a “top 
down” catastrophe planning framework. Furthermore, New Zealand’s approach to 
catastrophe response planning meets many of the criteria that are discussed later in the 
thesis as measures for the merging of national and local interests. The New Zealand 
comparison provides a template that can be adapted to fit within American constitutional 
parameters to foster joint efforts between federal emergency management planners and 
first responders at the state and local levels.  
 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 22.  
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3. Southern California Catastrophic Earthquake Response Plan 
The Southern California Catastrophic Earthquake Response Plan is one of three 
plans developed by the California Emergency Management Agency12 (CalEMA) for the 
state’s most impacted earthquake prone zones. The plan was produced in conjunction 
with the FEMA Region IX office and stakeholders from the various levels of 
government, non-government organizations, and the private sector—particularly those 
entities that own and maintain vital critical infrastructure.  
The more extensive For Official Use Only version (FOUO) is a sizeable 612 
pages but covers the greater Los Angeles area including the eight surrounding counties. 
The plan is heavily infused with data that was used to develop a detailed assessment of 
the physical damage and human toll that is expected from a large magnitude earthquake. 
More importantly, from an emergency management standpoint, the plan correlates the 
number of available response resources to metrics, such as the predicated number of 
casualties, buildings damaged, tons of debris, etc. This allows for the region to identify 
shortfalls in resources and to collectively develop means to fill those gaps. The plan’s use 
of geographic information systems (GIS) to calculate data sets of the specific effects of 
earthquake magnitude, population, and building density resulted in the identification of 
priority response areas (PRA). Because greater Los Angeles is one of the country’s 
largest regions, the plan can easily be adapted to meet the needs of the nation’s other 
metropolitan areas or can also be scaled down for smaller sized jurisdictions.  
The plan’s Unified Coordination Group (UCG) provides a model of 
intergovernmental coordination, integrating both federal and state officials into the 
response plan’s command structure. The significant amount of critical data and the 
analysis conducted are relevant to the strategic goals of the federal government and the 
immediate operational needs of local first responders. The plan has eliminated many of 
                                                 
12 The agency is currently the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (CalOES) and is 
the organizational name used on some of the state’s other response plans. Federal Emergency Management 
Agency [FEMA] Region IX, and California Emergency Management Agency, Southern California 




the obstacles that can hinder interoperability, providing a number of smart practices that 
can be implemented elsewhere. Furthermore, it meets all of the established evaluative 
criteria from the various emergency management sources.  
4. Integrated Improvised Nuclear Device Plan: City of Chicago, County 
of Cook, State of Illinois, and FEMA Region V  
The Integrated Improvised Nuclear Device Plan: City of Chicago, County of 
Cook, State of Illinois, and FEMA Region V revolves around a data-based scenario 
involving the detonation of an improvised nuclear device (IND) in Chicago.13 The plan 
combines the expertise of federal, state, and local practitioners to create a consortium of 
emergency responders of all levels of government. The “base plan” section provides a 
strategic overview of an IND detonation and provides geographic and scientific data that 
predict the resulting conditions. However, the plan’s keystone is a functional “execution 
checklist” annex. It is designed to help initiate and sustain operations at even the lowest 
level of government. The execution checklist presents chronologically listed actions that 
were developed and agreed upon by federal and local stakeholders. This format is 
markedly different from the southern California plan, thus offering an alternative option 
for other jurisdictions that are considering developing their own plan. 
The plan was selected because the unique effects of an IND detonation in one of 
the largest metropolitan areas in the country will automatically necessitate the 
involvement of specialized federal resources to assist local responders. Due to the far 
reaching hazards of the associated radioactive fallout, multiple states also contributed to 
the plan. The plan presents a patent merger of federal strategic expertise and practical 
local operational necessities. It also meets the most widely accepted criteria and standards 
used throughout the emergency management community.  
                                                 
13 Federal Emergency Response Agency [FEMA] Region V, Integrated Improvised Nuclear Device 
Response Plan City of Chicago, County of Cook, State of Illinois and FEMA Region V (Washington, DC 
Federal Emergency Response Agency Region V, 2012).  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
There is no shortage of literature on catastrophe preparedness, the gaps in U.S. 
national response planning, and suggested solutions or policy changes to close them. The 
bulk of the literature on the subject comes from federal government sources but also 
includes contributions from public policy groups and academic sources. There are 
numerous sources citing the faults in the national preparedness system and the lack of 
coordination among federal agencies. Among these are the 9/11 and Gilmore 
Commission’s reports, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act 
(PKEMRA), and the Center for Strategic and International Studies report, Managing the 
Next Domestic Catastrophe: Ready (or Not)? Some of the literature also emphasizes the 
importance of the private sector and non-government organizations in national 
catastrophe response efforts. However, there are few if any that focus on the 
synchronization, or lack thereof, between the federal, state, and local tiers of government. 
The literature also covers the United States’ overall preparedness strategy and the 
way that it is structured. The literature also discusses the faults in the national 
preparedness framework, policies, and recommendations for improving them. No 
literature could be found praising the overall national catastrophe response doctrine. At 
best, there were some objective reports from the Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
and Government Accounting Office (GAO) that provided objective overviews but still 
provided recommendations for improvement. However, there are a few frameworks and 
actual response plans that serve as excellent models of intergovernmental collaborations 
from domestic or international sources. Those well-developed plans that do exist succeed 
in incorporating the measures of several established emergency management 
organizations. 
These detailed, coordinated contingency plans were developed jointly by regional 
stakeholders who play operational roles in the response and recovery of catastrophic 
events. Case studies of a select number of these existing plans and their potential for 
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positively shaping future national catastrophic response include the Southern California 
Catastrophic Earthquake Plan14 and the Integrated Improvised Nuclear Device Response 
Plan City of Chicago, County of Cook, State of Illinois and FEMA Region V.15  
Other recommendations found in the literature to help coordinate catastrophic 
event planning are the establishment of a National Center for Catastrophe Planning called 
for in Jan P. Ithier’s thesis, “Synchronizing Federal Operational Planning for National 
Catastrophes”16 and expanding the current voluntarily accreditation program run by the 
Emergency Management Accreditation Program and linking it to grant funding. This 
approach was endorsed by Dr. Sharon Caudle in her testimony before the House 
Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and 
Management17 and Judson Freed in his thesis “No Failure of Imagination: Examining 
Foundational Flaws in America’s Homeland Security Enterprise.”.18  
The literature reviewed fits into several categories: 
• Sources that identify strategic threats and hazards 
• Examples of collaborative catastrophe response plans 
• Strategic approaches to catastrophe planning 
• Literature regarding international approaches 
• Evaluative criteria for catastrophe response plans 
• Case studies of exemplary catastrophe response plans 
• Executive branch documents 
• Other federal government publications 
• Literature from academic sources and public policy groups 
                                                 
14 FEMA Region IX, and California Emergency Management Agency, Southern California 
Catastrophic Earthquake Response Plan.   
15 FEMA Region V, Integrated Improvised Nuclear Device Response Plan.  
16 Ithier, “Synchronizing Federal Operational Planning for National Catastrophes.” 
17 Is DHS Effectively Implementing a Strategy to Counter Emerging Threats, Statement before the 
House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations and Management, 
114th Cong. (2012), (statement of Sharon L. Caudle), 
http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20Caudle.pdf.  
18 Judson M. Freed, “No Failure of Imagination: Examining Foundational Flaws in America’s 
Homeland Security Enterprise” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011).  
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This varied selection of literature provides a comprehensive overview of 
evaluation of intergovernmental collaboration. The sources provide a good foundation for 
an analysis of homeland security catastrophe response plans that support the 
recommendations and conclusions of the thesis. The categories of literature outlined in 
the following sections. 
1. Sources that Identify Strategic Threats and Hazards  
Research for this thesis was in-part, initially focused on what the perceived 
strategic threats and probable catastrophic events that the United States will encounter in 
the future. There is ample literature on this topic from a variety of sources. Therefore, the 
review process initially focused on the primary open source documents that consist of the 
federal government’s open source overviews of the intelligence, defense, and homeland 
security communities. These include the quadrennial reviews of the Departments of 
Defense (DOD) and Homeland Security (DHS), and the Director of National 
Intelligence’s (DNI) Statement of Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. 
Intelligence Community, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Among these three 
communities, there is a lack of unanimity on all of the perceived threats the nation faces; 
however, each of these reports cited the following common threats: 
1. Cyber-attack/espionage 
2. Terrorism 
3. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear and explosive (CBERNE) attack 
4. Infectious disease 
5. Natural resource (energy) scarcity/security. 
Noticeably absent from these five shared threats to the nation is any mention of 
natural disasters. However, DHS’s 2010 Homeland Security Quadrennial Review19 does 
discuss natural disasters, major accidents, and pandemics as well as the 2010 DOD 
                                                 
19 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010), 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2010-qhsr-report.pdf.  
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report20 devotes some attention to the military’s responsibilities during a national 
catastrophe. Other sources concentrate on specific natural occurring, large scale 
catastrophes such as space weather, particularly solar flares that can generate 
electromagnetic pulses (EMP) as outlined in the Lloyd’s report Space Weather: Its 
Impact on Earth and Implications for Business.21 In addition to the well documented 
potential for catastrophic earthquakes in southern California and the Bay Area, numerous 
sources examine the potential effects of other significant looming earthquakes such as the 
one predicted to occur along the New Madrid seismic zone22 and the Cascadia 
subduction zone along the northwest Pacific coast.23 An earthquake along the Cascadia 
fault lines would be compounded because, like recent events in Japan, it would also 
trigger a tsunami along the United States’ and Canada’s Pacific coasts.24  
Other documents from private policy organizations attempt to predict the most 
significant threats to the United States over longer periods. These include 2025 Global 
Trends25 and 2030 Global Trends,26 both published by the National Intelligence Council. 
These differ from the government written reports in that they also go into depth about 
non-traditional and slow onset or emerging threats, including the effects of global 
                                                 
20 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: Department of 
Defense, 2010), http://www.defense.gov/QDR/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf.  




22 “FEMA Region 6 NMSZ Planning Brief,” Power Point, July 14, 2011, 
http://gohsep.la.gov/agencyrelated/exercises/LANMSZBrief14Jul2011.pdf.  
23 Oregon Military Department, Office of Emergency Management, State of Oregon Cascadia 
Subduction Zone Catastrophic Earthquake and Tsunami Operations Plan (Salem, OR: Oregon Military 
Department, Office of Emergency Management, 2010), 
http://www.oregon.gov/OMD/OEM/plans_train/docs/CSZ/1_csz_plan_final.pdf.  
24 Ibid. 
25 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World (Washington, DC: 
National Intelligence Council, 2008), 
http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf.  
26 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (Washington, DC: National 
Intelligence Council, 2012), https://publicintelligence.net/global-trends-2030/.   
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warming and population growth as well as the strengthening of transnational criminal 
organizations.27  
Other major weather events, such as hurricanes and tornados, are also 
prominently represented in the literature. Hurricane Katrina appears most frequently, not 
only due to its intensity and level of destruction but also because of the failure of 
coordination at all levels of government to sufficiently respond to its devastating 
aftermath. The response to Hurricane Katrina is often cited as the prime example that 
demonstrates that the nation is still not prepared and has significant hurdles to overcome 
in its catastrophe response planning and execution.28 Congressional hearings on this 
momentous incident led to even further reforms and more legislation culminated in the 
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKERA).29 However, this 
bill also fails to provide mechanisms that create the necessary operational components to 
create effective catastrophe response plans. 
2. Examples of Collaborative Catastrophe Response Plans 
Response methods to particular natural and man-caused catastrophic events, such 
as hurricanes, tsunamis, improvised nuclear devices, and pandemics, are analyzed 
throughout the literature. Further analysis reveals that in states and/or regions where 
natural disasters are an eventuality rather than a possibility, the depth and level of 







                                                 
27 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025, 18, 51, 63; National Intelligence Council, 
Global Trends 2030, 30.  
28 Christine E. Wormuth, and Anne Witkowski, Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe: Ready (or 
Not)?: A Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase 4 Report (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2008), vi. 
29 “Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (2006 - S. 3721),” accessed January 5, 
2015, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/s3721.  
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plans for their most susceptible earthquake prone areas: southern California (greater Los 
Angeles)30 the San Francisco Bay Area,31 and Cascadia32 are all exceedingly well done 
and are products of the combined efforts of practitioners from local, state, and federal 
governments as well as other entities such as utility operators and non-profit 
organizations. 
Other catastrophe response plans were reviewed, including ones for the multi-
state earthquake prone region centered on the New Madrid seismic zone (NMSZ).33 
Elements of the NMSZ are extremely detailed. Some of the planning includes the 
preferable placement of resources, such as shipping containers and temporary housing at 
regional airfields.34 Having a plan developed to this level of detail saves time and 
optimizes the space and efficiency for getting critical assets into limited, vital spaces. 
When possible, emergency management agencies should strive to achieve this level of 
planning.  
The state of Oregon’s response plan for an earthquake along the Cascadia 
subduction zone also includes actions to be taken for the resulting tsunami that will 
occur.35 Predicting which evacuation routes will most likely be unusable based on the 
scientific analysis of tsunamis allows for alternative egress routes to be identified and 
communicated to public in advance of this inevitable, no notice event. The use of 
                                                 
30 FEMA Region IX, and California Emergency Management Agency, Southern California 
Catastrophic Earthquake Response Plan.  
31 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IX, and 
California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, San Francisco Bay Area Earthquake Readiness 
Response: Concept of Operations Plan (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency Region IX, and the California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, 2008), 
http://www.calema.ca.gov/PlanningandPreparedness/Pages/Catastrophic-Planning.aspx.  
32 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA] Region 
IX, and California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, California Cascadia Subduction Zone 
Earthquake and Tsunami Response Plan (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency 
Management Agency Region IX, and California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, 2013), 
http://www.calema.ca.gov/PlanningandPreparedness/Pages/Catastrophic-Planning.aspx.  
33 State of Missouri, and Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region VII, New Madrid Seismic 
Zone Joint Missouri Response Operations Plan (State of Missouri, and Federal Emergency Management 
Agency Region VII, 2011), https://www.llis.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/NewMadridSeismicZonePlan.pdf.  
34 “FEMA Region 6 NMSZ Planning Brief.”  
35 Oregon Military Department, State of Oregon Cascadia Subduction Zone.  
 17 
scientific, and evidence based data should be a fundamental element of any catastrophe 
response plan.  
The NMSZ and Oregon plans also were developed with the input of federal, state, 
and other local stakeholders. Having members from across the spectrum of the different 
levels of government is important as it helps in establishing expectations and 
responsibilities. Partnering with the private sector, particularly those who own and/or 
control critical infrastructure, insures priorities are maximized for the re-establishment of 
life sustaining utilities. All of these steps assist in synchronizing operations during the 
critical hours immediately following a catastrophe.  
3. Strategic Approaches to Catastrophe Planning 
Additional literature concentrates on the broader “whole of government” or 
“whole of community” response strategies.36 These reports attempt to analyze the best 
method for developing a strategic homeland security policy. Different models include the 
capabilities based, the worst case or “meta-scenario” based, and threat based strategies.37 
Current FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate is making a push toward a blended approach. 
This is being accomplished by defining the core capabilities that are essential to 
mitigating almost all catastrophes. At the same time, FEMA has developed the meta-
scenario and its associated benchmarks, which have created an understanding of the 
magnitude of devastation and the capacity of resources and personnel needed to provide 
for survivors and manage secondary hazards.  
4. Literature Regarding International Approaches 
There is also a body of literature from foreign countries’ efforts in this arena that 
provide comparative lessons for the United States. Dr. Nadav Morag’s textbook, 
Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons,38 and FEMA’s online comparative 
                                                 
36 Evolution of Emergency Management and Communication, before the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Craig Fugate, 
Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency), 2. 
37 Ibid., 5. 
38 Nadav Morag, Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons, 1st ed. (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 
2011). 
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emergency management (EM) book collection39 on various nations’ homeland security 
structures provide detailed overviews in comparison to the United States’. The Australian 
and British systems are most similar to the American system. While the New Zealand 
model is not as close in contrast, it does offer valuable lessons that could be adapted and 
implemented in the United States.  
Despite New Zealand’s centrist form of national government, it provides an 
innovated example of a locally formed basis for catastrophe response planning that 
legislatively mandates the inclusion of regions and local authorities in national planning. 
New Zealand’s Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Act40 is the legal 
foundation which the National CDEM Plan41 is built upon. The establishment of CDEM 
groups at the regional level is delineated within both the CDEM Act and CDEM plan and 
is the core mechanism that drives the New Zealand model.  
While the United States federalist structure of government does not lend itself to a 
direct adoption of the New Zealand centralist model, there are other ways the CDEM 
system could be modified into the United States’ catastrophe planning architecture. This 
thesis presents an overview of the New Zealand CDEM structure and recommendations 
for adaptation in the American emergency management structure.  
5. Evaluative Criteria for Catastrophe Response Plans 
There are several recognized sources in the emergency management field that 
have established standards and/or criteria to evaluate emergency response plans. These 
can be adapted to critique large scale catastrophe response plans. Those criteria 
established by the DHS42 and the University of Delaware’s Disaster Research Center 
                                                 
39 David A. McEntire, ed., Comparative Emergency Management: Understanding Disaster Policies, 
Organizations, and Initiatives from Around the World (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management 
Agency), https://training.fema.gov/hiedu/comparative%20em%20book%20-
%20introduction%20chapter.doc  
40 Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2002 (2002) [New Zealand], 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2002/0033/latest/DLM149789.html?src=qs. 
41 Ibid.  
42 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The National Preparedness Goal; Federal Emergency 
Management Agency, The Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, version 2.0 (Washington, DC: Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, 2010).  
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(DRC)43 specifically outline measures for catastrophe response plans. The National Fire 
Prevention Association 1600, Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity 
Programs44 and the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) 
Standard45 are the primary documents of nonprofit organizations that have developed 
criteria for emergency planning and plans. In the academic realm, Dr. Enricho L. 
Quarantelli of the DRC has conducted extensive research on the criteria of good disaster 
planning and has concluded that there are 10 general principles of good disaster 
planning.46 
Government sources that provide planning guidance and have developed 
measures include DHS’s 2008 National Response Framework (NRF)47 and FEMA’s 
Comprehensive Planning Guide (CPG) 101 (version 2.0). The CPG is a derivative of the 
2008 NRF and is dedicated to catastrophe response and vertical intergovernmental 
planning. Both share some common criteria for evaluating response plans specific to 
large scale public planning.  
The literature for providing measures for evaluating emergency and catastrophe 
response plans is balanced as it is comes from a variety of disciplines, including 
academia, non-profit organizations, and the federal government. The criteria from each 
source can be analyzed against the others to find commonalities, correlations, and 
differences between them to develop a core set of measures to evaluate the case studies 
presented later in the thesis and response plans in general.  
                                                 
43 Enricho L. Quarantelli, Research Based Criteria for Evaluating Disaster Planning and Managing 
(Newark, DE: University of Delaware, 1997), http://www.nifv.nl/upload/179144_668_1168610952796-
quarantelli-1998.pdf.  
44 National Fire Protection Association, NFPA 1600, Standard on Disaster/emergency Management 
and Business Continuity Programs (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association, 2013).  
45 Emergency Management Accreditation Program [EMAP], The Emergency Management Standard 
(Lexington, KY: The Emergency Management Accreditation Program, 2013), http://www.emaponline.org/.  
46 Quarantelli, Research Based Criteria for Evaluating Disaster.  
47 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework (2008). 
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6. Case Studies 
There are also domestic case studies from the United States that detail well-
coordinated and synchronized catastrophe response plans between local, state, and federal 
agencies. These can serve as a good basis for other regional partnerships to emulate or to 
form a national standard. As previously stated, the literature shows that those regions that 
face the prospect of a naturally occurring catastrophic event as an eventuality, rather than 
a possibility, tend to have well established, detailed plans.  
The state of California is an excellent example of this because of the three 
earthquake prone zones within its borders. Of the plans for these three regions, the 
Southern California Catastrophic Earthquake Plan48 was selected for inclusion as a case 
study in the thesis. In addition to being a detailed collaborative plan, it was selected as a 
case study, because of the sizeable geographic area and population it covers. The plan’s 
data driven assumptions and operational models could be used to address any emergency 
incident or large scale disaster. Accordingly, it provides examples in both planning and 
coordination for other jurisdictions across the country to follow.  
The FEMA Region V office has developed a catastrophe response plan for the 
less geographically fixed, manmade threat of a detonation of an Improvised Nuclear 
Device (IND) in conjunction with the City of Chicago, Cook County, and the State of 
Illinois.49 This plan also included private sector entities and non-government 
organizations in the planning process and also incorporated them into the operational 
response portion of the plan. This plan has a detailed execution checklist as an appendix 
to the base plan. The execution checklist is an innovative matrix that chronologically lists 
essential tasks that must be completed over the first 72 hours after the detonation of an 
IND. While specific to Chicago, the plan itself can be adapted to an IND detonation in 
another metropolitan region or the methodology of the comprehensive checklist matrix 
can be customized to another hazard. 
                                                 
48 FEMA Region IX, and California Emergency Management Agency, Southern California 
Catastrophic Earthquake Response Plan.   
49 FEMA Region V, Integrated Improvised Nuclear Device Response Plan.  
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7. Executive Branch Documents 
The President of the United States has developed a national catastrophe 
preparedness strategy through the issuance of several executive orders and other 
documents issued through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The executive 
orders span several administrations beginning with President Franklin Roosevelt’s 
issuance of Executive Order 8757 establishing the Office of Emergency Management 
within the Office of the President in 1941.50 President Jimmy Carter established the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) combining disparate agencies from 
various federal departments through executive order. The Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) was similarly formed by President George W. Bush.  
After the unprecedented attacks of September 11, 2001, executive orders specific 
to homeland security were distinguished from other executive orders. Under the George 
W. Bush administration, these were issued as homeland security presidential directives 
(HSPDs), and under the Obama administration, these evolved into presidential policy 
directive’s (PPDs).51 Like the presidential orders or directives before them, the PPDs 
established executive branch offices and mandates that only have authority over federal 
agencies. State and local jurisdictions remain unaffected by presidential executive orders.  
8. Other Federal Government Publications 
The government produced literature on national catastrophe preparedness is not 
limited to the executive branch. A new set of documents related to homeland security 
encompassing catastrophe preparedness were developed as a result of the formation of 
the DHS. Collectively, they form the federal doctrine for national preparedness. Among 
these strategy documents are the National Preparedness Goal, the National Preparedness 
Report, the National Preparedness Plan, and the national preparedness frameworks. Yet, 
                                                 
50 John Woolley, and Gerhard Peters, “Franklin D. Roosevelt, XXXII President of the United States: 
1933–1945. 52—Executive Order 8757 Establishing the Office of Civilian Defense. May 20, 1941,” 
American Presidency Project, accessed May 17, 2014, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=16117. 
51 Jared T. Brown, Presidential Policy Directive 8 and the National Preparedness System: 
Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), 
http://fas.org/.sgp/crs/homesec/R42073.pdf, 9.  
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all of these volumes continue to state strategic goals but do little in terms of operational 
direction.  
Congress has also addressed this issue through hearings, investigative reports and 
legislation. Testimony reviewed from various House and Senate committees include 
topics such as Is DHS Effectively Implementing a Strategy to Counter Emerging 
Threats,52 How Prepared is the National Capital Region for the Next Disaster,53 A 
Failure of Initiative: The Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate 
the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina,54 and Senator Tom Coburns’ 
widely circulated report, Safety at Any Price: Assessing the Impact of Homeland Security 
Spending on U.S. Cities.55  
The GAO and the CRS each have produced numerous reports regarding the topic 
as well. Jared T. Brown an analyst in emergency management and homeland security 
policy for the CRS has produced numerous reports researching the impact and 
effectiveness of federal policies. An example is Presidential Policy Directive 8 and the 
National Preparedness System: Background and Issues for Congress.56 Dr. Sharon 
Caudle, who was formally with the GAO and is a past professor at the George 
Washington and Texas A&M Universities, has written extensively on the topic.57 Much 
of Dr. Caudle’s research and recommendations center around capabilities based planning, 
a concept originally developed by the Department of Defense (DOD) as the basis for its 
                                                 
52 Is DHS Effectively Implementing a Strategy to Counter Emerging Threats?  
53 How Prepared Is the National Capital Region for the Next Disaster? Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Emergency Management, Intergovernmental Relations, and the District of Columbia of 
the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United States Senate, 113th Cong. (2013), 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/emdc/hearings/how-prepared-is-the-national-capital-region-
for-the-next-disaster.  
54 Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 
A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for 
and Response to Hurricane Katrina (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006), 
http://katrina.house.gov/full_katrina_report.htm.  
55 Tom Coburn, Safety at Any Price: Assessing the Impact of Homeland Security Spending in U.S. 
Cities (Washington, DC: Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 2012), 
https://info.publicintelligence.net/SenatorCoburn-UASI.pdf.  
56 Brown, Presidential Policy Directive 8 and the National Preparedness System.   
57 “Senior Fellows/Sharon Caudle,” George Washington University.  
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strategy development. Dr. Caudle’s work also questions the effectiveness of national 
level exercises (NLE) run by DHS and of the concept of setting a standard criteria across 
the country based on a national scale worst case scenario as FEMA has recently adopted.  
9. Literature from Academic Sources and Public Policy Groups 
Literature from think tanks, such as the Council on Foreign Relations’ Emergency 
Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared,58 government reports 
and even legislation concentrate on the lack of synergy between the federal components 
of government. Some of the literature criticizes the nation’s level of preparedness while 
at the same time presenting potential solutions. The work of Christine E. Wormuth and 
Anne Witkowsky on behalf of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, entitled 
Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe: Ready (or Not)?,59 is an excellent resource 
that analyzes the root causes behind the gap in catastrophe preparedness while offering 
recommendations to improve readiness across the federal system.  
10. Assessment of the Literature 
The literature does agree on the need for greater collaboration both horizontally at 
the federal level and vertically across the federal, state, and local levels. Much of the 
literature points to a consensus that a national strategy or doctrine exists. However, the 
literature almost universally expresses a need to create a comprehensive approach 
towards building a national operational catastrophe response capacity. Very little 
literature deals directly with the relationship between the local and federal governments 
in specific terms on the subject of national catastrophe response planning. In his thesis, 
Ithier mentions the need for further research on the topic of integrating catastrophe 
response across the different levels of government.60 His focus on the barriers between 
federal interagency coordination and cooperation suggests that if there is not a unity of 
                                                 
58 Jamie Frederic Metzl, Warren B. Rudman, and Richard A. Clarke, Emergency Responders: 
Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared: Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by 
the Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003). 
59 Wormuth, and Witkowski, Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe. 
60 Ithier, “Synchronizing Federal Operational Planning for National Catastrophes,” 97. 
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effort at the federal level; then there should be even greater concern for interoperability 
between the other independent levels of government.  
The majority of the reform recommendations by Wormuth and Witkowsky are 
also targeted toward the federal agencies and some that will have an impact at the state 
and local level.61 The review conducted to date by this author has found Freed’s thesis to 
be the only source written from the state or local perspective on this issue.62 The void in 
the literature from this standpoint alone is further evidence that there is a significant 
problem in our national catastrophe response strategy that needs solutions to address it.  
National preparedness doctrine has constantly evolved to address the pressing 
threats facing the country. Although arguably centered on terrorism, the current status of 
national policies are attempting to have an all-hazards  focus. While the contemporary 
version provides all tiers of government more guidance and structure than ever before, it 
still remains largely disjointed and lacks an effective overall operational response 
framework. The literature identifies the various components for catastrophe response, 
including threat/hazard identification, interoperability models, and other broad, planning 
concepts. Absent from the literature are any sources that provide comprehensive direction 
for synchronization of vertical intergovernmental catastrophe response planning.  
Sources discuss the aftermath of and mitigation techniques for individual hazards 
or threats; however, there is not a holistic guide or complete single source for the 
synchronization of intergovernmental catastrophe planning and mitigation. Although 
there are a varied amount of potential catastrophes that face the nation, there is not a 
consensus on the approaches to planning. The literature does provide a number of 
methodologies, including hazard specific, worst case or meta-scenario, and capabilities 
based planning that create foundational bases in planning design. The cascading effects, 
infinite variables, magnitude, the geographic landscape, and demographics of a region all 
contribute to the complexity of any catastrophe. Therefore, each event has distinctive 
characteristics, and in general, the overwhelming scope of catastrophes make it difficult 
to move beyond foundational planning and into specifics.  
                                                 
61 Wormuth, and Witkowski, Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe, 83–85. 
62 Freed, “No Failure of Imagination.”  
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However, the literature does include established catastrophe response plans. The 
research has shown that these plans are definitive sources for examining synchronized 
intergovernmental catastrophe response plans. The best examples of well-organized 
catastrophe plans have been organically derived from communities that face inevitable 
rather than possible catastrophes. The thoroughness and functionality of these plans is 
predicated on the realization that they will actually be put into practice instead of merely 
drafted to justify more grant dollars or fulfill an administrative requirement. In order to 
reach this level of detail, the well-developed plans rely heavily on data and evidence 
based information in their planning. These relatively recent concepts are essential in the 
development of catastrophe response plans and are also subjects not found in the 
literature. 
Therefore, catastrophe response planning requires a process that incorporates all 
of the stakeholders and utilizes the principles, best practices, professional standards of the 
emergency management field, and case studies to develop a regional operational response 
plan. Rather than being limited by just one methodology, a blended approach of the 
different planning concepts can be combined to better suit the plan for a particular region 
and/or hazard. The comparative study that examines the New Zealand emergency 
management model, the response plans presented in the case studies,63 and similar 
existing plans offer the most comprehensive sources to research or model in the 
development of future response plans.64  
The next chapter provides an overview of the evolution of national catastrophe 
preparedness efforts. From their beginnings with a single office in the executive branch 
focused on wartime civil defense, to the development of the all-hazards, multi-agency, 
cabinet-level, Department of Homeland Security. However, the changes in policies and 
bureaucratic agencies have done little to address the gap between federal, state, and local 
                                                 
63 FEMA Region IX, and California Emergency Management Agency, Southern California 
Catastrophic Earthquake Response Plan; FEMA Region V, Integrated Improvised Nuclear Device 
Response Plan.  
64 However, researchers and emergency management planners should realize these are end products 
and that they provide limited insight as to how the collaborative efforts that developed these plans were 
created and sustained to successfully arrive at solid finished products. Thus, this may be a topic of future 
research. 
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coordination of catastrophe plans. Possible exceptions are the post-World War II, Office 
of Civil Defense programs, where fallout shelters where designated and stocked at the 
community level with supplies provided by the Department of Defense.  
With every new presidential administration come changes in agency restructuring 
and overall strategy. Collaboratively developed and well-coordinated operational 
response plans have been addressed in limited circumstances and only very recently. The 
case studies featuring good intergovernmental response plans will demonstrate where the 
evolution of catastrophe response planning needs to be and continue into the future. 
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III. EVALUATION OF NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS STRATEGY 
This chapter outlines the progression of American national level preparedness 
doctrine. The focus of many of the policies and establishment of most of the agencies 
charged with developing federal catastrophe response plans correlate with the nation’s 
anticipated or actual involvement in wars or other overseas conflicts. Although the 
federal government has more recently taken an all-hazards  approach in its planning, this 
overview with show that vertical intergovernmental synchronization to catastrophes has 
still not fully been addressed.  
A. ORIGINS OF NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS POLICY (WORLD WAR II–
COLD WAR) 
The course of U.S. national emergency preparedness policy has evolved from its 
origins in the civil defense movement of both world wars and later during the Cold War. 
Early homeland security preparedness programs included air raid drills, food rationing, 
and the designating of bomb or fall-out shelters.65 These were developed and run from 
organizations such as the Office of Emergency Planning and the Civil Defense Corps. 
While these early policies were strategically formed to enhance the nation’s resilience to 
the potential of conventional military aerial bombing and later a nuclear attack they had 
an operational component, in the form of designating shelters, storing rations, and 
designating neighborhood wardens thereby incorporated local stakeholders in the 
process.66 This provided strategic guidance, yet applied a local operational structure and 
resource allocations in direct support of operations down to the local neighborhood level. 
In a whole of government strategy, this is what is needed and what the present overall 
national doctrine is missing. 
                                                 
65 “Civil Defense Museum: Significant Events in United States Civil Defense History,” Civil Defense 
Museum, accessed May 20, 2014, www.civildefensemuseum.com/history.html.  
66 Ibid. 
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B. POST–COLD WAR (DISASTER RESPONSE ERA) 
As the civil defense responsibilities diminished with the end of the Cold War, the 
federal disaster response mission advanced. This was also initiated by several large scale 
incidents, including the Three Mile Island Disaster and Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew.67 
This evolved at the state level in an almost bureaucratic and ad hoc manner as each event 
needing federal resources required its own congressional resolution.68 Therefore, the 
federal government formally entered the emergency management field, which had 
previously been the exclusive domain of the states. As a result, national preparedness 
policy has undergone additional transformations since its origins in an attempt to make it 
more efficient.  
Several significant pieces of legislation and two notable government 
restructurings have occurred during which smaller programs and/or agencies were 
combined into larger entities. Ultimately, this has culminated in the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Furthermore, there have never been more 
legislation, plans, or policies than there currently are governing national preparedness. An 
overview of the progression of national preparedness policy shows there has been a 
greater emphasis for federal involvement and an increased focus on planning and 
responding to large scale, catastrophic events. However, more reliance on federal 
agencies has not always translated into a more efficient system and national scale 
planning has not always incorporated crucial first responders and the vital resources they 
bring to bear during a catastrophe.  
The first major policy to centralize national preparedness into a single agency was 
Executive Order 12148, Federal Emergency Management, which was enacted by 
President Jimmy Carter in 1979 to establish the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA). Similar to the creation of DHS in 2003, FEMA’s establishment led to the 
absorption of several smaller independent disaster response and recovery agencies such 
as the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) Federal Disaster 
                                                 
67 Ithier, “Synchronizing Federal Operational Planning for National Catastrophes,” v. 
68 Anna Marie Baca, “History of Disaster Legislation,” FEMA—On Call: Disaster Reserve Workforce 
News (September 2008): 1, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/dae/200809.pdf.  
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Assistance Administration and the General Services Administration’s (GSA) Office of 
Preparedness.69 The intent of the merger was largely designed to reduce the number of 
agencies the states had to engage during and after a crisis to obtain federal aid.  
In 1988, the Stafford Act amended the earlier Disaster Mitigation Act of 1974 in 
an attempt to streamline federal aid to the states in times of crisis by eliminating the need 
for a congressional resolution for each disaster and allowed the president to direct federal 
agencies, military units, and their assets to respond to incidents that are beyond the range 
and capabilities of state and local governments. The act also grants the president, and 
therefore the federal government, the authority to coordinate all disaster relief assistance, 
including federal, state, local, and even private and volunteer organizations.70 However, 
the term coordination is vague and does not have the same emphasis as the terms direct 
and control. This is because the federal government cannot exact its power over state, 
local, and private resources.  
In keeping with the constitutional legal concept of “states’ rights” ingrained in the 
10th Amendment, a state must first make a formal request for assistance to the president 
and then a presidential declaration of disaster or emergency must be issued in order to 
receive federal assistance.71 The affected or assisting states’ resources remain under the 
physical control of their personnel but they take direction from an appointed incident 
commander under the National Incident Management System.72 This framework 
balances the sometimes contentious relationship between the states and the federal 
governments. Additionally, it is another progression, although an imperfect one, toward a 
national preparedness system.  
As the Cold War diminished, federal catastrophic planning moved further away 
from civil defense policies and focused more on an all-hazards approach, emphasizing 
the response to major natural disasters. President Ronald Reagan issued Executive Order 
                                                 
69 Ibid., 3. 
70 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C., vol. 5121, Title 3, 
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71 Ibid., 5121, Title IV, §401. 
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12656 in 1988.73 This reasserted FEMA’s role as the primary federal agency assigned to 
lead “the implementation of national security emergency preparedness policy by 
coordinating with other Federal departments [and] agencies and with State and local 
governments.”74  
While this executive order presents advancement in national preparedness by 
designating a single agency as the “lead” federal coordinating agency, it still did not vest 
authority over state and local resources because of the constitutional boundaries that 
appropriately prevent this from occurring. Furthermore, it did little to extend FEMA’s 
authority over other federal agencies either. As Ithier has argued, even after the post 9/11 
era and the establishment of the DHS, there continue to be siloed efforts among federal 
agencies that have created redundancies in effort, resources and command structures.75  
C. POST 9/11 – ALL-HAZARDS APPROACH 
Up to this point, presidential executive orders were the primary instrument to 
address national preparedness responsibilities within the federal government. After 
September 11, 2001, executive orders regarding national preparedness transformed once 
again. Although they still addressed all-hazards, homeland security became the 
predominant focus. Executive orders addressing homeland security took on added 
significance and became distinguished from other executive orders.76 
Under the George W. Bush administration, these took the form of homeland 
security presidential directives. One of the main directives issued in December 2003 by 
President Bush was Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8: National 
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Preparedness.77 This established a strategic policy for preparedness for the entire 
country. The strategy emphasized four main areas  
1) prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks, 2) protect the American people, 
critical infrastructure, and key resources, 3) respond to and recover from 
incidents that do occur, and 4) continue to strengthen the management 
foundation of homeland security to ensure long-term success.78  
Like the civil defense efforts established during previous wartime footings, homeland 
preparedness policy again centered on external enemy threats.  
As the importance for homeland security and thus, national preparedness grew, so 
did the volume of policies. HSPD-8 established the foundation for the 15 national 
planning scenarios and five overarching mission areas.79 The mission areas were sub-
categorized into a 578 page Target Capabilities List encompassing hundreds of tasks for 
almost every conceivable hazard the nation faced.80 These formed the foundation of the 
national preparedness strategy during the onset of the global war on terrorism. However, 
the uncoordinated response to the resulting aftermath of Hurricane Katrina demonstrated 
that considerable gaps in synchronization between all levels of government during a 
catastrophic event persisted—despite the extensive revisions to national preparedness 
policy after 2001 and the establishment of the DHS. 
Congress then passed the Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act (PKEMRA) in 
2006,81 in an effort to close the significant gaps that were exposed. This legislation 
mandated the president establish a set of policies that addressed national preparedness 
beyond HSPD-8. The Obama administration incorporated many of the PKEMRA’s 
mandates in its versions of homeland security specific executive orders. In 2011, 
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Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness (PPD-8). Consequently, the Bush 
era order (HSPD-8) was rescinded and PPD-8 became the preeminent directive and 
guidance on national preparedness. Similar to previous policies the updated strategy 
“called for a national framework of collective efforts and shared responsibilities to build 
and sustain critical homeland security capabilities.”82  
However, PPD-8 not only fulfilled the legislative requirements of the PKEMRA, 
it transformed and expanded upon the foundations of HSPD-8 by moving from a multiple 
scenario based model and changed the mission areas. Furthermore, the mission areas 
were divided into separate publications entitled “Frameworks” for each of the following:  
prevention, protection, response, recovery, and, the newly added mission area, 
mitigation.83 This represented a change from a single, concentrated document as was the 
case in the preceding National Response Plan developed under the direction of HSPD-8.  
Furthermore, the strategy under PPD-8 “reaffirmed the ‘whole of government’ 
approach, which is the need for all levels of government, if not the whole country, to 
strengthen national preparedness.”84 The stated purpose of PPD-8 is to establish a 
“common intent and fostering of robust partnerships across all communities and levels of 
government; building the capacity of partners across jurisdictional boundaries; and 
encouraging coordination and cooperation.”85  
Both HSPD-8 and PPD-8 were similar in that both utilized the original 
Department of Defense concept of “capability-based planning” as their foundations.86 
The main elements of capability-based planning are: planning under uncertainty, for a 
wide range of current challenges, and while working within an economic framework.87 
Theoretically, by concentrating on the core capabilities needed to respond to all 
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catastrophic events, such as fatality management services or mass search and rescue, 
emergency responders can expand these foundational skills to meet the scale and scope of 
the incident. This does not translate so simply in terms of national catastrophe 
preparedness, as the extensive research by Dr. Enricho L. Quarantelli proves.88  
Also, unlike the disparate federal, state, and local emergency management and 
response entities, the military has a cohesive, integral structure where the most 
subordinate units understand their roles in conjunction with the overall mission of the 
upper levels of command. In general, each branch of service also maintains its own 
resources and controls its personnel. However, local responders do not always understand 
their roles and responsibilities in a federal framework when faced with or assisting with a 
catastrophe response, especially if responding to an out-of-state jurisdiction where 
protocols differ and the organizational structures may be unfamiliar. 
In order to better facilitate capabilities-based planning, PPD-8 amended the 
extensive Target Capabilities List into a concentrated sum of 31 “core capabilities” 
through the publication of the 2011 National Preparedness Goal.89 The goal made clear 
that the “core capabilities presented an evolution from the voluminous target capabilities 
list in response to HSPD-8.”90 Under FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate, the focus on 
the core capabilities has also led to the latest policy emphasis on maximum capacity for a 
major disaster or catastrophe.91 As a result, preparedness planning at the strategic level 
was now based on a “maximum of maximums” concentrated into a “meta-scenario.”92  
The meta-scenario is a generic hypothetical “no notice” incident that outlines a 
series of specific benchmarks in terms of mass casualties and affected geographic area 
with severely damaged infrastructure that hinders response efforts. The meta-scenario 
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was developed by FEMA and is permeating through many federal agencies.93 Its extreme 
scope is being utilized as the basis for federal preparedness planning, but it does not 
appear to have been widely disseminated at the local government level.  
This maximum of maximums approach is not without its detractors who argue 
that it is too broad and does not apply to large segments of the country where they neither 
are confronted with large scale natural disasters nor are assessed to be targeted for 
catastrophic terrorist attacks.94 However, the criteria set in the meta-scenario helps 
establish an understanding of the magnitude of the impact of a catastrophic event, which 
enhances planning, especially for state and local emergency management practitioners 
who are generally more locally and narrowly focused.  
D. SUMMARY 
The course of national catastrophe response planning has progressed over the last 
century from an emphasis on civil defense, to a doctrine centered primarily on terrorism, 
and then to “all-hazards” in the first years of this millennium. Wartime settings have 
influenced the basis for national domestic emergency management planning frameworks 
throughout their evolution. Increasingly, more involvement by the federal government 
has become evident—from its first venture into the emergency management realm with a 
small adjunct office in the executive branch to a cabinet-level department with well over 
200,000 employees. In that course of time, multiple transitions have occurred from 
wartime domestic preparedness, to providing federal financial aid to states affected by 
large scale disasters, to a capabilities-based, all-hazards approach, and the addition of the 
meta-scenario in planning considerations.  
Each of these transitions in the national doctrine has benefitted and added to the 
overall national preparedness; however, a coordinated planning and response effort 
across all levels of government has been lacking. The key element of a viable national 
operational framework must include local first responders’ technical experience and 
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input, along with the federal government’s broader understanding of the scale of 
catastrophes, and the necessary logistics and coordination apparatus needed to insure an 
effective response. It appears that FEMA is making progress toward putting the whole of 
government concept into practice in the planning stages. As the case studies will 
demonstrate, detailed, coordinated catastrophe contingency plans have been developed 
among the various levels of government and represent a positive development in 
implementing meaningful, synchronized operational policy. 
The latest evolution in national catastrophe planning, based in part on the meta-
scenario, shows promise because it provides a tangible, data-based set of criteria for 
federal emergency managers and local first responders to conceptualize and base their 
planning for natural and man-made catastrophic events. FEMA is also placing the 
responsibility of coordinating plan development with the state and local agencies and the 
FEMA regional offices. This too is a positive development that bridges a regional 
understanding with strategies made in Washington, DC. The latest plans to be created 
under this model assign responsibilities and take into consideration the strengths and 
limitations of the participating agencies capabilities and capacities. Overall gaps in these 
areas can then be identified and mitigated before a catastrophe occurs.  
However, as this overview of national catastrophe preparedness has shown, there 
has been a long history of federally-centric strategies that have not been inclusive of the 
states or local emergency responders. Before positive examples of good, cross-tiered 
government catastrophe response plans can be presented, evidence of the continuing gap 
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IV. EVIDENCE OF A GAP 
Fractious and disparate planning always leads to fractious and disparate 
response.95  
 
A. CATASTROPHES—A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING 
Despite the numerous changes and additions in legislation and the creation and 
merger of agencies to address the evolving demands of the national preparedness 
doctrine, there is still a gap in the synchronization of local, state, and federal catastrophe 
operations. The magnitude of catastrophes and scope of planning needed to begin to 
mitigate them is often underestimated, even by experienced practitioners, as the examples 
below demonstrate. The following chapter confirms that there is still a gap, 
notwithstanding the progress that has been made and concludes with some of the 
underlying reasons why the gap remains.  
In November 2010, the Consortium for Homeland Defense and Security in 
America—a conglomeration of the United States Army War College’s Center for 
Strategic Leadership, George Washington University’s Homeland Security Institute, the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Heritage Foundation, held a 
symposium concentrating on developing a “unity of effort” in preparing for and 
responding to catastrophic events. During the two-day forum, several panel discussions 
occurred. Themes presented emphasized planning include: coordination between active 
duty military and National Guard components; command and control; and the 
incorporation of the concept of the “whole of community,” including private and non-
government organization based partnerships during catastrophic incidents.96  
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Dr. Christopher Bellavita, of the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for 
Homeland Defense and Security, also spoke at the conference. In his comments, Dr. 
Bellavita suggested that several of the other panelists were building on a flawed 
paradigm. He explained that many of the previous solutions offered worked under the 
supposition that the structures and processes needed to implement them would still be 
intact. Dr. Bellavita continued stating, “If the structures and processes of Unity of Effort 
are still present…maybe you’re not really talking about a catastrophe.”97  
Dr. Bellavita’s questioning the assumptions of senior homeland security 
policymakers and practitioners is very telling of our overall national preparedness efforts. 
If there is this level of disagreement concerning the magnitude of destruction and 
degradation of resources and infrastructure associated with operating in a catastrophic 
environment among this type of assemblage, then clearly an even greater misperception 
exists among first responders.  
A significant portion of local emergency response workers’ level of preparedness 
correlates to Dr. Bellavita’s remarks.98 An examination of a sample of state, regional, and 
local multiyear training and plans (MYTEP) demonstrates that trainings and drills 
conducted at the state and local level do not always integrate the conditions inherent to 
catastrophes in their mock scenarios. These should include criteria such as the complete 
loss of or significant degradation of their workforces, functioning communications and 
data services, existing hospitals, and other healthcare facilities. These lessons learned 
from disasters and catastrophes from all over the globe are already accounted for as part 
of the case studies that are presented in later chapters. This reveals why federal officials 
and state and local authorities need to share their collective experiences to draft 
catastrophe response plans. Furthermore, exercises generally only test within or slightly 
above organizations’ current capabilities and capacities. As Dr. Bellavita counseled, by 
definition, a catastrophe will immediately overwhelm any organization far beyond its 
standard abilities.99 As a result, the prioritization of “incidents within the incident” and 
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the limited resources available to mitigate them inherent in proactive planning will 
become a key component to any response to an event of this scale.  
Current FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate, who previously served as the 
Director of the Florida Division of Emergency Management, has also expressed these 
concerns. In his June 16, 2011 testimony, he stated, “emergency management historically 
planned for scenarios to which government could respond and recover from.”100 Instead, 
he emphasized, “modern disaster planning should be for a “meta-scenario” (or 
“maximum of maximums” event) destined to overwhelm all levels of government.101 
Dr. Caudle states, “Such worst-case planning would require the efforts of a 
‘whole community’ approach intended to leverage the expertise and resources of 
governmental and non-governmental stakeholders—the entire emergency management 
community from the federal government to individuals, families, and communities.”102 
Administrator Fugate’s recognition of a whole of community approach constitutes a 
needed shift in strategy on the part of the federal government. While this buzz phrase 
summarizes exactly what is called for during a catastrophe, it does not, in and of itself, 
translate into a blueprint for operational implementation across all segments of American 
society.  
While there is an emphasis on “target capabilities lists” or the more recent “core 
capabilities” in the national preparedness doctrine, there is not a distinction or enough 
attention on response capacity or where it will be drawn from during a catastrophe.103 In 
December 2013, Dr. Alexander Isakov, the Executive Director of Emory University’s 
Office of Critical Event Preparedness and Response, presented a case study that 
illustrated this point at the Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Workshop. Dr. Isakov 
explained to the audience of homeland security professionals that the 2004 Madrid 
terrorist bombings of commuter trains resulted in nearly 2000 casualties that were 
transported primarily to just two hospitals. This resulted in a patient surge at each of the 
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two hospitals of approximately 272 patients that had injuries that required admission in 
the time span of just two and a half hours.104  
Dr. Isakov challenged the attendees by asking, “Can your hospital do this?”105 
The rhetorical nature of his question implies that not many, if any, hospitals have this 
capacity. His presentation demonstrated that it does not take a catastrophe to quickly 
overwhelm standard emergency response plans. If there is a question as to whether most 
hospital systems are prepared to handle an incident like the one that occurred in Madrid, 
where terrorists used conventional, improvised weapons, how prepared are they for a true 
catastrophe or “meta-scenario” that FEMA estimates could have more than 200 times as 
many casualties?106 
Jared Brown, an analyst specializing in emergency management and homeland 
security policy for the Congressional Research Service, produced a research report, 
Presidential Policy Directive 8 and the National Preparedness System: Background and 
Issues for Congress. In the report, Brown recognizes that the meta-scenario created by 
FEMA was most likely used to drive the development of the listed response and recovery 
capabilities in the new executive order. In view of that, he stated, “The extreme nature of 
the meta-scenario may necessitate revision of the National Response Framework (NRF) 
simply because the event demands the nation to achieve higher standards of response 
capabilities.”107 He concluded by noting:  
If holistically, the standard for preparedness is based in part on the meta-
scenario described in the National Preparedness Goal, Congress may wish 
to evaluate whether existing appropriated resources are sufficient to meet 
the challenge of the consequences described in the catastrophic 
scenario.108 
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Dr. Sharon Caudle also brings attention to the federal government’s inability to 
accurately assess the catastrophe response capabilities at all levels of government. 
Testifying before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on 
Oversight, Investigations, and Management, she reported:  
Assessing preparedness based on national preparedness capabilities 
remains very elusive. Summarizing the difficulties, the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) found that evaluation efforts that collected 
data on national preparedness capabilities faced limitations such as data 
reliability and the lack of standardized data collection. According to GAO, 
FEMA had problems in completing a comprehensive assessment system 
and developing national preparedness capability requirements based on 
established metrics.109 
B. GAPS BETWEEN FEDERAL DOCTRINE AND STATE/LOCAL 
OPERATIONAL RESPONSE PERSIST 
During another hearing of the House Subcommittee on Management, Oversight 
and Investigations, the Chairman, Congressman Christopher Carney ridiculed the 
inaugural Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, stating that “there was no discussion 
of the status of cooperation between the Federal Government and State, local, and Tribal 
governments in preventing terrorist attacks and preparing for emergency response to 
threats to National homeland security.”110  
In his thesis entitled “Examining Flaws in America’s Homeland Security 
Enterprise,” Judson M. Freed the Director of the Ramsey County (MN) Emergency 
Management and Homeland Security provides a view from the local practitioner’s 
perspective when he explains:  
Current United States policy vis-à-vis the nation’s homeland security 
enterprise is built on a fatally flawed foundation. It is a top-down, federal-
centric model rather than on a constitutional model that develops 
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capability for resilience, response, protection and preparedness for 
crises111  
The top-down model that Freed negatively critiques is the opposite approach that is taken 
in the New Zealand “bottom up” CDEM Group model and in the two domestic case 
studies that are presented as examples of smart practices in later chapters.  
An emergency management professional with over 25 years of experience, Freed 
further asserts:  
that the unprecedented federal oversight and multitudes of federal laws, 
hearings, and investigations that have resulted in massive interference by 
the federal government in the operation of local and state agencies, has not 
facilitated the achievement of the goals of these various oversight bodies. 
The top-down, one-size-fits-all federal mandate method has resulted in a 
system of systems that duplicates effort of various jurisdictions competing 
for grants.112  
He suggests that nationally scoped, coordinated programs that increase the resiliency of 
state and local first responders will help mitigate catastrophic events.  
The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism 
Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, better known as the Gilmore Commission, was 
assembled in response to the domestic terrorist bombing of the 1995 Alfred P. Murrah 
Federal Building. The members of the commission represent a broad spectrum of 
government, non-government organizations, private sector, and senior emergency 
response professionals from across local, state, and federal enterprise. The collective 
group of subject matter experts produced updated reports every year over a five year 
period (1999–2003) on the status of the United States’ preparedness level for a terrorist 
initiated or other catastrophe. 
In its fifth report, the commission recommended a comprehensive national 
strategy “that is not simply a Federal strategy but rather one that integrates and 
synchronizes local, State, and Federal government and private sector efforts in a true 
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nationwide effort.”113 However, the last report still called for “general strategies to be 
turned into specific roadmaps to direct, local, State, Federal and private sector 
actions.”114 In what the commission phrased a “New Normalcy for 2009,” it 
recommended “strong preparedness and readiness across State and local government and 
the private sector with corresponding processes that present an enterprise-wide national 
capacity to plan, equip, train, and exercise against measurable standards.”115 The 
commission’s report also recognized that the proper mechanisms include an extensive 
analysis of gaps in national capability and capacity, proper processes, and equipment 
needs to be developed in order to build a successful national planning and response 
structure. 
Moreover, the commission recognized that the current national preparedness 
framework is federally-centric resulting in a focus that is too narrow. In the 2003 report’s 
“Enterprise Architecture for the Future” section, the commissioners recommend greater 
participation by the states and local governments and for a comprehensive national risk 
assessment to be conducted. The authors bluntly state, “Such a process does not exist.”116 
The building of national capabilities and capacities for catastrophe response cannot be 
accomplished without first establishing a baseline understanding of the impact of the 
threats and hazards the country faces. In order to institute this, states and local emergency 
preparedness partners need to have a conduit to work with the federal government to 
form a complete picture of the nation’s current status and requirements needed for an 
effective response to a catastrophe.  
The thesis, “Synchronizing Federal Operational Planning for National 
Catastrophes,” written by Jan P. Ithier, the Deputy Director of North American 
Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command 
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(USNORTHCOM) at the Pentagon, reveals that since the Three Mile Island disaster, the 
federal catastrophic response framework has been reconfigured to address problems with 
operational issues following each subsequent major disaster. He has concluded, “The 
federal government is in dire need of reform in respect to national and homeland 
security.”117 More specifically, his research shows:  
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has no means to identify 
available capabilities and the potential gaps, overlaps and duplication of 
these capabilities until an incident happens. In this void, DHS has the 
daunting task of coordinating federal preparedness and response efforts 
without the knowledge of other federal agencies’ plans capabilities and 
milestones.118  
As stated earlier, if the federal government cannot collectively accomplish this 
among its own various agencies, how can it account for the resources maintained at the 
state and local levels? In reality, this problem is only exacerbated on the state and local 
side because of the relative independence of each of the states and localities. 
Additionally, there are no legislative or other official mandates that obligate a state or 
local jurisdictions to report the availability of their resources or contribute them to any 
other jurisdiction other than voluntary memorandums of agreement and the Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).119 Furthermore, EMAC simply facilitates 
the requests by states for critical resources during disasters and fills them by those 
agencies willing to do so with the understanding that the assisting organization will be 
reimbursed for their costs at a later time.  
The executive summary of the study, Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe: 
Ready (or not)?, authors Christine E. Wormuth and Anne Witkowsky lead off by bluntly 
stating, “America is not ready for the next catastrophe.”120 Many of their conclusions 
concur with those already cited in this chapter. However, this authoritative study that 
took over a year to research, organized a working group of officials from the multiple 
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levels of government, academia, public policy organizations, and homeland security 
experts to assist in developing their recommendations. The authors of this study 
understood the importance of the states and local governments in the homeland security 
enterprise. Therefore, the research team took considerable time to interview current and 
former officials at this level “seeking to help bridge what at times appears to be a 
substantial divide between them and federal personnel.”121  
The study by Wormuth and Witkowsky details the gap in emergency 
preparedness efforts between the state and local governments and the federal government 
and many of the causes for this divide. Among the examples cited are the lack of detailed 
government-wide plans to respond to a catastrophe, confusion over who is the lead in a 
disaster, and a lack of guidelines to assess the capabilities or determine the capacity of 
emergency response resources at the state and local levels.122 The authors also cite the 
inconsistencies in the numerous federal documents that create confusion about the roles 
and responsibilities between the federal government and state and local governments.123  
Additionally, study maintains that many of the components needed to successfully 
manage a catastrophe exist, but the lack of coordination and need to assess and mitigate 
gaps in capabilities and capacities hampers the ability to effectively respond in a whole of 
nation approach. Just as the Gilmore Commission affirmed, this study’s findings also 
conclude that the “country is still not ready for a domestic catastrophe because the major 
relationships and processes needed to coordinate a response to a catastrophic event are 
not yet clear or mature and because attempts to date to implement a homeland security 
system that will organize these relationships and processes have struggled mightily.”124  
Furthermore, Wormuth and Witkowsky go on to state, “the only way to 
orchestrate the complex assembly and deployment of capabilities across the various 
levels of government and other stakeholders in a response to a catastrophe is to build 
relationships and the framework that defines the governance and interaction between 
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them.”125 In addition, they warn, “these relationships do not exist today.”126 Wormuth 
and Witkowsky even more strongly argue, “added to the continuing ambiguity about 
inter-government roles and responsibilities is a critical weakness in structure: the process 
necessary to prepare the nation at all levels to respond effectively to a catastrophe are 
nascent at best and in some areas simply do not exist.”127 
In the guide Managing Chaos: The Disaster Manager’s Handbook, Mitch 
Stripling of the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene emphasizes 
the need for plans to be operational. He writes, “The best plan only really exists in the 
minds of those who will run the response.”128 In addition, he emphasizes the need for 
senior leaders and outside stakeholders to be part of disaster response planning process 
and that plans written by a single person or organization will most likely will sit of shelf 
and not be useful during an actual crisis. He believes one of the reasons for this is that 
“organizations are rarely comfortable with productive jurisdictional planning because it 
sits outside their comfort zone.129 Furthermore, Stripling encourages moving beyond 
“response networks” and instead mapping out a “network of means.”130 Once the 
resources are identified that contribute to the end solution of a scenario, he then 
recommends completing a framework of any organization that can contribute to fill the 
means that were developed into the plan. This will help identify non-traditional partners 
who can bring solutions to parts of the greater number of interconnected challenges.   
C. CONCLUSION 
The assessments of these research papers, study conclusions, and commission 
findings all conclude that despite numerous federal legislative and policy reforms that 
gaps still exist in national catastrophe preparedness between the local, state, and federal 
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governments. The limited authority of the federal government over state and local 
governments is a contributing factor in the failure to build inter-government planning 
teams. National doctrine that concentrates on strategic concepts without providing much 
in the way of operational response guidance is another challenge to successful national 
catastrophe preparedness. The top-down approach for developing strategy that the federal 
government has taken until recently further inhibits the participation of state and local 
emergency responders to participate in a collaborative effort with the DHS.  
The multiple changes in federal-centric national doctrine have led to ever shifting 
standards, guidelines, and priorities. The lack of consistency reduces the credibility of 
national preparedness doctrine as doctrine has changed with almost every new 
administration. The comparative model and case studies presented in the next chapters 
provide excellent exemplars of collaborative, multilateral response plans based on 
multilateral planning processes. They take into consideration the different regional 
threats, infrastructure and assemblage of resources; however, they still integrate the 
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V. COMPARISON MODEL FOR CATASTROPHE 
PREPAREDNESS—THE NEW ZEALAND MODEL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This section presents a comparative model of the structure and process of New 
Zealand’s Ministry of Civil Defense and Emergency Management (MCDEM) has 
established for its catastrophe response planning. This model is centered on CDEM 
groups that are composed of stakeholders from the emergency services and national, 
regional, and local governments. Although the participants are legislatively required to be 
members of these groups, the plans they produce are representative of all parties’ 
perspectives. Once completed, the regional plans are forwarded to the MCDEM for 
inclusion into the national CDEM plan. New Zealand tested this model during the 2011, 
magnitude 6.3, Christchurch earthquake. Evaluations of the plan’s effectiveness were 
overall very positive. This comparative model presents an international viewpoint and an 
example that can be adapted to meet the legislative and procedural requirements of the 
U.S. national catastrophe framework. 
Sir Geoffrey Palmer, the Former Prime Minister of New Zealand, once put the 
threats to his nation and the need for preparedness quite succinctly: 
Sometimes it does us a power of good to remind ourselves that we live on 
two volcanic rocks where two tectonic plates meet, in a somewhat lonely 
stretch of windswept ocean just above the Roaring Forties. If you want 
drama—you’ve come to the right place.131 
This has led New Zealand to design and implement a national strategy that 
incorporates local stakeholders on the front end of the planning process as well as 
incorporates them in the operational response mission in the event of a significant 
emergency event. Although New Zealand is much smaller country than the United States 
and has a centrist form of government, the New Zealand CDEM model provides a case 
                                                 
131 David A. McEntire, and Chris Webb, Emergency Management in New Zealand: Potential 
Disasters and Opportunities for Resilience (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
2008), https://training.fema.gov/hiedu/downloads/compemmgmtbookproject/comparative%20 
em%20book%20-%20chapter%20-%20em%20in%20new%20zealand.doc, 1.  
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study with a global perspective that offers aspects that can be adapted to meet the legal 
and structural parameters of the United States’ system.  
The U.S. can learn from the New Zealand Ministry of Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management, which “provides a model for others wishing to reduce the risks 
from hazards and respond more effectively to disasters due to its progressive approaches 
to emergency management.”132 Through its Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
Act of 2002, New Zealand has strengthened the emergency management structure by 
defining “roles and responsibilities across local communities, local authorities, central 
government, emergency services and lifeline utility operators.”133  
The key difference from the U.S. system is that the local or regional governments 
in New Zealand are incorporated into the planning and structuring of the national 
emergency management process. Central to this model is the establishment of CDEM 
groups. These legislatively delineated groups develop plans at the local level to address 
the hazards and identify the emergency response resources germane to their regions that 
are then incorporated into New Zealand’s National CDEM Strategy.134  
This “bottom-up” approach is more effective because it incorporates the local 
understanding of the regional hazards and, more importantly, the shortcomings in the first 
responders’ capabilities and capacities. This allows for the central government at the 
strategic level to either build capabilities where none exists or coordinate across regional 
and national levels of government to provide the capacity needed to mitigate the 
identified risks. The regional CDEM group may also be tasked to fill the gap on its own 
by obtaining the necessary capability or building the needed capacity. 
                                                 
132 Ibid.  
133 Ibid., 10.  
134 New Zealand Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management [MCDEM], National Civil 
Defence Emergency Management Strategy (Wellington, New Zealand: New Zealand Department of 
Internal Affairs, 2008), http://civildefence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/publications/national-CDEM-strategy-
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B. NEW ZEALAND CIVIL DEFENSE AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
STRUCTURE 
New Zealand is a nation with a strong central government where even police and 
fire services are operated at the national level; therefore; it seems almost counterintuitive 
that emergency preparedness and management are organized at the local level. 
Theoretically then, the New Zealand CDEM group based model should work well with a 
decentralized federalist system of government such as that of the United States.  
During the end of the last century, New Zealand dramatically reorganized the way 
it responded to disasters. As a result, this led to significant legislative and policy 
changes.135 The definitive piece of legislation that was drafted was the Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Act 2002. The CDEM Act emphasizes “the importance of 
hazard management in local authority plans; the strengthening of emergency management 
arrangements; and clearer roles and responsibilities across local communities, local 
authorities, central government, emergency services and life line utilities (critical 
infrastructure) operators.”136  
The New Zealand Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
(MCDEM) summarized the act’s primary objectives as: 
• Promotes sustainable management of hazards 
• Encourages and enables communities to achieve acceptable levels of risk 
• Provides for planning and preparation for emergencies, and for response 
and recovery 
• Requires local authorities to coordinate planning and activities 
• Provides a basis for integration of national and local civil defence [sic] 
emergency management 
• Encourages coordination across a wide range of agencies, recognizing that 
emergencies are multi-agency events.137 
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The important distinction in the CDEM Act, which U.S. strategic policy does not 
account for, is its overarching emphasis on the responsibilities and compulsory 
requirements of local authorities to plan for and respond to catastrophic events. It also 
“provides a basis for the integration of national and local civil defence [sic] emergency 
management planning and activity through the alignment of local planning with a 
national strategy and national plan.”138  
As a result, the MCDEM has a doctrine created with input from local first 
responders, who are the “boots on the ground” who understand the terrain, communities, 
hazards, challenges, and resources in the region. In turn, the central government provides 
a comprehensive national scope picture concentrating on large scale disasters. The 
incorporation of the local authorities through the regional and national planning process 
ensures that both strategic and operational needs are taken into consideration.  
Although, the CDEM Act has given the director of the MCDEM substantial 
power, especially during a state of national emergency to manage catastrophic events, the 
cornerstone of New Zealand’s national preparedness framework is the Act’s requirement 
for the formation of regional CDEM groups which are given the responsibilities of 
identifying hazards and insuring there is both the capability and ample capacity to 
respond to them. The CDEM groups consist of: 
• The chief executive of each regional council (similar to a governor in the 
U.S.) 
• The chairperson or other delegated elected official from each of the local 
authorities within the region. 
• An executive officer from the New Zealand Police assigned to the region 
• An executive officer from the national fire service assigned to the region 
• Members of the rural fire service, if applicable, within a region 
• Members of the hospital and health services139  
                                                 
138 Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, New Zealand Ministry of Civil Defence 
Emergency Management, Wellington, New Zealand, reprinted January 1, 2014, 
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The CDEM group members have planning, preparedness, and operational 
responsibilities. They are tasked with: identifying and preemptively mitigating hazards 
within their respective regions, defining and attaining the resources needed to insure there 
are both the necessary capabilities and capacities to respond to the potential hazards, and 
executing emergency response and recovery.  
The CDEM Act requires each group to compile and publish a regional CDEM 
group plan that outlines the above listed responsibilities. In addition, public consultation 
is also required throughout the development of the groups’ plans to gain constituents’ 
input and ensure hazards and risks are dealt with to a level the community accepts.140 
Obtaining the community’s “grass roots” perspective further enhances the breadth of 
knowledge and experience in comprehending not only the hazards to the region but the 
resources needed to mitigate and respond to them.  
The act also specifies that the community helps determine the level of risk it is 
willing to accept. This becomes vital for the CDEM groups in their calculation as far as 
budgeting and resource management. For example, if the feedback from a region’s 
residents is that they are willing to live with the risks of seasonal flooding, then the 
CDEM group may not budget for levee’s to mitigate flood waters or invest extensively in 
response equipment, such as swift water rescue assets. Conversely, if they were 
concerned about the effects of earthquakes the CDEM group may provide funding to 
retrofit older constructed buildings as a mitigation measure and invest in urban search 
and rescue (USAR) equipment and training to better the region’s preparedness for 
earthquakes. This is essential in setting the communities expectations and understanding 
as to the limits and priorities of funding for preventative efforts and of first responders’ 
operational tasks particularly during catastrophes.  
The CDEM Act states that each CDEM group must also establish a coordinating 
executive group (CEG). Legislatively mandated members of the CEG are the chief 
executive of each region’s council and representatives of the emergency services. The 
purpose of the CEG is to advise and provide subject matter expertise to the CDEM group, 
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execute CDEM group decisions, oversee the development and implementation of the 
CDEM groups’ plans.141  
The development of a regional CDEM plan is another way local elected officials 
and first responders contribute to and are integrated into the broader National Civil 
Defence Emergency Management Plan. The CDEM Act dictates that the CDEM groups’ 
plans “must not be inconsistent with the national civil defence [sic] emergency 
management strategy and must take account of the Director’s guidelines, codes, or 
technical standards.”142 This keeps the process between the various levels of government 
consistent administratively and procedurally allowing for mutual assistance among the 
regions or from the central government when needed. 
Among the National CDEM Plan’s declared purposes “is to state the hazards and 
risks to be outlined at the national level; and provide for the civil defense emergency 
management arrangements to meet those hazards and risks.”143 It sets as its first 
objective: “to provide for effective management of states of national emergency or civil 
defence [sic] emergencies of national significance through a planned and co-ordinated 
[sic] whole-of-government response.”144 Other objectives listed in the plan include the 
effective recovery from national level events and effective management of national 
support in states of local emergency.  
In keeping with the principle of the community’s determination of risk tolerance, 
the plan acknowledges that at the national level “New Zealand has finite capacity and 
capability” in terms of responding to national scale disasters.145 However, the plan makes 
the MCDEM:   
1. Responsible for assessing resource requirements needed to manage civil 
defence [sic] emergencies at the national level;   
                                                 
141 Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, 22–23.  
142 Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002, Part 3, §53.   
143 The National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2005, §8, subsection (5), 
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2. Will monitor the capacity and capability of CDEM groups; and  
3. Alert CDEM groups, agencies and the government to any significant 
shortcomings in national civil defence [sic] emergency management 
capacity and capability.146 
This is an essential segment of the legislation. Implicit in the above three tasks assigned 
to the MCDEM, is that there is a distinction between capability and capacity. Also, it 
essentially demonstrates that there are mechanisms in place to determine any gaps and 
instructs the MCDEM notify the regional CDEM group or the appropriate central 
government ministry in order to take corrective action.  
By design, New Zealand has built its catastrophe preparedness strategy from the 
local level up. This commonsense approach goes beyond recognition that there needs to 
be better coordination at the operational and strategic levels of emergency management. 
It integrates local first responders as vital partners in shaping national catastrophe 
response policy, and they are a fundamental element. While there are other aspects of the 
New Zealand approach, the ones captured here are those that show promise for adaption 
to improve the U.S. system of emergency preparedness across all levels of government. 
Ithier’s assessment of the New Zealand approach is that it “not only optimizes 
emergency planning but it also makes better use of existing capabilities by placing 
responsibilities on the appropriate level for development of plans and the conduct of 
response operations.”147 Furthermore, Ithier also recognizes that the New Zealand model 
incorporates both operational and planning elements. Just as importantly, by stating it 
places responsibilities at the appropriate level, he acknowledges that local first responders 
are crucial in the planning process. However, New Zealand’s model would face the 
ultimate measure of its effectiveness during an actual catastrophe.  
C. FRAMEWORK ASSESSMENT 
On February 22, 2011, New Zealand (NZ) suffered a magnitude 6.3 earthquake 
that struck the South Island, severely damaging the central business district of the 
                                                 
146 The National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2005, §8, subsection (5), 
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147 Ithier, “Synchronizing Federal Operational Planning for National Catastrophes.”   
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country’s second most populous city, Christchurch. Ultimately, the earthquake resulted in 
185 deaths and an estimated NZ $40 million in damage. The earthquake resulted in a 
declaration of a national state of emergency that remained in effect until April 2011. 
Unfortunately, this disaster provided the MCDEM the opportunity to test the National 
CDEM Plan and its overall catastrophic response strategy.  
The independent commissioned after action report, entitled Review of the Civil 
Defense Emergency Management Response to the 22 February Christchurch Earthquake, 
states, “Overall the response to this extremely challenging situation can justifiably be 
regarded as having been well managed and effective.”148 This is markedly different then 
the almost universal criticism FEMA received in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and the 
muted critiques after Super Storm Sandy. In terms of the CDEM Plan, the review also 
states that in general terms the current legislation and subsidiary documents provide an 
adequate basis for emergency management and that changes would be limited based on 
its findings.149 
Additionally, the review mentions several positive aspects of the response. One 
constructive finding was that agency command was well established across emergency 
services.150 The British USAR team leader who flew in to assist in the response stated, 
“The organisation [sic] has been outstanding, the best-organised [sic] emergency I’ve 
been to.”151 This is quite an endorsement from an experienced team that has deployed to 
other disasters. The review’s overall critique of the response effort can be summarized in 
the following statement and should serve as major lesson for U.S. catastrophe planning: 
In examining the Response one feature was strikingly apparent: 
organisations [sic] that were well prepared in advance responded much 
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better than those who were not. This was seen both at the highest level and 
with almost all supporting and peripheral agencies. It is a natural human 
reaction to any emergency to use those contacts and communication 
channels that apply in normal life. It was strikingly obvious that those 
organisations [sic] that responded most effectively had emergency 
responses that closely mirrored normal operations where possible and in 
which emergency responses had been predetermined and embedded in 
normal operations.152 
The New Zealand model for national catastrophic planning offers several lessons 
for the United States. Most importantly is New Zealand’s bottom-up approach that 
incorporates the local communities’ knowledge of their area’s hazards, resources, 
expertise, and risk tolerance. This helps in setting expectations and accounting for asset 
and personnel shortcomings needed to respond to the specific challenges of that region. 
The conduit through which to do this is through the regional CDEM groups.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The New Zealand model has clearly bridged the gap between local responders and 
national policy planners. The CDEM groups’ utilization of an extensive, collaborative, 
intergovernmental planning process is a proven method to form fully synchronized 
catastrophe response plans. The CDEM groups provide an excellent example for the U.S. 
to adapt and establish a similar framework to create a more efficient and coordinated 
national strategy that incorporates local operational response requirements. Examples of 
this kind of integrated government collaboration can already be found in the United 
States. The case studies presented in later chapters are exemplars of excellent coordinated 
catastrophe response plans that conform to the standards and criteria of government, non-
profit, and academic emergency management measures. These standards and criteria and 
the source documents that established them are presented and analyzed in the next 
chapter. 
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VI. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS 
OF CATASTROPHE RESPONSE PLANS  
Preventing, protecting against, preparing for, and responding to 
catastrophes inside the United States requires a national approach based 
fundamentally on coordination and cooperation horizontally between 
different types of organizations such as governments, the private sector, 
nonprofit organizations, and individuals and vertically between the 
federal, state, and local levels of government (6).153 
 
A. OVERVIEW 
One of the most significant aspects to successful catastrophe preparedness is the 
development of a strong, jointly-developed, intergovernmental plan. The elements that 
make up quality catastrophe response plans can provide insight into what aspects will 
assist in merging federal strategic concepts and local operational requirements. The case 
studies in the upcoming chapters can then be evaluated by the criteria developed as an 
outcome of analysis of the various standards presented in this chapter. Although equally 
important, the creation of a collaborative process in order to develop a plan is not the 
focus of this thesis. This chapter will concentrate on the standards for inclusion and the 
criteria by which to judge a catastrophe response plan.  
Standards from non-government associations include: the National Fire 
Protection Association (NFPA) 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and 
Business Continuity and the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) 
Emergency Management Standard. The NFPA 1600 is a publication widely used in 
industrial and corporate sectors.154 The EMAP Standard is the primary accreditation 
manual used by emergency management agencies throughout the United States.155 The 
federal government has also developed and revised its evaluation criteria for emergency 
response plans.  
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The Department of Homeland Security’s 2008 National Response Framework156 
(NRF) and FEMA’s Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans: 
Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 (CPG 101)157 establish criteria to measure key 
aspects of response planning. Both share five criteria, while the earlier published NRP 
has an additional two listed. Academic researchers have even examined the development 
process and evaluative criteria for catastrophe response plans. 
A scholarly work, Researched Based Criteria for Evaluating Disaster Planning 
and Managing, includes “10 general principles” to evaluate disaster planning.158 This 
analysis was conducted by Dr. Enrico L. Quarantelli, a research professor and founding 
director of the Disaster Research Center (DRC) at the University of Delaware. This 
builds upon his earlier research on this topic and is also included in this thesis for analysis 
and comparison.  
The analysis of these sources has found commonalities among each of the various 
measures and any criteria that are universal to all of the source publications. The 
evaluation also identified differences among the various standards, criteria, and research. 
An analysis of the evaluated measures established criteria for those characteristics and 
metrics to evaluate catastrophe response plans. The five primary sources are discussed in 
greater depth in the following sections. 
B. NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK AND COMPREHENSIVE 
PREPAREDNESS GUIDE 101 
The 2008 and 2013 versions of DHS’s National Response Framework (NRF) are 
both strategic in scope. In its introduction, the 2008 NRF is described as “a guide to how 
the Nation conducts all-hazards response.”159 This NRF gives an overview of the United 
States’ preparedness system describing the roles and responsibilities of the multiple 
federal agencies and the general structure of state emergency management. Additionally, 
                                                 
156 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework (2008).  
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covers response actions and organization, concentrating on the National Incident 
Management System and the recommended steps to take for an effective response. The 
2008 NRF has an entire chapter dedicated to planning in which it lists the criteria of the 
“key aspects of response planning.”160 It concludes with a summary of additional 
resources that are available to emergency management practitioners to further assist in 
response planning. In contrast, the 2013 NRF does not have a chapter dedicated to 
planning and refers readers to the CPG 101, which was published in 2010 during the 
interim between the two versions of the NRF. However, the 2008 NRF chapter on 
planning has an established list of criteria to evaluate response plans: therefore, the newer 
2013 version will not be referenced in this thesis.  
Chapter IV of the 2008 NRF, “Planning: A Critical Element of Effective 
Response” has a section devoted to the “Criteria for Successful Planning.” The section 
lists the following criteria as key aspects of response planning: 
Acceptability. A plan is acceptable if it can meet the requirements of 
anticipated scenarios, can be implemented within the costs and timeframes 
that senior officials and the public can support, and is consistent with 
applicable laws.  
Adequacy. A plan is adequate if it complies with applicable planning 
guidance, planning assumptions are valid and relevant, and the concept of 
operations identifies and addresses critical tasks specific to the plan’s 
objectives.  
Completeness. A plan is complete if it incorporates major actions, 
objectives, and tasks to be accomplished. The complete plan addresses the 
personnel and resources required and sound concepts for how those will 
be deployed, employed, sustained, and demobilized. It also addresses 
timelines and criteria for measuring success in achieving objectives, and 
the desired end state. Completeness of a plan can be greatly enhanced by 
including in the planning process all those who could be affected. 
Consistency and Standardization of Products. Standardized planning 
processes and products foster consistency, interoperability, and 
collaboration 
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Feasibility. A plan is considered feasible if the critical tasks can be 
accomplished with the resources available internally or through mutual 
aid, immediate need for additional resources from other sources (in the 
case of a local plan, from State or Federal partners) are identified in detail 
and coordinated in advance, and procedures are in place to integrate and 
employ resources effectively from all potential providers.  
Flexibility. Flexibility and adaptability are promoted by decentralized 
decision making and by accommodating all hazards ranging from smaller-
scale incidents to wider national contingencies.  
Interoperability and Collaboration. A plan is interoperable and 
collaborative if it identifies other plan holders with similar and 
complementary plans and objectives, and supports regular collaboration 
focused on integrating with those plans to optimize achievement of 
individual and collective goals and objectives in an incident.161 
These seven “key aspects” from the 2008 NRF provide a good foundation for the 
criteria used to evaluate response plans. All of these criteria will help in merging federal 
stakeholders with their counterparts at the state and local level. However, the objectives 
of interoperability and collaboration and consistency and standardization have the most 
direct correlation for bridging the gap between the varied levels of government. As stated 
earlier, an outcome of the 2008 NRF is the CPG 101 that focuses entirely on the planning 
process and including developing and evaluating plans.  
C. COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING GUIDE 101 
The original CPG 101, released in 2008, is another government published 
document, this time attributed to FEMA. The “version 2.0” was released in November 
2010. As the title implies the guide’s entire focus is on developing emergency operations 
plans. The CPG 101 asserts that it “is the foundation for state, territorial, tribal, and local 
emergency planning in the United States.”162  
Moreover, the CPG 101 explains the “planning environment” in its second 
chapter by going over the structure in which federal, state, and local plans intersect. It 
also addresses planning principles and processes as well as the criteria for actual plans. In 
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addition, it describes different types of plans based on the level of government, the 
department/agency, or specific threat hazard; however, the guide only lists five criteria 
for evaluating plans. They are essentially five of the seven listed in the 2008 NRF; 
however, the CPG 101 elaborates on those not included in the list more fully in separate 
sections.163 
The two criteria specified in the 2008 NRF but not the CPG 101 are flexibility 
and interoperability and collaboration. Both of these are addressed in the first chapter of 
the CPG 101, “The Basics of Planning.”164 Interoperability and collaboration is 
addressed in a paragraph with the heading “Planning Must Include Participation from All 
Stakeholders in the Community.” There is a greater emphasis on whole of community 
planning in these sections and the overall CPG 101 than there was in the NRF standard. 
Additionally, this section in the CPG 101 goes into depth about the inclusion of a diverse 
planning team to include civic leaders, businesses, faith-based, advocacy, and educational 
organizations, for example.  
Flexibility is addressed in a paragraph with the heading “Planning Should Be 
Flexible Enough to Address Both Traditional and Catastrophic Incidents.”165 The NRF 
criterion for flexibility is vague and mentions the need for scalability and is contained in 
a single sentence. Whereas, the CPG 101 states there are differences between incidents of 
varying magnitude and distinguishes catastrophes by stating, “that exceptional policies 
and approaches are necessary for responding to and recovering from catastrophic 
incidents.”166  
The five common criteria are listed in Chapter 4 of the CPG 101, The Planning 
Process. Under the section labeled as “Step 5: Plan Preparation, Review, and Approval” 
and the subcategory, “Review the Plan,” it states, “Commonly used criteria can help 
decision makers determine the effectiveness and efficiency of plans.”167 It goes on to list 
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the five criteria and a brief definition of each, which have been slightly modified from the 
2008 NRF. Additionally, the criterion listed as “consistency and standardization of 
products” in the NRF has had its title changed to “Compliance” in the CPG 101. The five 
criteria in CPG 101 are as follows: 
Adequacy. A plan is adequate if the scope and concept of planned 
operations identify and address critical tasks effectively; the plan can 
accomplish the assigned mission while complying with guidance; and the 
plan’s assumptions are valid, reasonable, and comply with guidance.  
Feasibility. A plan is feasible if the organization can accomplish the 
assigned mission and critical tasks by using available resources within the 
time contemplated by the plan. The organization allocates available 
resources to tasks and tracks the resources by status (e.g., assigned, out of 
service). Available resources include internal assets and those available 
through mutual aid or through existing state, regional, or Federal 
assistance agreements.  
Acceptability. A plan is acceptable if it meets the requirements driven by a 
threat or incident, meets decision maker and public cost and time 
limitations, and is consistent with the law. The plan can be justified in 
terms of the cost of resources and if its scale is proportional to mission 
requirements. Planners use both acceptability and feasibility tests to ensure 
that the mission can be accomplished with available resources, without 
incurring excessive risk regarding personnel, equipment, material, or time. 
They also verify that risk management procedures have identified, 
assessed, and applied control measures to mitigate operational risk (i.e., 
the risk associated with achieving operational objectives).  
Completeness. A plan is complete if it:  
• Incorporates all tasks to be accomplished  
• Includes all required capabilities  
• Integrates the needs of the general population, children of all ages, 
individuals with disabilities and others with access and functional 
needs, immigrants, individuals with limited English proficiency, 
and diverse racial and ethnic populations  
• Provides a complete picture of the sequence and scope of the 
planned response operation (i.e., what should happen, when, and at 
whose direction)  
• Makes time estimates for achieving objectives  
• Identifies success criteria and a desired end-state.  
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Compliance. The plan should comply with guidance and doctrine to the 
maximum extent possible, because these provide a baseline that facilitates 
both planning and execution.168  
There are several differences between the definitions provided in the 2008 NRF 
and the CPG 101. The criterion acceptability has added additional language regarding the 
managing of risk to personnel, resources, and the community in the CPG 101. The 
definition of adequacy has remained essentially unchanged between the two documents. 
Under the term completeness in the 2008 NRF, it stated that the plan would have to 
consider “all those who could be affected.”169 The CPG 101 is more specific, spelling out 
several of the special needs populations, such as children, non-English speakers, and 
individuals with disabilities, who must be cared for during a crisis. As noted above, 
consistency and standardization of products has been streamlined to compliance. Not 
only is the word standardization absent from the heading but it does not appear in the 
definition. Instead, the CPG 101 recommends complying “with guidance and doctrine to 
the maximum extent possible”170 allowing for more latitude in following federal 
doctrine. Feasibility in the CPG 101 also includes timeframes as a measure and not just 
resources to complete the required tasks. As noted earlier, the categories of flexibility and 
interoperability and collaboration are not listed as criteria for evaluating plans but are 
addressed in more depth elsewhere in the CPG 101.  
D. NFPA-1600: STANDARD ON DISASTER PLANNING AND BUSINESS 
CONTINUITY PROGRAMS 
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1600: Standard on Disaster 
Planning and Business Continuity Programs is a non-government publication listing 
standards for organizations in emergency preparedness including mitigation, risk 
assessment, and planning and operational procedures. Chapter 5 of the NFPA 1600 is 
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based on planning and lists several standards including the planning and design process, 
risk assessment, and business impact analysis.171  
This chapter is geared more toward the planning process and not response plans. 
Also, because the NFPA 1600 is intended for businesses and private entities, it does not 
directly correlate to the plans for a regional or national catastrophe response plan. 
However, there are certain standards that are applicable and can be used to evaluate an 
intergovernmental response plan. Standards such as 5.2 Risk Assessment, and 5.5 
Performance Objectives, which are listed in the chapter on planning, can be incorporated 
to evaluate governmental response plans.172  
Chapter 6 of the NFPA 1600 is entitled “Implementation” and has more of the 
listed standards apply to the evaluation of response plans then those in the preceding 
chapter. All of the sub-categories in Standard 6.1 Common Plan Requirements would 
apply and are listed as follows: 
6.1.1 Plans shall address the health and safety of personnel. 
6.1.2 Plans shall identify and document the following: 
1. Assumptions made during the planning process 
2. Functional roles and responsibilities of internal and external, 
organizations, departments, and positions 
3. Lines of authority 
4. The process for delegation of authority 
5. Lines of succession for the entity 
6. Liaisons to external entities 
7. Logistics support and resource requirements 
6.1.4 The entity shall make sections of the plans available to those 
assigned specific tasks and responsibilities therein and to key stakeholders 
as required.173 
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Other standards that would apply to the evaluation of catastrophe response plans 
include 6.4 Crisis Communications and Public Information, 6.5 Warnings, Notifications, 
and Communications, 6.6 Operational Procedures, and 6.7 Incident Management.174 Of 
those, 6.6 Operational Procedures is the most applicable as it presents guidance on the 
response phase of a plan. Criteria in this standard are: 
6.6.1 The entity shall develop, coordinate, and implement operational 
procedures to support the program. 
6.6.2 Procedures shall be established and implemented for response to and 
recovery from the impact of hazards identified in 5.2.2. [this is an 
extensive list of natural occurring hazards and manmade threats that could 
potentially effect an entity using this standard]. 
6.6.3 Procedures shall provide for life safety, property conservation, 
incident stabilization, continuity, and protection of the environment under 
the jurisdiction of the entity. 
6.6.4 Procedures shall include the following: 
1. Control of access to the area affected by the incident 
2. Identification of personnel engaged in activities at the 
incident 
3. Accounting for personnel engaged in incident activities 
4. Mobilization and demobilization of resources175 
Standard 6.8 Emergency Operations/Response Plans only has four subcategories. 
They include defining responsibilities and carrying out specific actions, protective actions 
for life safety, and resource and donation management.176 It also refers back to the 
standards on warning and notification and crisis communications for inclusion in these 
plans. This may seem limited; however, the audience NFPA 1600 is intended for is 
private entities that have little if any response capabilities. Instead, they would build 
notification procedures into their plans to insure the proper public safety departments 
would respond. 
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Other chapters in the NFPA 1600 include standards for prevention, mitigation, 
and exercise and tests. These standards do not correspond directly to response plans. As 
such, they will not be used as criteria for the case studies presented in the following 
chapters. However, another private organization’s accreditation standards may provide 
further, pertinent criteria for evaluation. 
E. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ACCREDITATION PROGRAM 
STANDARD 
The Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) Standard is 
published by EMAP, a non-profit organization dedicated for establishing credible 
standards for the emergency management communities and providing a peer reviewed 
accreditation process.177 Therefore, the standard has broad focus on entire emergency 
management programs, although it has a section focused entirely on operational planning. 
Under Chapter 4 Emergency Management Program Elements, subsection 4.6 Operational 
Planning can be found. This subsection not only covers operational planning but recovery 
plans,178 continuity of operations (COOP), and continuity of government (COG) 
plans.179 Similar to NFPA 1600, not all the standards apply to response planning. Of the 
five listed in this section, three are directly related. These include Standard 4.6.1, which 
requires that formal planning processes involve stakeholders to be involved in the 
development of the plan.180 Standard 4.6.2 states that operational plans need to address 
the following:   
1. purpose, scope and/or goals and objectives; 
2. authority; 
3. situation and assumptions; 
4. functional roles and responsibilities for internal and external agencies, 
organizations, departments and positions; 
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5. logistics support and resource requirements necessary to implement plan; 
6. concept of operations; and 
7. plan maintenance181 
Standard 4.6.3 lists 30 “areas of responsibility” that reflect most of FEMA’s 15 
emergency support functions (ESF), such as firefighting, mass care and sheltering, and 
volunteer management that need to be addressed in operational plans.182 The EMAP 
Standard adds to the resources that are available to help in the evaluation of catastrophe 
response plans. Measures for evaluation that could assist in interagency collaboration 
from the federal government and two non-profit organizations have already been 
presented. Lastly, evaluation criteria researched and developed in an academic setting 
will be considered.  
F. RESEARCH-BASED CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING DISASTER 
PLANNING AND MANAGING 
Through his extensive research, Dr. Enricho L. Quarantelli has established 10 
principles of disaster planning. These 10 measures appear throughout his published 
research, including Research Based Criteria for Evaluating Disaster Planning and 
Managing. In this paper, Dr. Quarantelli goes into depth about the 10 criteria for planning 
and 10 for managing disasters. For the purposes of this thesis, only those principles 
referring to disaster planning will be explored. The introduction explains just how 
extensive the research behind Dr. Quarantelli’s findings is: 
It would be possible to advance an ideal version of what should be, but we 
prefer to root our answer in empirical research already undertaken by 
social and behavioral scientists. Although we use many specific findings 
from more than 500 different studies of disasters and mass emergencies 
done by the Disaster Research Center (DRC) since its establishment in 
1963, our general observations and conclusions are based on the larger 
body of scientific knowledge accumulated in about four decades of 
research.183  
The 10 general principles this research concluded upon are listed in bold text:  
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1. Focus on the planning process rather than the production of a 
document. 
This is conveyed by stating “preparedness planning involves all of those 
activities, practices, interactions, and relationships, which over the short 
and long term are intended to improve the response pattern at times of 
disaster impact.”184 
2. Recognize that disasters are both quantitatively and qualitatively 
different from minor emergencies and everyday crises. 
Disasters are not just a matter of scale and therefore cannot be handled as 
larger routine incidents. Most distinctively, disasters quickly overwhelm 
local capabilities and capacities requiring “more and different 
organizational relationships”185 including those from the public, private 
and non-governmental realms.  
3. Be generic rather than agent specific. 
Do not plan separately for specific hazards. There are commonalties to 
most catastrophes that require the same resources, agencies, emergency 
personnel and procedures. Therefore, planning should be more generic and 
general and one major organization responsible for coordinating the 
overall planning. 
4. Avoid the development of a “command and control” model. 
Catastrophes are dynamic therefore a plan must be flexible enough to 
allow first responders to adapt to unforeseen or changing environments. 
Plans should concentrate heavily on coordination; not on control.  
5. Focus on general principles and not specific details. 
“Complex and detailed planning is generally forbidding to most potential 
users and will end up being ignored.”186 Organizational structure should 
be focused on and the more tactical elements should not be overstated. 
6. Be based on what is likely to happen. 
“Good planning must be based on what realistically is likely to 
happen.”187 It should avoid building too much on past events because 
every catastrophe is unique with its own set of challenges and anomalies.  
7. Be vertically and horizontally integrated  
Disasters do not impact only one sector or segment of a community; in 
fact, a disaster involves a disruption of community life across the 
board.”188 This principle supports the more recently coined term of 
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“whole-of-community” effort. It directly supports the need for interagency 
collaboration between local, state and federal entities.  
8. Strive to evoke appropriate actions by anticipating likely problems 
and possible solutions or options.  
Catastrophe planning should concentrate on “appropriate actions” not on 
tasks found in templates or responses that are not appropriate for a specific 
region or community. Consequently, “it is more important to obtain valid 
information about what is happening than it is to take immediate 
actions.”189 
9. Use the best social science knowledge possible and not myths and 
misconceptions.  
“Research has consistently shown that many popular views about disaster 
behavior are inaccurate.”190 As a result, considerable effort is often wasted 
planning and preparing for predictions that will never materialize. For 
example, research has shown that mass sheltering is frequently not used to 
the estimated levels due to survivors preferring to stay in their own homes 
or with friends and family.191 
10. Recognize that crisis time disaster planning and disaster managing 
are separate processes.  
Planning should be viewed as preparing a community for a disaster, while 
managing involves the best tactics to be used to mitigate the various 
results of a catastrophe.192  
Each of the sources and their various measures have their own merits. Although 
they have different headings or titles, there are similarities across the different standards 
presented. An analysis of commonalties among the five sources and any resulting 
universally accepted criteria further aids in determinate measures that constitute smart 
practices in evaluating catastrophe response plans.  
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VII. COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS OF CRITERIA PRESENTED 
IN VARIOUS SOURCES 
A. OUTLINING THE CRITERIA 
Not all of the criteria from the various sources presented in the previous chapter 
easily translate across to one another. The NFPA 1600 and EMAP appear to be more 
tactical or specific in the standards that they present. Dr. Quarantelli’s 10 principles, the 
2008 NRF, and the CPG 101’s criteria present more macro or strategic guidance. 
However, Table 1 endeavors to match like criteria from all of those presented from the 
five selected sources for comparison. 
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Table 1.   Comparative Applicable Criteria Table 
 
COMPARATIVE APPLICABLE CRITERIA TABLE 
 
2008 NRF CPG 101 NFPA 1600 EMAP Quarantelli 
Acceptability 
Meets scenario’s, applicable laws, 
costs and timeframe requirements 








Planning is valid and relevant 
Addresses Critical Tasks 
Adequacy 5.2—Risk Assessment 
 
 5. Focus on general principles and not 
specific details 
Completeness 
Concept of Operations (CONOPS) 
Major actions, objectives, tasks and 
timelines are incorporated 
All stakeholders, resources & 
personnel requirements are addressed 
 
Completeness 5.2- Risk Assessment 
6.1.1—Addresses the 




responsibilities, lines of 

















Logistics and resource 
needs 
4.6.3—List of 30 “Areas 
of Responsibility” 
8. Strive to evoke appropriate actions 
by anticipating likely problems and 
possible solutions or options 
9. Use the best social science 




Applies with other policies, standards, 
and procedures 
Compliance 6.8.4—Compliance with 
regulatory requirements 
3.1.2—Has a method for 
evaluation, maintenance , 
revision and corrective 
action of program polices  
4.2.2—Maintains a process 




Realistic and achievable with on-hand 
and/or obtainable resources 
Feasibility 5.5—Performance 
Objectives 
 2. Recognize that disasters are both 
quantatively and qualitatively different 
from minor emergencies and everyday 
crises 
6. Be based on what is likely to happen 
 
Flexibility 
Decentralized decision making, 
adaptable 
*   3. Be generic rather than agent 
(hazard) specific 
4. Avoid the development of a 
“command and control” model 
Interoperability/Collaboration 
Integrated and complementary 
objectives 
* 6.1.4—Makes plan 
available to those tasked 
with responsibilities and 
other stakeholders 
4.6.1—Formal planning w/ 
all stakeholders 
 
7. Be vertically and horizontally 
integrated 
    1. Focus on the planning process rather 
that the production of a written 
document  
    10. Recognize that crisis time disaster 
planning and disaster managing are 
separate processes 
               *Not listed specifically as a plan evaluation criteria but referred to elsewhere in the document 
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It is also important to keep in mind that the intended audience and end products of 
the five sources these criteria were derived from also differ. For example, the NFPA 1600 
is intended for private organization or “entities,” most of which have little, if any, 
response capabilities. In contrast, the EMAP standard is directed toward emergency 
management agencies, primarily in the public sector, and it is designed at a broader 
accreditation process for those agencies. The criteria listed in these sources tend to be 
more tactical because they are designed as accreditation or industry standards.  
Conversely, the 2008 NRF, CPG 101, and Dr. Quarantelli’s research were 
specifically developed for regional disaster or catastrophe response plans. As a result, 
their criteria are more wide-ranging rather than narrowly focused or tactical in nature. 
This must be kept in mind when trying to interpret the data in the previous matrix. 
Conclusions can be drawn about the relevance of the criteria based on their inclusion or 
exclusion in the various emergency management publications or the number of individual 
standards that apply to a certain criterion.  
For the purposes of this analysis, the 2008 NRF criteria will be used as the base or 
control criteria for comparison and reference against. Using this methodology, there is 
one true universal criterion among these five sources—completeness. It is mentioned, in 
one form or another, in all five publications. In addition, more of the individual standards 
or principles, 11 in total, relate to it. Interoperability/collaboration would also be 
universally accepted if it were listed as a specific evaluation criterion under the “Plan 
Preparation, Review, and Approval” section of Chapter 4 of the CPG 101.202 However, it 
is referenced in more depth in an earlier chapter and should also be considered as a 
universal criterion among the five sources.   
This is followed by acceptability, consistency/compliance, and feasibility as each 
listed in four documents. The criterion of adequacy appears in three documents and 
flexibility specifically in two documents but is also mentioned elsewhere in the CPG 101. 
The two principles that are found only in their own source document are: “focus on the 
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planning process rather than the production of a document”203 and “recognize that crisis 
time disaster planning and disaster managing are separate processes.”204 Both of these 
originate from Dr. Quarantelli’s work, but they speak more to processes than to criteria 
for the evaluation of response plans. 
Working under the premise that these are five of the definitive sources on 
evaluating that catastrophe response plans, completeness would clearly be designated as a 
valid measure because of its inclusion in all of the sources. The same argument could also 
be made for interoperability/collaboration, which again is not specifically listed as a 
criteria for evaluating response plans but is mentioned in more depth elsewhere in the 
CPG 101. This makes it universally acceptable across all the sources. Feasibility and 
acceptability are also mentioned in four of the source documents, including the three that 
are dedicated to response plan design and evaluation: the 2008 NPF, CPG 101, and Dr. 
Quarantelli’s 10 principles. These criteria should also be endorsed because of their 
widespread use among the source documentation including those most relevant to the 
evaluation of response plans. 
Consistency is also represented in four of the source documents; however, it is not 
included in Dr. Quarantelli’s research. Flexibility and adequacy are referred to in only 
three documents, but they are the three sources centered on response plan evaluations. 
They are not included in the two non-profit organization standards (the NFPA 1600 and 
EMAP Standard).   
B. CRITERIA ASSESSMENT 
With the exceptions of the two criteria that only matched one source, all of the 
others where referenced in the majority of the sources. Those that were included in four 
or more should be considered as valid criteria to evaluate response plans because of their 
broad acceptance. The remaining criteria are integrated in three of the five sources that 
included all three that are focused on intergovernmental catastrophe plans and should also 
be considered. Therefore, criteria from the 2008 NRF are representative of the major 
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emergency management standards and disaster planning research criteria that are 
currently in use.  
Subsequently, the criteria set in the 2008 NRF will be the basis used to evaluate 
the case studies of actual catastrophe response plans that are featured as case studies in 
the following chapters. One case study is centered on a natural occurring hazard and the 
other on a man-made threat. They also differ in how they are structured; one is centered 
on geographical information systems (GIS) data and the other is task oriented. Both rely 
heavily on evidence and/or data based information in their plans. This is essential to the 
criteria of completeness and feasibility and should be considered and integral element to 
a modernized definition of these criteria. The first case study to be presented is the 
Southern California Catastrophic Earthquake Plan and the second is the Integrated 
Improvised Nuclear Device Plan: City of Chicago, County of Cook, State of Illinois, and 
FEMA Region V. Although the plans differ in how they are presented, each embodies the 
criteria of good response plans and affords outstanding templates for future planners or 
other researchers.  
C. CONCLUSION 
The eight identified criteria (acceptability, adequacy, completeness, consistency, 
feasibility, flexibility, and interoperability/collaboration) are consistent measures found 
across all five standards. The standards included publications from the federal 
government, nonprofit accreditation organizations, and academia. The established 
evaluative criteria support the leading guidance from major emergency management 
organizations and disaster research. Therefore, each of the criteria should be incorporated 
into future catastrophe or disaster plans and will be used to evaluate the case studies in 
the following chapters.  
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VIII. CASE STUDY: SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA  
CATASTROPHIC EARTHQUAKE PLAN 
A. OVERVIEW 
The state of California’s catastrophic earthquake plans for the three regions 
primary affected by earthquakes present well thought-out models of vertically 
synchronized preparedness that others should emulate. In particular, the Southern 
California Catastrophic Earthquake Response Plan, produced by the California 
Emergency Management Agency and FEMA Region IX, provides an excellent model 
that bridges the gap between strategic catastrophic planning and local operational 
response considerations. This empirical, data-based plan meets the criteria established in 
the previous chapter for sound catastrophe response plans.  
The southern San Andreas Fault has generated earthquakes of magnitude 7.8 on 
average every 150 years. The United States Geological Survey’s (USGS) estimates the 
last earthquake of this magnitude in southern California happened more than 300 years 
ago.205 The San Francisco earthquake of 1906 is estimated to have had a magnitude 
ranging from 7.7 to 8.3, and the portion of the fault system that caused it has an average 
occurrence rate of approximately every 200 years.206 The Cascadia subduction zone 
(CSZ) experiences a full fault rupture, with earthquakes of magnitudes greater than 7.0, 
once every 500 years, on average.207 The last major earthquake with a full CSZ rupture 
took place in the year 1700.208 
As a result of these eventualities, the California Emergency Management Agency 
(CalEMA) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) have developed 
catastrophe plans for each of the three major areas that will be affected by major 
                                                 
205 FEMA Region IX, and California Emergency Management Agency, Southern California 
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earthquakes. This case study concentrates on the planning for Los Angeles and the 
surrounding area that culminated in the Southern California Catastrophic Earthquake 
Plan.  
Like the New Zealand CDEM groups, the authoring bodies incorporated both 
federal and local input to develop a comprehensive document that takes into account both 
the strategic view and the operational response requirements. It is important to note that 
the federal representation for this plan did not originate from Washington, DC but the 
FEMA regional office that encompasses all of California. Once again, this is similar to 
the New Zealand CDEM group model and is an important factor in its successful 
acceptance and completion.  
Having regionally based federal and local practitioners work on the response plan 
for a catastrophe makes them intimately familiar with its overall direction and details 
prior to an event taking place. This also helps strengthen the relationships among the 
emergency services personnel that are likely to have to respond and/or manage a 
catastrophe and creates better respect, trust, and cooperation among the various 
stakeholders. Not only does this build professional relationships before the crisis strikes, 
but it lends credibility to the plan across all participating organizations. 
B. PLAN DETAILS 
The Southern California Catastrophic Earthquake Plan also took into account the 
expertise of hundreds of people. This is also reflected in the depth of the number of 
emergency support functions included in the plan. In fact, the plan states it:  
is the result of more than 1500 emergency management professionals 
determining how best to use the combined capabilities of the private 
sector, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local, state, tribal and 
federal resources to respond to a magnitude 7.8 earthquake on the southern 
San Andreas Fault.209  
It is notable that not only were the different levels of government made a part of the 
process, including tribal institutions, but the private sector and NGOs were brought into 
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the planning and are integrated into the plan’s concept of operation. This demonstrates 
great foresight and is a good illustration of incorporating the “whole-of-community” 
concept. 
The Southern California Catastrophic Earthquake Plan exists in two formats—a 
public version and a restricted “for official use only” version. The public and restricted 
versions are both relatively comprehensive in conveying the overall concept of 
operations. However, the voluminous 612-page, restricted version contains an extensive 
number of finished geographical information systems (GIS) based maps and 
corresponding information that correlate to the operational response components of the 
plan. Each version of the plan is based on strong data sets that establish a firm foundation 
for prioritizing and directing various resources to areas of operation where there greatest 
impact and needs are predicted to be. This can then be used as a guide to determine where 
there are shortages in capacity of emergency response resources and core capabilities 
prior to an actual earthquake or any other catastrophe.  
The public document, containing 118 pages, is also very robust and is based on 
the same data driven models as the restricted version and retains much of the same 
information. For the purposes of this thesis, only content from the publicly available 
version was evaluated and cited. The purpose in mentioning the for official use only 
(FOUO) version is make emergency management practitioners aware of its existence and 
to give the reader a sense of the level of detail and resources put into this exhaustive plan, 
as indicated by its length.  
What is immediately apparent when reading the plan is that this was not only a 
document published jointly by CalEMA and FEMA but that all levels of government are 
integrated functionally through the “Concept of Operations” section. One of the first 
items noted in the plan is a figure depicting “Basic Structure and Responsibilities of the 
Joint State/Federal Organization.”210 The figure illustrates that the plan is designed 
around a unified coordination group (UCG) made up of elements from federal, state, and 
local governments. Among the positions designated are a federal coordinating officer 
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(FCO), a state coordinating officer (SCO), a California Air National Guard 
representative, and the state adjutant general (AG), and a Department of Defense (DOD) 
representative (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1.  Basic Structure and Responsibilities of the Joint State/Federal 
Organization 
This chart makes clear that federal, state, and local officials are to work together 
in a unified command structure. The fact that this is a jointly developed plan adds 
credibility and buy-in across agencies for the intended framework and will prevent 
unnecessarily modification it during an actual event. In addition, the plan’s UCG 
exemplifies a good balance between federal and state officials in their respective 
disciplines. It is also important that the plan’s authors have included a DOD 
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representative in the structure under the governor, as there has been a continual debate as 
to where active duty military assets fit into national catastrophe response structure.211 
The plan also makes a point that the coordination between the federal and state 
partners permeates throughout the plan and extends beyond the top tiered UCG through 
the lower levels of the incident command system. The following statement is highlighted 
throughout the plan emphasizing this concept: 
The “Unified Command” concept quite often extends into the Operations 
organization to the Branch and Division/Group level depending on the 
capability of State and Local government. As a result FEMA operations 
may have joint positions (FEMA, state, and/or local) throughout the 
organization.212 
Once again the development, statements, and organizational charts all provide a 
consistent message making it clear that the plan supports joint operations and efforts 
between the federal and local emergency management organizations.  
C. ADEQUATELY PREPARING LOCAL EMERGENCY PROVIDERS FOR 
CATASTROPHIC EVENTS 
The plan establishes three phases: Phase 1 normal operations, Phase 2 response, 
and Phase 3 recovery. The inclusion of the first phase for normal or “steady state” 
operations and its associated objectives of plan, organize, train, equip, exercise, evaluate, 
and take corrective action demonstrates the understanding that catastrophe planning does 
not start at the onset of the incident.213 Through the plan’s following sections, it is 
apparent that first responders are being educated and are training for the magnitude of 
such an event and the degraded conditions and challenges they will be confronted with 
when a sizable earthquake strikes (see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2.  Phases of Earthquake Response 
This is accomplished by utilizing the data-driven predictive statistics outlined in 
the plan to create a very bleak yet, realistic picture of the aftermath of a major earthquake 
occurring in the greater Los Angeles region. The plan envisions the eight counties that 
comprise southern California to all be affected in one form or another. Additionally, the 
plan describes the anticipated physical consequences of this type of earthquake to include 
fault offsets, landslides, and liquefaction. Under the “Critical Considerations” section, it 
states there will be a significant disruption of basic services including transportation, 
healthcare, water, power, and communications.214 
When examining the issue of hospital surge capacity based on the metrics 
developed for the earthquake scenario, the plan recognizes, “Demand will exceed 
capabilities; the system is currently taxed under normal conditions.”215 This is reiterated 
by other examples, such as the need for USAR teams will be exceeded and that there will 
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be a “need to prioritize and merge competition for limited resources region wide.”216 All 
too often, this type of blunt and pragmatic perspective is excluded from published 
government reports; however, it is essential in setting expectations, promoting 
understanding, and building personal responsibility and resiliency. 
The “Critical Assumptions” section of the plan lists the following outcomes based 
on a 7.8 magnitude earthquake: 
• 553,000 people are injured and in need of medical assistance 
• 10,000 to 100,000 landslides 
• 5,000 people are in completely collapsed buildings, 10,000 more in red-
tagged uninhabitable buildings and 20,000 in severely damaged buildings 
• 1600 fires ignite—many merge causing conflagrations engulfing 
approximately 4500 acres or the equivalent of 133,000 single family 
homes 
• Fires double the initial fatality rate from the initial 1800 dead killed by the 
quake to over 3600 mortalities 
• 140,000 hazardous material incidents occur including an anticipated three 
chlorine gas releases and one ammonia gas  
• 300,000 buildings (1 in 16) are damaged to the point they require 
structural inspections 
• 542,000 displaced persons require shelter 
• 81 million tons of debris need removal 
• 300 reservoirs fall within the affected area  
• 15 percent of the 900 roads that cross the main fault will be severely 
damaged217 
These data-based predictions leave any one, including first responders, emergency 
services commanders, or elected officials, who reads them with a clear understanding of 
the aftermath and the enormity of the ensuing response needed to successfully begin to 
recover. The amount of effort that went into determining these estimates must have been 
quite extensive; however, the analysis of these metrics in terms of determining gaps in 
capability and capacity is even more impressive. The plan is an excellent example of 
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preemptively comparing current resources against the estimated outcomes of an 
anticipated event to calculate deficiencies so they can be remediated beforehand. 
The plan presents thorough analysis of capability and capacity using the various 
estimates of casualties and property damage delineated in the critical assumptions 
section. For example, the plan has identified that there are 5,926 trained building 
inspectors certified in the Safety Assessment Program for the estimated 300,000 
structures that will require safety and occupancy inspections. The plan goes further in this 
category by identifying where state officials can draw capacity for additional inspectors. 
Additionally, it even divides this into additional subcategories for inspectors in bordering 
states (23) and throughout the rest of the country (416).218 Based on these figures, 
California can develop a program to increase the number of certified inspectors. 
Furthermore, FEMA can institute training or incentives to train and make available more 
inspectors across the nation (realizing this is a gap in national capacity as well) or it may 
assess that it is satisfied with the current configuration. Whatever the decision moving 
forward, the emergency managers in California have a grasp of the capacity to inspect 
buildings and its potential impact on the response and recovery operations.  
Additional analysis shows the following determinations when evaluating public 
health and medical services for the scenario presented. There are approximately 2600 
ambulances in the state; however, 27 percent of them are components of fire departments 
that are also tasked with other previously noted priorities, such as fires and hazardous 
material incidents.219 In the scenario, hospital functionality is decreased by 30 percent 
regionally and in the greatest affected areas it may be diminished by 75 percent. This 
results in the loss of 13,000 in-patient beds.220 Patients hospitalized at the time of the 
earthquake may not be directly affected, but they will need to be transported to suitable 
alternative medical facilities. Ambulances will also be needed to transport the estimated 
40 percent of medical special needs patients from long-term care facilities in need of 
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immediate assistance and relocating another 60 percent that will need to be moved to 
other facilities after 72 hours.221  
Other points of this type of excellent analysis contained in the plan are the fact 
that 94 percent of all USAR team members are firefighters, which effects the 
prioritization of the tasking of those personnel.222 Also, the region only has proper 
storage for 1400 bodies in order to provide mass fatality services.223 Knowing this, the 
plan has already identified the need to request federal disaster mortuary operational 
response teams (DMORT) and military mortuary affairs teams to supplement the local 
morgues and private funeral parlors. This is a prime example of local resources being 
supplemented by federally coordinated ones. The plan also points out that most of the 76 
California landfills are almost full, requiring alternatives to remove the predicted 81 
million tons of debris created as a result of the earthquake.224  
This is an outstanding level of detail that is necessary in order to properly analyze 
and determine the anticipated capacities in a range of disciplines and their shortcomings. 
Phase 1 of the plan (pre-earthquake) is the optimal time to discover the types of 
deficiencies and establish alternatives or build supplemental capacity to close gaps. 
Moreover, the plan offers an exemplary template in this respect for other jurisdictions to 
model in their catastrophe preparedness planning. Additionally, the plan meets several of 
the criteria for good catastrophe plans as established in the last chapter. These include: 
adequacy, completeness, feasibility, flexibility, and interoperability/collaboration. 
The plan goes further by instilling elements that insure it is actionable. In 
addition, the plan specifies a detailed training regime based on the factors resulting from 
the forecasted scenario. The plan’s operations annex advises “private, non-profit, local, 
state, tribal and federal stakeholders to prepare for a catastrophic earthquake.”225 It goes 
on to direct local jurisdictions, CalEMA, and FEMA Region IX to conduct a full scale 
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“Golden Guardian Exercise” every five years and a table top exercise or training every 
two years. It then instructs each level of government, mandating the necessary 
participating agencies including the eight southern California counties, CalEMA, FEMA 
Region IX, and their subsidiary sections to “organize/equip, train, exercise, evaluate and 
improve earthquake plans.”226  
D. COLLABORATION OF STRATEGIC GOALS AND OPERATIONAL 
RESPONSE REQUIREMENTS 
The plan addresses both strategic goals and operational requirements. 
Furthermore, the plan sets priorities in the scope of time by first constructing global 
operational goals outlined in the phases of operation. Then, for each discipline it 
establishes standardized benchmarks in specific terms for that emergency support 
function. For each group involved in the response, such as command, intelligence or 
operations, the annexes of the plan outlines their priorities and responsibilities through 
the following format:  
1. Situation 
2. Mission 
3. Execution  
4. Concept of operations: 
Phase 1—Pre-incident (steady state), end state 
Phase 2a—Activation (immediate response), end state 
Phase 2b—Deployment and employment, end state 
Phase 2c—Sustained response, end state227 
This framework creates a guide for each group of responders to not only 
understand the tasks they are assigned but to know where they fit in during the overall 
response and when they should be moving on to the next mission set. An example of this 
is the debris removal function. The plan calls for a “phased approach to debris removal” 
delineating the first priorities being the major staging areas of the ports and airfields.228 
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Next are primary and secondary transportation corridors that access mass care sites and 
those that lead to critical infrastructure so these two missions can be addressed. The plan 
also specifies that during these immediate phases debris will only be moved or staged in 
order to provide access to emergency responders and critical infrastructure restorers. It is 
not until the later phases that the debris is actually removed or hauled. These tasks are 
discussed in more depth and are listed under each phase for the overall plan so they can 
be synchronized with other mission areas that rely on debris removal to complete their 
duties during the same timeframe.  
The plan has several operational considerations that are rather specific but remain 
flexible enough to give first responders the ability to make tactical decisions based on the 
future conditions on the ground. Through layered GIS analysis, the plan identifies priority 
response areas (PRAs). The PRAs are designated after an evaluation of three criteria: 
shake magnitude, population concentrations, and structural density.229 Therefore, first 
responders have advanced notice of the areas that will be most greatly affected by a 
strong magnitude earthquake and gives them starting points for their response efforts. 
Since they are pre-designated, even if there is a loss of communications with higher 
commands, first responders know where they should respond to make the most impact. 
The plan indicates already pre-selected potential staging areas; however, they will 
not be formally designated until after damage assessments are completed. These staging 
areas were selected due to their abilities for offloading and staging incoming teams, 
equipment, and proximity to the projected incident area. Once a staging area is officially 
designated, it will be supplied with needed life sustaining supplies. The staging areas will 
then use a “hub and spoke” concept to deliver vital supplies to places where people 
historically have gone to seek shelter and assistance in the past.230 These areas include 
hospitals, stadiums, arenas, and schools. In addition, the staging areas will resupply 
designated points of distribution (POD) and shelters.  
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Public messaging is critical in any large scale disaster, and it will obviously be 
essential to the response to an earthquake on southern California of this magnitude. The 
plan’s “Annex F: Public Messaging”231 recognizes that many of its traditional means of 
communicating with the public will be greatly reduced due to the damage caused by the 
earthquake. However, it states first responders should continue to use traditional means of 
messaging, including social media but does not dismiss and rather encourages 
untraditional means of communication to successfully keep the public informed. To 
further the public information mission, several agreed upon, pre-drafted, jointly crafted 
(federal/state) messages are actually published in the plan for private media outlets and 
local municipalities alike to use. These templates address a number of foreseeable issues, 
including saving time and thus lives because the parties have agreed to the verbiage and 
context and have had them made available for use in the calm prior to the incident.  
Furthermore, the plan calls for the triage of critical systems and infrastructure 
early on in the concept of operations. Not only is it obvious from the plan that the critical 
infrastructure in the predicted areas of operation have been surveyed, but private/public 
sector task forces for water restoration and port reconstitution have also been established. 
Because of the unique composition of this area, it has also created the Cajon Pass Task 
Force232 to deal with the multitude of utilities and other critical infrastructures that 
traverse the pass from the west to provide essential services for southern California. In 
fact, the plan states, “In coordination with the California Utilities Emergency 
Association, FEMA will establish partnerships with the private sector before a 
catastrophic earthquake occurs.”233 
Similarly, a communications expert working group drafted the planning 
assumptions for the plan’s communication annex, knowing there will be stresses and 
breaks in the existing communications systems. The plan’s mission statement for the 
communications sector is concise, outlining the expectations before and after an 
earthquake. It reads as follows, “Insure the reliable, redundant, and uninterrupted 
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communications for emergency responders during the initial phases of a no-notice 
disaster and to transition support to the private sector infra-structure and communication 
service as soon as possible”234 While this addresses the strategic intent for 
communications overall, the plan also addresses the operational communications needs as 
well.  
During Phase 1 “expected communications shortfalls and requirements and 
concepts of operations for establishing emergency communications for responders after a 
catastrophic earthquake disaster”235 are to be identified and coordinated. California has 
already taken steps in this direction knowing that “a large number of radio transmitter/
repeater sites will be non-functional; therefore, radio communications will have to 
transition to the Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES) and Radio Amateur Civil 
Emergency Services (RACES) networks.”236 For data and voice over Internet, California 
has invested in the Operational Area Satellite Information System (OASIS). OASIS 
provides 58 fixed satellite communications “earth stations” for each of the counties in the 
state and an additional six trailer-mounted, mobile platforms are operated by Cal EMA 
and another three by other state agencies.237 This investment in this alternative 
communication system is already paying dividends as it is used to manage wildfires by 
incident commands in remote and often rugged terrains.  
E. SUMMARY 
The plan is a detailed document that has utilized large amounts of data to not only 
predict the number of casualties and amount of damage that a catastrophic earthquake 
could potentially cause in southern California, but it also estimates current resources and 
the anticipated shortfalls in those critical areas needed to mitigate an event of this 
magnitude.  
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The plan’s extensive use of geographic information systems (GIS) and the 
resulting identification of priority response areas (PRA) are central to the overall plan. 
The plan incorporates the stakeholders of regional critical infrastructure and has 
developed private/public task forces to assist in restoring essential utilities as soon as 
possible. These are the primary strengths of the plan that will be evaluated in the 




IX. CRITERIA-BASED EVALUATION OF THE SOUTHERN 
CALIFORNIA CATASTROPHIC EARTHQUAKE PLAN 
A. OVERVIEW 
The previous section gave an overview of the Southern California Catastrophic 
Earthquake Response Plan and some highlights on how the plan merges federal strategy 
with the state and local operational requirements. The plan is very detailed in some 
respects but general enough to give responders the flexibility needed to work in a fluid 
environment. In addition, the plan meets the evaluative criteria established in the previous 
chapter for well-developed catastrophe response plans. The following section will 
provide examples from the plan that support each of the criteria.  
B. ACCEPTABILITY 
The plan discusses authorities, costs, and timeframe requirements. Section 1.3 
Authorities lists the applicable state and federal authorities the plan operates under.238 
For the state these include the California Emergency Services Act, State Emergency Plan, 
and the California Disaster and Civil Defense Master Mutual Aid Agreement. At the 
federal level, some of the authorities listed are HSPD-5, HSPD-8, the 2008 NRF, and the 
Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act 2006.  
The plan also has a section titled “4.0 Administration, Resources, and Funding” 
that meets the acceptability criterion.239 This plan discusses the responsibilities of 
managing financial activities among the various tiers of government, including federal 
aid through the Stafford Act.240 It also addresses the “Coordination of State Mutual Aid 
Agreement(s)” and the governor’s authority to implement inter and intra-state 
agreements.241 Other areas in this section include the administration of policies regarding 
personnel and travel reimbursement.  
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The plan manages timelines by outlining three primary phases: normal operations, 
response, and long-term recovery. The response phase is broken down even further into 
subsections. These consist of: activation (immediate response (0–12 hours), deployment 
and employment (12–72 hours), and sustained response (72+ hours).242 The plan 
discusses each of the different mission areas, such as debris removal or mass care, in 
terms of these phases and the progress or level of their operations in conjunction with 
them.  
These examples from the plan demonstrate its conformity with the criterion of 
acceptability. Additionally, it has specific sections dedicated to the main functions of this 
criterion. Authorities and legislation, costs, and timeframes are all covered in the plan. 
This standard is well rounded in this regard meeting the essential components of the 
criterion.  
C. ADEQUACY 
The plan meets the adequacy criterion by having valid planning, addressing 
critical tasks, and presenting an overall risk assessment. Moreover, it discusses general 
operational principles without becoming too rigid. The planning is clearly relevant as it 
addresses a natural occurring catastrophe that is an eventuality based on the best science. 
As the overview stated, a large magnitude earthquake occurs along the southern San 
Andreas Fault approximately every 150 years.243  
A plan for an incident of this enormity must be addressed in general principles but 
simultaneously must be valid and relevant. The plan does this by defining its operational 
timeline in the three phases above. It gives an overview of the hazards that will be faced 
as a result of the predicted earthquake including fires, liquefaction, fault offsets, and 
landslides.244 The “Critical Assumptions” section is divided by objective areas that 
outline the challenges that may impact their operations. Other parts of the plan that round 
out examples of this criterion are the “Critical Considerations” section that gives an 
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overview of the operations and expectations for each mission area and a “senior leaders’ 
intent” that provides a framework to coordinate the overall response including the unified 
coordination group and the National Incident Management System (NIMS).245 
D. COMPLETENESS 
Besides being thorough, the criterion of completeness strives to anticipate likely 
problems during a catastrophe and appropriate solutions to mitigate them. The Plan also 
uses the best social and evidence based sciences to formulate its responses. It 
incorporates many emergency management principles such as, a concept of operations 
(CONOPS),246 a crisis communications plan,247 and “areas of responsibility” or 
emergency support functions (ESF). The plan demonstrates it meets these and the other 
benchmarks, making it a sound operational plan that synchronizes the responses of the 
various levels of government into a single collaborative effort.  
The plan features a CONOPS, which is one of the objectives listed under this 
criterion. The CONOPS is divided into the three phases of operations already mentioned. 
The second phase, response, is further subdivided into three additional timeframes. Tasks 
are incorporated into this phase to include activation/mobilization, protective actions, 
assessment, and prioritization.248 Protective actions address the risk assessment and the 
health and safety of personnel. The establishment of staging areas is also included in this 
phase, and the use of a “hub and spoke” concept of logistics is also outlined.249  
The hub and spoke model anticipates likely problems and utilizes the best social 
science. Staging areas for supplies and needed resources act as the hub in this framework. 
These are pre-selected from likely locations such as airfields, ports, rail yards, and other 
established logistical centers. The plan then calls for delivery of the supplies and 
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resources to those places, such as schools, stadiums, hospitals and fairgrounds, where 
survivors have typically congregated after a disaster.  
The fact that over 1500 emergency management professionals contributed to the 
plan clearly demonstrates the wide variety of perspective taken into account in the plan’s 
development.250 Moreover, essential private sector entities that own and operate critical 
infrastructure, such as power, water, and ports, were also included. These were further 
subcategorized into water, port reconstruction, and the Cajon Pass task forces. The Cajon 
Pass Task Force includes other vital functions such as communications, electric power, 
railroad, and natural gas services, all of which must quickly get back online, not only for 
restoration but to help in life saving and sheltering efforts.  
The plan also demonstrates its completeness by the extensive data-based 
assessments it provides for the aftermath of a catastrophic earthquake. The calculations 
derived in the plan for the numbers of casualties, damaged structures, the tonnage of 
debris, and the other measures listed in the overview clearly leaves any reader with an 
understanding of the magnitude of an earthquake of this size and recognition that this is 
very different from everyday crises.  
The plan identifies critical assumptions and addresses areas of responsibility for a 
number of important functions including public messaging, communications, emergency 
services, health and human services, and infrastructure.251 In addition, the 15 emergency 
support functions (ESF) are listed as areas that are required to be coordinated. This meets 
the objectives listed throughout the completeness criterion and correlates to the EMAP 
Standard “4.6.3. Areas of Responsibility” and the NFPA Standard “6.8 Emergency 
Operations/Response Plan.”  
The plan meets all of the requirements outlined in the completeness criterion. 
Moreover, it includes all stakeholders, has a CONOPS, lists the purpose, scope, and goals 
and strives to provide appropriate solutions for anticipated problems and challenges. 
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Furthermore, it utilizes strong data and social science in its development presenting an 
accurate depiction of the circumstances in the aftermath of a catastrophic earthquake.  
E. CONSISTENCY 
The plan is consistent with several other policies, regulatory requirements and 
applicable authorities that are noted in the plan. The plan has two specific sections 
specific to the measures outlined in this criterion. Section “3.3 Key Federal Roles and 
Responsibilities” states that the federal government’s response will be in accordance with 
the NRF and NIMS and will be carried out in accordance with the ESFs.252 Section “3.4 
State and Local Coordination Requirements” states all resources will be coordinated 
through the state in accordance with the California Emergency Services Act and the State 
Emergency Management System (SEMS).253  
The applicable authorities have already been outlined in the acceptability 
criterion. The plan also assigns the appropriate agencies with authority over certain tasks 
such as the Department of Transportation (DOT) and Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) with operational assessment of commercial airports. Other examples can be found 
throughout the plan. The plan meets the various standards set in the consistency (or 
compliance) criterion by outlining the various federal and state policies it complies with 
and by assigning the applicable agency to perform tasks within their authorities.  
F. FEASIBILITY 
In its level of detail, the plan recognizes that this scenario is both quantitatively 
and qualitatively different from those emergencies that occur regularly. It also projects 
what is likely to happen. This is conveyed most effectively by incorporating the predicted 
data-based numbers such as: 140,000 hazardous material incidents, 53,000 injured 
persons needing medical assistance, and 542,000 displaced persons in need of shelter.254 
As stated previously, this also provides a complete picture of the level of devastation and 
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the magnitude of the contingencies that first responders and emergency managers would 
face and the need to prioritize limited resources to contend with the challenges they 
present.  
The plan also utilizes the forecasted figures to also understand the limitations in 
the resources it has available and how the earthquake could affect them. Acknowledging 
that the scope of the situation will immediately exceed the national capacity of USAR 
resources is an illustration of the pragmatic assessments built into the plan. Calculating 
that 94 percent of California’s USAR trained personnel are also firefighters further allows 
the emergency managers to realize an even greater shortfall in this vital skill set.255 This 
creates a realistic understanding that there are a finite number of USAR resources, 
particularly for a catastrophe of this scale. Therefore, the limited number of USAR assets 
will have to be limited to a few prioritized sites where they will have the greatest impact. 
This corresponds to the priority response areas (PRA) that are determined through GIS 
and other data. 
Similar estimates were developed for structural inspectors and the number of 
inpatient hospital beds. Assessments of the number of shortages that can be expected in 
each of these areas can then be calculated and solutions developed to bridge the gaps in 
advance. For example, the plan accounts for obtaining inspectors from other regions in 
the state and outside of California. Hospital capacity outside of the southern California 
area can now prepare for the predicted loss of 13,000 inpatient beds resulting from an 
earthquake of this magnitude.256  
It will be extremely difficult, even under the best of circumstances, to obtain the 
necessary resources to manage the life safety needs of those affected by any catastrophic 
event. However, the plan includes an extensive analysis of current resources and the 
potential shortfalls resulting from a sizeable earthquake. This analysis of resources and 
the damage estimates complete the expectations of the feasibility criterion. It also allows 
                                                 
255 Ibid., 16. 
256 Ibid., 17. 
 99 
for an accurate assessment of what to anticipate and to make contingencies based on the 
data-driven estimates of the aftermath of a catastrophic earthquake.  
G. FLEXIBILITY 
The plan meets the measures of the criterion of flexibility if it is adaptable, 
generic (rather than hazard specific), allows for decentralized decision making and is not 
a command and control model structure. On the surface, the plan may not seem to meet 
this criterion. It calls for the establishment of a unified coordination group (UCG), use of 
the National Incident Management System (NIMS), and is agent specific to an 
earthquake. However, a closer analysis reveals that the plan remains flexible by 
implementing adaptable frameworks and general emergency management practices.  
As mentioned in the overview, the plan is detailed in describing the predicted 
negative outcomes of a large magnitude earthquake and charting critical geographical 
impact and response areas. However, it is general enough when addressing the operations 
of the different mission areas and how they are incorporated into the different phases. It 
does not specify individual units for certain tasks and addresses the tasks in general 
terms, such as public information and warning, firefighting, and mass care services. 
From the command and control perspective, the senior level assembly of decision 
makers is named the UCG. The title is very telling of its approach to executing the plan. 
Rather than a single “incident commander” or even a “unified command,” the plan calls 
for a UCG. This translates to a merged, collective organization with a collaborative 
approach rather than a directed one. The UCG is a joint set of federal and state officials 
that the plan tasks with prioritizing, allocating, and de-conflicting resources. It also 
requires the UCG to provide logistical support as required.257  
The plan does not state that the UCG will command, control, or direct resources 
or personnel. Rather, the intent of the plan is to clearly disperse the decision making 
among several officials representing both federal and local interests. Accordingly, the 
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UCG will coordinate with local unified commands that will have command and control 
of tactical operations. 
Unified commands are a component of the NIMS structure and are just one 
element of the adaptable framework proven to help organize and manage emergency 
situations. The composition of a NIMS compliant Incident Command System (ICS) 
organization is not pre-determined nor is it specified in the plan. This allows the unified 
command or incident commander to form a system that works best to mitigate the 
situation they are tasked with managing. The plan states NIMS will be employed during a 
catastrophic earthquake. This provides consistency across all levels of government yet 
allows the needed flexibility to those managing critical operations.  
In addition, the plan’s framework is flexible in and of itself. The plan does not 
provide a rigid structure that dispenses assignments or prescribes tactics for individual 
units. Rather, it incorporates a broader overall concept of operations, injects phases rather 
than strict timelines, and establishes a limited number of essential objective areas. 
Furthermore, the plan makes the distinction of identifying potential staging areas, as 
opposed to designating them prior to an earthquake. The staging areas will be officially 
designated during the post-event response based on the damage assessments from the 
area of operations.  
The “hub and spoke” staging area methodology and infrastructure task force 
models presented in the plan are obviously intended for the response to a catastrophic 
earthquake. However, these concepts are generic enough that they may be used for 
almost any type of calamity including mudslides, wild fires, and flooding which also 
regularly impact the region. While Dr. Quarantelli’s research suggests that a good 
response plan is not “agent specific,”258 the plan’s operational foundations and “objective 
areas” could be pillars to any catastrophe response and not just an earthquake. Because of 
this and the other examples cited, the plan is consistent with the criterion of flexibility. 
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H. INTEROPERABILITY/COLLABORATION 
For the plan to be deemed interoperable and collaborative according to the 
established evaluative measures it must be vertically and horizontally integrated with all 
of the stakeholders. The objectives of the plan should also be integrated, as well as 
complimentary of each other. The plan meets the criterion as demonstrated by several of 
the examples already provided in the other criteria.  
As mentioned previously, the plan included the participation of over 1500 
stakeholders. This included the integration of key, private sector, and infrastructure 
partners that were formed into task forces during the planning phase. The formation of 
the UCG is a primary example that shows the plan is both vertically and horizontally 
integrated. The plan states,  
The ‘Unified Command’ concept quite often extends into the Operations 
organization to the Branch and Division/Group level depending on the 
capability of State and Local government. As a result FEMA operations 
may have joint positions (FEMA, state, and/or local) throughout the 
organization.259  
This also insures synchronization across the various tiers of government.  
Having the plan’s response phase and the sub-phases of activation, deployment 
and employment, and sustained response correlate with the various objective areas 
removes impediments to making forward progress during the response. This ensures that 
specific functions are prioritized during these corresponding phases. It also allows for 
tasks to complement and build upon earlier performed assignments thus enhancing 
subsequent actions.  
I. SUMMARY 
The Southern California Catastrophic Earthquake Plan meets the objectives 
listed in the criteria from the leading emergency management standards outlined in the 
Comparative Applicable Criteria Table. Its extensive use of data-based planning lends 
authority to the criteria of adequacy, feasibility, and completeness. The considerable 
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number of stakeholders, including the private sector and non-profit organizations, 
supports the interoperability/collaboration criterion. The plan’s concept of operations and 
operations plans are broad enough to be flexible but contain enough specificity to be 
complete. The plan meets regulatory, legal, and other authorities and is compatible with 
state and federal guidelines.  
The plan is an exemplar of intergovernmental collaboration and planning for a 
foreseeable natural hazard. Also, the plan incorporates several standard emergency 
management principles, which make it adaptable for other contingencies besides an 
earthquake. This chapter establishes that the plan meets the objective standards of the 
primary sources in the field of emergency management.  
The next case study examines the response plan for a more random, manmade 
catastrophe—the detonation of an improvised nuclear device (IND) in a highly populated 
metropolitan area. It uses a very different format to achieve many of the evaluative 
criteria yet has many similarities to this chapter’s case study. It is presented to give an 




X. CASE STUDY: THE INTEGRATED IMPROVISED NUCLEAR 
DEVICE RESPONSE PLAN: CITY OF CHICAGO, COUNTY OF 
COOK, STATE OF ILLINOIS, AND FEMA REGION V 
A. OVERVIEW 
The Integrated Improvised Nuclear Device Plan: City of Chicago, County of 
Cook, State of Illinois and FEMA Region V differs from the southern California plan in 
that it addresses a deliberate, man-made event. Although it utilizes GIS data, the Chicago 
plan is centered on an ambitious and detailed execution checklist. This effectively merges 
federal strategic concerns with local operational necessities. This case study is similar to 
the previous one due to its collaborative development among agencies from the various 
echelons of government, non-government organizations, and the private sector. This plan 
also makes extensive use of regional data and scientific modeling to create a firm 
understanding of the conditions created by the detonation of an improvised nuclear 
device (IND). In this, it provides an interesting contrast to compare to the southern 
California case study. 
The Integrated Improvised Nuclear Device Response Plan: City of Chicago, 
County of Cook, State of Illinois and FEMA Region V is a catastrophe response plan that 
was developed around the scenario of an IND that is detonated at ground level within the 
confines of the city of Chicago. Although the immediate effects of the IND will devastate 
a major portion of the city, the ensuing collateral damage caused by radioactive fallout 
and the cascading effects caused by the thermal and blast damage will be widespread 
over a multi-state region. The projected cost to remediate and recover from such an event 
is projected to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars.260  
Like the previous case study, this plan is also very detailed and provides an 
excellent example for other jurisdictions to consider when developing a plan of their own. 
The plan acknowledges that all catastrophes begin as local events regardless of 
magnitude and have to be managed at the local level until outside or higher level 
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assistance arrives. However, as the full title implies, the plan is a collaboratively derived 
document between local, state, and federal stakeholders.  
Paul Preusse, the Director of the FEMA Region V Response Operations Division 
and a principal partner in drafting the plan, talked about the importance of building 
collaborative efforts and the keys to an effective process. He explained,  
To enable such regional planning efforts it is essential to create 
collaborative consortia that bring together the key stakeholders from all 
segments of government, non-profits, business, academe and the 
community. Gaining everyone’s involvement is necessary to establish an 
enabling rapport and trust among the participants that will foster 
information sharing and coordination. These regional consortia are also 
essential to identifying and assessing preparedness shortfalls, endorsing 
the activities chosen for implementation, and undertaking individual and 
collective solutions to address the gaps.261 
B. PLAN DETAILS 
The base plan section of the overall plan consists of 59 pages and has several 
appendices and annexes, including an innovative and functional “execution checklist” 
that is the primary instrument that makes the plan operational. Due to the nature of the 
threat it addresses, the entire plan is designated For Official Use Only (FOUO) and will 
only be discussed in broad terms to provide an overview of the strengths and positive 
attributes of the plan. However, the plan can still be evaluated to provide an effective 
case study. A copy of the draft version can be requested from the FEMA Region V Office 
for vetted purposes. 
Like the Southern California Catastrophic Earthquake Plan, the regional FEMA 
office performed the main federal role in developing the plan. As stated in the case study 
from California, this allows for federal representation that is more knowledgeable of the 
region and the state and local participants who also contribute to the plan. In any 
enterprise, personal relationships, and local understanding of the issues are essential. This 
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is even more important during emergency situations and crucial during an incident on the 
scale of an actual disaster or catastrophe.  
In order to formulate a coalition to work on the plan, the Homeland Security 
Exercise and Evaluation Program’s (HSEEP) framework, developed by DHS, was used 
to assist in the creation of the plan over a multiyear process.262 It began with a series of 
workshops that included area emergency managers as well as officials from other 
government agencies, national voluntary organizations active in disasters (NVOAD), and 
representatives from the private sector.  
As stated in the New Zealand comparative model and the southern California case 
study, the inclusion of the private sector, particularly those who own and operate critical 
infrastructure, such as energy and water utilities, are crucial to any response to a 
catastrophe. These stakeholders absolutely need to be a part of the planning phase before 
a catastrophe strikes. Similar to the New Zealand CDEM model, elected officials were 
also instrumental in participating in the initial planning stages and most importantly 
placing their support behind the development of the plan.263 
C. BASE PLAN 
The base portion of the plan generally illustrates the magnitude of the catastrophic 
event caused by the detonation of an IND and recognizes there will be cascading effects 
that will substantially overwhelm not only the abilities of emergency responders but the 
ability of all levels of government to respond. As did the southern California plan, this 
plan recognizes that the primary critical infrastructures will be greatly affected but also 
does an excellent job of highlighting the fact that those commodities essential to life 
saving operations, such as fuel and water, will also be severely impacted.264 In addition, 
the Chicago plan uses data to estimate the loss of these commodities due to the 
destruction of their storage areas, distribution networks, or supply chains. Moreover, it 
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also calculates the projected burn rates or daily allotment of these commodities for these 
emergency response resources that are vital to mitigating the physical damage of the 
catastrophe and caring for displaced survivors.265  
The plan uses evidence based analysis and relies heavily on comprehensive 
research, extensive data, and modeling. It incorporates traditional technologies, such as 
GIS systems, but also includes the Nuclear Evacuation Analysis Code (NUEVAC)—a 
“tool for evaluation of sheltering and evacuation responses following urban nuclear 
detonations” that was developed by the Sandia National Laboratory.”266 The federal 
Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC) also provided 
radiological fallout plume modeling. Based on the expertise of the center’s personnel, the 
fallout is expected to extend well beyond the initial blast site and have an extended affect 
in Illinois and the surrounding states.267 Additionally, both of these modeling concepts 
are incorporated into the operational section of the plan to assist in directing the response.  
The plan also utilizes modeling to predict the size of the geographic area expected 
to be affected by the kinetic effects of the IND. This allows for the designation of specific 
damage zones that inform emergency responders and managers of the level of destruction 
in impacted areas. First responders can then safely establish lifesaving operations in light 
and moderately damaged areas outside of the fallout plume’s direction of travel. 
Definitions of what constitutes the different levels of damage zones are stated in the base 
plan, allowing those in the field to properly assess and differentiate the different zones 
and safely function in them.268  
The plan also uses scientific modeling to describe, in detail, the estimated number 
of fatalities and injured casualties.269 This is further broken down into sub-categorizes of 
the triage classification of those patients. The plan even includes an estimate of the 
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number of people who will suffer from acute radiation sickness, which is a condition that 
is specific to this type of event and requires specialized expertise and treatment.270 
Therefore, any gaps in capability or capacity in this specific area of medical treatment 
can be addressed ahead of time. 
As stated, the plan provides precise estimates that are restricted; however, a recent 
exercise conducted by the National Capital Region Incident Management Team (NCR-
IMT) based on a similar scenario that occurs in Washington, DC, may provide some 
insight as to the magnitude of the numbers of casualties that may be involved. The NCR-
IMT scenario predicts approximately 70,000 fatalities immediately occur and within 24 
hours another 39,857 are also estimated to die.271 The NCR-IMT exercise scenario also 
states, “Injuries and radiation exposure leave another 284,850 people with varying 
probabilities of dying in the hours that follow. Without medical attention, another 60,641 
fatalities are virtually assured.”272 
The plan even provides an approximation of the percentage of emergency 
response resources and personnel that are expected to be directly impacted and therefore 
inoperable as a result of the detonation. This demonstrates that an even greater workload 
will be placed on the remaining, functional assets and an even heavier reliance on outside 
resources. The most important lesson learned from this is that detailed analysis is what 
permits those developing catastrophe response plans to effectively and accurately forecast 
the resource requirements necessary to implement and respond to the respective scenarios 
they are formulating. Planners therefore must insure that they account for the anticipated 
losses of resources when determining the additional capacity required to mitigate a 
catastrophe. 
As in the southern California case study, the Chicago plan’s analyses also help 
subject matter experts at the federal level provide a better understanding of the scope of 
the event to local first responders. This is especially important in this specific scenario 
                                                 
270 Ibid.  
271 NCR IMT Spring Exercise 2014—Operation Unified Resolve (Vienna, VA: Ascenttra Inc., 2014), 
10.  
272 Ibid.  
 108 
because many first responders may have the false impression that there is little if 
anything they can do in response to the aftermath of a detonation of a relatively low yield 
nuclear weapon. The plan clearly explains that this is not the case and presents 
informative guidance and parameters on how and when to safely operate in this specific 
type of catastrophic environment.  
D. PRE-DESIGNATING 
The plan is also successful in its use of pre-planning, including the establishment 
of regional hub reception sites and the identification of major routes of vehicular ingress 
and egress that are anticipated to be limited in damage and alternative means of mass 
transit. It also discusses pre-staged resources and a “contact list” of stakeholders and 
essential service providers needed in the event of a catastrophe and is included as one of 
the appendices. 
The plan also addresses specific areas listed in the source standards and in the 
completeness criterion that can be maximized through pre-planning including public 
messaging. Having already established and agreed upon public service and other 
messages is essential when time sensitive events, such as the direction and movement of 
radioactive fallout plumes, need to be immediately communicated. This also promotes 
consistency among all stakeholders and empowers any agency, regardless of the level of 
government, to rapidly deliver vital public messaging as soon as possible in order to save 
lives.  
Another area of plan asserts the need for pre-event education of the public, 
especially of the importance of sheltering in place in the initial hours after the detonation. 
It also expresses the importance of the private sector to develop policies, protocols, and 
physical measures that harden critical infrastructure to make them more resilient to the 
threat of an IND and subsequently to other hazards. Emphasizing these pro-active steps 
prior to an event will reduce the burden on first responders by limiting the number of 
people requiring assistance and getting more essential services functioning more quickly 
to assist in supporting emergency functions.  
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E. EXECUTION CHECKLIST 
The authors of the plan make a point to mention that it is not based on an 
organizational chart but instead on sound operational strategies that can be implemented 
by any agency in the impacted area.273 Whereas, California’s catastrophic earthquake 
plans incorporate a significant amount of data from GIS information systems, the 
Chicago plan is more limited in this standpoint. Unlike established fault lines, the exact 
location of an IND detonation is not fixed and the direction of the resulting radiological 
fallout plume is dependent on several meteorological and other factors. Therefore, the 
cornerstone of the plan is the detailed execution checklist appendix.  
The execution checklist is a functional matrix consisting of headings of major 
functional categories followed by subcategories of tasks that uses the core capabilities 
listed in DHS’s National Preparedness Goal274 as its foundation. It is a comprehensive 
appendix to the base plan that is linearly designed and outlines chronological decision 
points or tasks to be completed in set timeframes, beginning immediately after the 
detonation of an IND through the evolution of 72 hours post-blast and ending when the 
state unified area command intends to transition to a federal unified coordinating 
group.275  
The tasks listed in the execution checklist have been collectively predetermined 
and prioritized by the plan’s many contributors. The benefit to this is that it enhances 
sense making during the chaos inherent in catastrophic events because it has already 
established the prioritization of individual tasks that are built upon in a logical, sequential 
order that maximizes lifesaving efforts. 
This too is essential because the purpose behind the established order that some of 
these tasks follow may not be so evident. An overly simplified example of this is that the 
restoration of the water supply must precede the task of firefighting. Consideration to 
those missions that save the most lives is also an essential factor in ranking these 
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competing priorities. Therefore, one of the plan’s first tasks is to institute public 
messaging to advise survivors to shelter in place and take other lifesaving measures.276 
On the surface, this may not appear to be as essential as some other traditional emergency 
service functions. However, public messaging has been determined by the planning group 
to have the potential to save the most lives, thus reducing the inevitable and immediate 
strain on resources.  
The execution checklist also catalogs the organization that is responsible for a 
particular task. The responsible agency can then be located in the contact list appendix 
and communicated with to see if it is still capable to execute the essential function or if it 
is no longer able to so. The matrix is also designed to allow the user to simply track a task 
from the time it began and the progress being made by indicating it as pending, in 
progress, or completed.277 An additional benefit to the execution checklist is that almost 
anyone can utilize it to initiate response operations in a methodical and organized fashion 
by following the sequential format. This also allows for separate units and commands to 
move in the same direction in mitigating the incident even when communications 
between them are lost. Therefore, the cumulative sum of their individual units’ efforts 
will still have a positive aggregate effect on the incident. 
F. SUMMARY 
The plan is an outstanding exemplar of the merging of national catastrophe 
preparedness strategy and operational response guidance. The base plan portion provides 
a detailed strategic overview of the predicted situation and circumstances first responders 
can expect to encounter based on data analysis, modeling, and subject matter expertise 
from the federal level. The execution checklist provides a functional, user friendly means 
for emergency response personnel beginning at the local level to implement the 
appropriate sequence of operational tasks and decision points that will maximize the 
effectiveness of interdependent tasks and lifesaving actions.  
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This chapter has provided a thorough overview of the plan despite it being 
restricted as FOUO. The plan also provides a solid basis for further assessment. The next 
chapter will evaluate the plan against the criteria established in Chapter VI and the 
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XI. CRITERIA-BASED EVALUATION OF THE INTEGRATED 
IMPROVISED NUCLEAR DEVICE RESPONSE PLAN: CITY OF 
CHICAGO, COUNTY OF COOK, STATE OF ILLINOIS AND FEMA 
REGION V  
A. OVERVIEW 
Although the Southern California response plan’s framework and methodology is 
different from the Improvised Nuclear Device Response Plan: City of Chicago, County of 
Cook, State of Illinois, and FEMA Region V it also meets all of the criteria established in 
Table 1, the Comparative Applicable Criteria. This chapter will outline how the Chicago 
plan meets each of the criteria. In some instances it will have similarities to the New 
Zealand CDEM comparison and the southern California case study while it will also cite 
independent validation of the evaluative criteria.  
B. ACCEPTABILITY 
The plan will be acceptable if it meets applicable laws and authorities. In addition, 
the plan must outline associated timeframes and procedures to capture and work within 
delineated costs. The plan’s first chapter includes Section 1.3 which encompasses 
authorities. The section covers statutes and regulations, executive orders, and presidential 
directives. The sources cited include the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform 
Act of 2006, the Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, Executive Order 
12656, and HSPD-8. Additional authorities are listed under headings such as 
environmental, military and chemical, biological and nuclear authorities.278  
Chapter 4.0, Administration, Resources, and Funding, addresses the costs 
requirement of this criterion.279 Section 4.1.2 Senior Financial Advisor Responsibilities 
and 4.1.4 Financial Oversight are specific to accounting for the costs associated with 
implementing the plan.280 The plan also states that it does not impact or alter the 
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responsibilities of the senior financial advisors of any federal, state, or local department 
or agency; however, it also states that FEMA’s Office of the Chief Financial Officer 
provides the overall management of multi-agency coordination centers including region 
response coordination centers and joint field offices. It references the National Response 
Framework and its “Financial Management Support Annex” for guidance for 
management of federal agencies.281  
Section 4.3 Funding elaborates on the Stafford Act and establishes federal 
financial reimbursement for presidential declared disasters for federal as well as state and 
local response agencies. This section emphasizes that all participants must comply with 
established processes and laws and are responsible for tracking eligible expenditures. It 
concludes by stating that the FEMA mission assignment process is the mechanism for 
obtaining assistance under the Stafford Act.282  
The plan’s major component, the execution checklist, clearly fulfills the criteria’s 
objective of addressing timelines. The logical, sequential checklist delineates tasks that 
must be addressed in a pre-determined sequence during the outlined phases of operations. 
This will maximize the efficiency of limited resources and maximize the number of lives 
saved. The execution checklist allows for the continuity of a unity of effort even though 
communications are anticipated to be severely hampered or have completely failed. By 
following the execution checklist, independently operating units can intrinsically work in 
a coordinated fashion although they may not be able to communicate with each other.  
The Plan meets the criterion of acceptability as detailed above. The authorities 
and administration chapters of the plan respectively address the requirements of 
complexity with applicable laws and costs. The plan’s execution checklist provides an 
excellent framework for managing operations within an established timeline. Combined 
these examples complete the established measures for this criterion.  
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C. ADEQUACY 
In order to meet this criterion the plan must include valid and relevant concepts 
and address critical tasks. This may take the form of a risk assessment when a specific 
threat is not anticipated. The plan should also focus on general principles and not specific 
details. These measures create the basis for this criterion. 
The plan meets this criterion in several ways. The situation chapter provides an 
overview of the nature of an IND detonation and puts it into context. This includes the 
scope of the affected geographic area, number of projected casualties, and the potential 
extent of damaged infrastructure. Radiological factors unique to this scenario, such as 
nuclear fallout and acute radiation sickness, are also mentioned. Since there has never 
been an IND detonation, the plan discusses other comparable radiological incidents, 
including Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to provide a 
baseline understanding of the magnitude of this type of potential scenario.283  
The threat section and its 15 subsections go into depth regarding the effects of an 
IND. These comprise the kinetic or immediate blast results, thermal effects, and 
radiological consequences. This portion of the plan also discusses the anticipated injuries 
that result from an IND’s destructive effects. The plan then discusses the specific impacts 
of the aftermath of an IND detonation relative to Chicago by listing specific data for the 
predicted number of casualties and other after effects.284  
Section 1.1.2 Scope summarizes the operations plan. It states that the overarching 
mission of the plan is to save lives, and it emphasizes that it was not designed around an 
organizational chart. The plan establishes its primary and most effective lifesaving 
strategy as sheltering from the blast and the need to prepare for and work toward this 
goal.285  
Similar to the southern California plan the Chicago plan has a critical assumptions 
section in the first chapter; however, it also has sections on critical considerations and 
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mission-essential tasks. The critical assumptions and considerations section overlaps with 
these last two sections by emphasizing the need for a unified vertical response across all 
echelons of government. The two sections differ in that the critical assumptions section 
primarily deals with the effects of an IND, whereas the critical considerations section 
addresses factors of response planning. The mission essential tasks list broad operational 
necessities that must be accomplished in the immediate aftermath of the detonation of an 
IND.  
The plan also incorporates a brief mission statement emphasizing lifesaving as the 
ultimate goal until operations can be effectively transitioned to a unified coordination 
group.286 There is also a senior leaders’ intent that reiterates many of the mission 
essential tasks and focuses on the importance of properly managing an incident for those 
critical first 72 hours.287 Collectively, these parts of the plan and those previously 
reviewed under this section meet the measures defined in the adequacy criterion.  
D. COMPLETENESS  
The requirements delineated for the criterion of completeness are the inclusion of 
a concept of operations (CONOPS) and the incorporation of major actions, objectives, 
tasks, and timelines. Other requisites include the purpose, scope, and goals. To be 
complete a plan should also include a needs assessment of stakeholders, resources, and 
personnel. Additionally, plan that is complete will also define mission areas or assign 
responsibilities for the various emergency support functions (ESF). Furthermore, a 
complete plan should anticipate likely problems and envision appropriate solutions or 
alternatives. The best social and data-based sciences should be used in the design of the 
plan making it as empirically sound as possible. The Chicago plan complies with all of 
these evaluative standards using a comprehensive framework intended to promote a unity 
of effort even in the event of catastrophic losses of resources and infrastructure. 
The plan includes a CONOPS. It is based upon the same phases as those utilized 
in the southern California plan—pre-incident, immediate response (the first 24 hours), 
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deployment (24 to 72 hours), sustained response (72 + hours), and short- and long-term 
recovery.288 The CONOPS recognizes that the capabilities and capacities of state, local, 
and federal resources will immediately be exceeded and prioritization of those remaining 
assets will be critical.289  
The CONOPS also affirms the need to designate exclusion and tiered operational 
zones based on the hazards caused by the IND’s blast and radiological fallout plume 
models. Furthermore, the plan’s CONOPS discusses major actions that must be taken 
during the response phase to include evacuation, logistics and transportation mission 
functions. In addition, the CONOPS also addresses the initial command structure and 
how it evolves and transitions during the various phases.  
The major phases outlined in the CONOPS broadly address the criterion’s 
requirement for operational timelines. The combination of the standard incident phases 
along with the detailed execution checklist annex makes this measure of the completeness 
criterion exceedingly complete. This provides both a strategic overview of what stage the 
incident is functioning under and a tactical matrix for first responders to follow and 
synchronize operations.  
The execution checklist also exemplifies the criterion’s measures of integrating 
tasks and objectives. As described earlier, the execution checklist is a chronological 
annex of sequential tasks that are required to be completed over the three phases 
encapsulated in the first 72 hours. The list is very extensive and entails functions of all of 
the ESF’s and the EMAP Standard’s 30 areas of responsibility. It also delineates 
responsibilities among the numerous stakeholders. The sections of the plan mentioned in 
the criterion of adequacy, including the mission essential tasks, obviously addresses tasks 
and objectives and the senior leader’s intent substantiates the scope and purpose of the 
plan.  
The plan also addresses personnel and resource requirements. Like the southern 
California plan it calculates the projected losses in capacity of emergency medical 
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facilities; however, it also predicts the IND’s impact on other public safety 
departments.290 This will allow for the region to not only plan for resources to mitigate 
the physical effects but also arrange for supplementation for the anticipated reduction in 
capacity in emergency response resources. The Chicago plan even examines, in detail, 
the estimated shortfalls in commodities essential for lifesaving such as fuel and potable 
water.291  
The “Planning Scenario Planning Assumptions” section provides additional 
examples of areas that will also be affected by an IND detonation, such as government 
services, banking and finance, and extensively on infrastructure and utilities.292 These 
areas are supported by data, evidence-based research, and extensive modeling. GIS 
systems analysis is utilized to estimate and differentiate the extent of the damage zones, 
while the scientific methodologies such as the Nuclear Evacuation Analysis Code 
(NUEVAC)293 and the expertise of the Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric 
Assessment Center (IMAAC) are used to provide information regarding the radiological 
effects of an IND detonation.294  
The plan meets the established requisites in Chapter VI for the most 
comprehensive criterion of completeness. It has a well-developed CONOPS and 
addresses other measures by incorporating goals, major actions, purpose, and scope 
through the range of other sections. Timelines and tasks are detailed in the execution 
checklist. The plan also makes extensive use of data and evidence based planning as well 
as other scientific models. These examples also demonstrate the plan’s anticipation of 
problems and potential solutions. As a result, it anticipates several significant problems 
and has developed solutions in the form of tasks in the execution checklist. The plan 
therefore thoroughly meets the criterion of completeness.  
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E. CONSISTENCY 
The criterion of consistency insures a plan complies with regulatory requirements, 
and other policies, standards, and procedures. The Chicago plan conforms to several of 
these measures, many of which are outlined in the plan’s guiding principles section. 
These include: 
• Presidential Policy Directive-8, National Preparedness  
• The National Response Framework  
• The National Preparedness Goal 
• The National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident 
Command System 
• the DHS planning guidance Strategy for Improving Response to and 
Recovery from an IND Attack 
• The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) U.S.C., §2163 
• The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 
• The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) of 
2006 
• The Illinois Statewide Communications Interoperability Plan (SCIP) 
• The National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP) 
• The FEMA Regional Planning Guide  
• Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG 101)295 
The above listed resources that the plan draws from are not all inclusive; however, 
these resources represent both state and federal guidelines. They also include a spectrum 
of policies and regulations that address emergency management principles, radiological 
considerations, and interoperability of communications. The range of these regulations 
and procedures from the different tiers of government firmly establishes that the plan is 
compliant with the criterion of consistency. 
F. FEASIBILITY  
In order to meet the requirements of the criterion of feasibility, the plan must 
recognize that disasters are quantitatively and qualitatively different from everyday 
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emergencies and everyday crises. It also must be based on what is likely to happen. The 
plan does this by first stating that all echelons of government will initially be 
overwhelmed and that resources will not only be significantly strained but actually will 
be critically reduced instantaneously upon the detonation of an IND.296  
Just as in the southern California plan, the Chicago plan also has utilized an 
extensive amount of data to calculate the estimated number of casualties, damage zones, 
and impact on critical infrastructure and essential resources. This further supports the 
criterion’s measures, creating as realistic of an understanding of the impacts as possible.  
As a result of the detailed analysis of the likely outcomes of the scenario, and 
evaluations of national and local capabilities and capacity, a gap analysis can be 
conducted. Strategically, the federal government gains an understanding of the gaps in 
technical capabilities and general capacities that will be needed for this type of scenario. 
It also can plan where to obtain some of the needed resources from or fund new efforts to 
build a certain capability shortfall. Tactically, this level of technical detail better informs 
first responders how to safely work in and around the hazards presented in this type of 
attack. This literally lends itself to the feasibility of the plan.  
The sheer magnitude of an IND detonation and the immediate loss of vital 
resources and critical infrastructure make it impossible to have enough initial on-hand 
resources. At best, it will take a considerable amount of time to obtain the resources to 
just stabilize the effects of a detonated IND. However, the plan incorporates both 
Department of Defense civil support teams and federal civilian assets, such as the 
Department of Energy’s Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) teams in its 
response.297  
The Chicago plan meets the criterion of feasibility. It predicts possible problems 
and addresses them through the tasks listed in the executive checklist. In addition, the 
plan recognizes that the detonation of an IND is significantly different than other crises 
and as such will need extensive outside resources and assets with special capabilities to 
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respond. Furthermore, the plan lists compiled data similar to the southern California plan 
regarding the number of casualties, damaged zones, and cascading effects of critical 
infrastructure failures. This presents a realistic understanding of the likely circumstances 
that a region will face in the aftermath of an IND detonation. Together these examples 
succeed in meeting the measures of this criterion.  
G. SUMMARY 
The case studies presented are very similar despite concentrating on two different 
hazards. The southern California plan relies heavily on GIS, while the Chicago plan 
centers on the execution checklist. However, both appear to be based on the same 
underlying principle of capabilities-based planning. The next chapter will analyze the 
plans by further comparing and contrasting the common areas that make them exemplars 
of the thesis’ evaluative criteria. Those sections of reciprocal merit will then be 
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XII. CONCLUSIONS BASED ON EVALUATION  
OF THE CASE STUDIES 
A. EVALUATION  
Each of the case studies follows the evaluative criteria established in Chapter VI 
of the thesis. The criteria was developed using measures from the federal government, 
private non-profit associations, and academia. This diverse grouping of sources from 
which the criteria were derived ensures a well-balanced assessment of the federally 
coordinated response plans presented in the case studies.  
The southern California plan addresses a natural occurring catastrophe while the 
Chicago plan prepares for a man-caused event. Therefore, the structures of the plans 
differ significantly, yet they have several commonalities that make them exemplars of 
vertically synchronized, intergovernmental, catastrophe, response plans. This chapter 
assesses the positive aspects of the plans and areas for further research and improvement.  
The foundation of the southern California plan is based extensively on the 
analysis of geographic information systems (GIS). The application of GIS works well for 
this plan because of the fixed nature of the hazard posed. The location of the San Andreas 
fault combined with historic perspectives and scientific models of regional earthquake 
activity make GIS a logical medium to center the plan around. This has led to the 
development of the concept of priority response areas (PRA).  
These PRAs are based on shake magnitude, population concentrations and 
structural density. By pre-designating these areas, first responders know where to 
concentrate their efforts regardless if they have communications with higher commands 
or lateral units. This same methodology can be utilized for different applications. The two 
variables of population concentration and structural density are universal to almost any 
catastrophe. The third variable of shake magnitude from the California case study can be 
altered to different hazards, such as river and tributary flooding, the inland distance and 
height of a tsunami induced wave, or explosive blast proximity.  
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The major component of the Chicago IND plan is the execution checklist. This 
functional matrix chronologically lists tasks, pre-determined by stakeholders, that are 
essential to a successful response to the detonation of an IND. Since the tasks have been 
agree upon, this allows for its immediate use at the onset of a crisis. An additional benefit 
of the pre-established execution checklist is that the sequence of the tasks is synchronized 
so they complement and build upon each other. Furthermore, they can be implemented 
without direction from higher command in the event communications are lost, as is 
expected in this scenario. The structure of the Chicago plan clearly has applications to 
other catastrophes and important concepts that should be replicated in other response 
plans.  
The difference in the plans is indicative of the criterion of flexibility. Although 
counter to Quarantelli’s recommendation that response plans not be agent specific, the 
two different formats validate the necessity of adaptability in response plans. Emergency 
planners should first attempt to identify the likely hazards that could impact their 
communities. If they are not prone to any natural disasters, then industrial accidents, 
critical infrastructure failures, and/or acts of terrorism should be examined. Planners must 
then consider the best planning framework for the threat or hazard they are preparing for 
in order to implement the most effective response.  
B. UNIVERSAL PLANNING APPLICATIONS 
The case studies also provide important lessons learned for universal catastrophe 
response planning. Many of the features of each of the plans are valid, even in regions 
that do not have predictable catastrophes. The “hub and spoke” concept of pre-
designated, established, and stocked staging and supply areas are essential to any 
catastrophe response. Having them co-located or near planned routes of ingress is also an 
important factor that is incorporated into both plans. This should not be limited to 
roadway access but should include multiple modes of transportation to include railways, 
airports, and seaports.  
This leads to the determination of pathways and end points for supply or resupply. 
In addition, this includes identifying potential shelters and places survivors traditionally 
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congregate for assistance after a catastrophe, such as stadiums, arenas, and schools. 
Staging areas and base camps for incoming resources, rescue workers, and volunteers 
also need to be considered ahead of a catastrophic event as they have in the case studies.  
Additional commonalties of both case studies that are fundamental to the 
development of future plans are their tracking and accounting of baseline regional, pre-
event demographics and infrastructure. As mentioned above, the key elements used in 
determining PRAs include elements such as population concentrations, structural density, 
and hazard vulnerability. An understanding of a region’s critical infrastructure and the 
most critical links and nodes of the individual system are essential to predetermine and 
harden from a potential hazard if possible. Interdependencies of each sector’s systems 
and its impact on a response plan’s priorities are also a major learning point from both of 
the plans presented.  
Both plans also make extensive use of scientific, evidence, and data-based 
information in their development. Having quantifiable statistics concerning the numbers 
of potential injured casualties, fatalities, damaged structures, and amount of debris for the 
most likely threats provides the basis to start planning. It also establishes an 
understanding of the magnitude and scope for stakeholders, planners, and emergency 
responders. This important function is supported by Quarantelli’s criterion that plans 
recognize that disasters are both quantitatively and qualitatively different from other 
types of crises.  
This type of data assists in establishing resource needs for the response and 
mitigation of the after effects of a catastrophe. Both plans identify the potential 
consequences of the respective threats on the current, local inventories of emergency 
response resources, and critical infrastructure. The Chicago IND plan even calculates the 
anticipated loss of vital commodities, such as fuel and water, to the immediate affected 
area and the surrounding region. Based on these predicted losses, the Chicago IND plan 
then tries to gauge the additional amount of commodities needed to make up for the 
deficiencies; not only to sustain survivors but also to support the influx of first responders 
and their life saving missions. This level of specificity prepares for worst-case scenarios 
and shows an exceptional level of detail of the cascading effects catastrophes create.  
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Therefore, a finding as a result of the research of this thesis is that data, scientific 
and/or evidence based information are important factors in catastrophe planning and must 
be integrated into a catastrophe response plan. These quantitatively and qualitatively 
defendable details should expand upon and be incorporated into Quarantelli’s principle 
that the best social science be used as an integral part of the development of a catastrophe 
plan. The advent of “big data” and the resulting scientific principles should be a modern 
addition to the decades-old and proven 10 principles of disaster planning.298  
Both plans address the capabilities or skills needed, such as firefighting, USAR, 
and radiation sickness medical specialists. The Chicago plan, also expounds upon the 
quantity of needed vital commodities in the aftermath of an IND detonation. Furthermore, 
each plan also calculates the losses of essential resources and the additional capacity 
needed to supplant these losses and mitigate the multitude of subsequent hazards and 
support life sustaining needs.  
Historically, this additional capacity will come in the form of federal assets or 
from voluntary intrastate memorandums of agreement or interstate Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) requests. Presumably, this is where each plan 
assumes the additional capacity that is needed to respond to each of the respective 
scenarios presented will come from; because it is not fully addressed in either plan. The 
researched literature uses the term capability to describe both the necessary skills and 
additional quantity of resources. However, there is a marked distinction between 
capability and capacity. As Figure 4 demonstrates, rapidly mobilizing emergency service 
and other resources is extremely problematic in the initial stages of a catastrophic 
incident.  
                                                 
298 Quarantelli, Research Based Criteria for Evaluating Disaster, 4.  
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Figure 3.  Conceptual Illustration for Assessing Capability Requirements and 
Identifying Capability Gaps for National Preparedness299 
Therefore, defined skills or abilities—capability versus the amount of those 
resources needed—capacity should be defined and calculated separately. For example, 
the military may have the most capable, small unit, special operations team, yet it does 
not have the capacity to assault an enemy division. The next section of this chapter makes 
recommendations to remedy or enhance the essential issue of ensuring needed capacity.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Several recommendations emerged based as a result of the author’s research and 
experience, several recommendations emerged. These include adapting current federal 
task force models for catastrophe planning and reforming grant funding to address the 
gap in emergency service resource capacity dedicated to national catastrophe response.   
                                                 
299 Government Accountability Office, FEMA Has Made Limited Progress in Efforts to Develop and 
Implement a System to Assess National Preparedness Capabilities, 2010, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1151r.pdf, 4.  
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1. Enhance the Emergency Management Assistance Compact Processes 
The catastrophic scenarios presented in both of the case studies calculate an 
enormous number of casualties, physical destruction, and collapse of critical 
infrastructure. The unpredictable timing of an IND explosion or of a strong magnitude 
earthquake in major metropolitan areas demonstrates the need to have resources pre-
identified and to deploy on short notice before an incident occurs.  
The present national emergency resource request and allocation system is the 
EMAC. EMAC is a national interstate mutual aid agreement among all 50 states and 
several of the United States’ territories to provide assistance and resources in the event of 
a disaster declared by a governor. According to the compact: 
Once the conditions for providing assistance to a requesting state have 
been set, the terms constitute a legally binding contractual agreement that 
makes affected states responsible for reimbursement. The EMAC 
legislation solves the problems of liability and responsibilities of cost and 
allows for credentials, licenses, and certifications to be honored across 
state lines.300   
It is administered by the National Emergency Managers’ Association (NEMA), a 
group started among state emergency officials in 1974 to exchange information and 
coordinate operations. EMAC works in conjunction with FEMA’s federal disaster 
response system to provide state-to-state assistance when it appears a disaster is going to 
be declared. 
States usually request personnel and resources in the wake of disasters through 
their emergency management agencies. This process can be quite bureaucratic. First, the 
impacted state makes an EMAC request for specific needed resources, which is then 
retransmitted to other state emergency management agencies to see if they can fill the 
order. State emergency management agencies fill the request at the state level or poll 
local jurisdictions to see if they can meet the request. If a state or one of its county or 
municipalities can fill an order for resources or personnel, that jurisdiction must calculate 
the financial costs associated with deploying them. This is forwarded to the requesting 
                                                 
300 “Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC),” 
http://www.emacweb.org/.index.php/learnaboutemac/what-is-emac, 1.  
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state to compare against other incoming proposals so they can accept the ones that best 
meet their needs. Besides financial costs, states consider variables such as FEMA typing 
(level of capability), response time and others. Even though the process can be 
bureaucratic, EMAC has developed a system that expedites this process. 
Mission ready packages (MRP) identify resources that are pre-established and 
entered into the EMAC system, indicating they are ready for deployment. The essential 
information needed for a state to consider and accept a resource to respond to a 
catastrophe, including FEMA type, related costs, deployment time, and location, are 
already calculated and are loaded in the EMAC system. By doing so, these agencies 
indicate they are ready for immediate consideration by states in need of their services.301 
EMAC still needs to insure the listed resource is available from the participating 
jurisdiction and the requesting agency still needs to formally accept. While this does 
speed up the resource ordering process, additional procedures can be added to further 
reduce response times and add national capacity.  
EMAC should institute a fourth operations level, Level 4, to its existing three 
levels.302 The current three levels are not activated until the onset of an emergency (see 
Figure 5). This new fourth level would provide a daily, around-the-clock operational 
watch desk. During this Level 4 phase, EMAC would electronically check on the status 
of mission ready packages from across the country to affirm their availability, 
deployment status, and any changes in their EMAC criteria at least once in a 24-hour 
period. A steady state operational status report would be made available of all the 
emergency response assets that states and other municipalities have available and can 
deploy on short notice. This is similar to what fire departments across the country do each 
and every day and on a national level what the Department of Defense does through the 
                                                 
301 “EMAC—Emergency Management Assistance Compact: Frequently Asked Questions About 
MRPs,” 2015, http://www.emacweb.org/.index.php/learnaboutemac/module-positions/mission-ready-
package, 1.  
302 Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC),” 23.  
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Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) to track and account for its available 
resources.303  
 
Figure 4.  Current EMAC Operation Levels304 
Having EMAC account for emergency response assets on a daily basis not only 
would create a common operating picture of what is immediately available in times of 
crisis, it also would establish a larger picture as to the overall capability and capacity for 
national emergency response. Utilizing this system, resource gaps could then be better 
identified and programs to improve national or regional capability, and capacity could be 
developed. The resource gaps identified by instituting this system could be addressed by 
Congress through DHS by modifying its grant structure and the terms in which funding 
for resources are allocated. This will be expanded upon later in the chapter. 
                                                 
303 Laura J. Junor, “The Defense Readiness Reporting System: A New Tool for Force Management,” 
Joint Force Quarterly, no. 39 (October 2005): 30, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA479857   
304 Federal Emergency Management Agency, EMAC—Emergency Management Assistance Compact: 
EMAC Overview, August 2006, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1726-25045-
0915/060802emac.pdf, 23.  
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2. Build National Capacity through a County Based System 
The above recommended changes to the EMAC system are just one way to help 
determine where the gaps strategically lie in national catastrophe preparedness. Each 
state, or at a minimum, each FEMA region should have a baseline of assets that are 
capable of handling the Department of Homeland Security’s “core capabilities” for its 
largest populations. Additionally, states should also be ready to mitigate likely large-scale 
natural disasters for their area of operations and be able to contribute to the benchmarks 
of the meta-scenario.  
In order to ensure there is adequate national capacity, a county-based resource 
system should be implemented. There are 3141 counties or there equivalents throughout 
the United States, not including the American territories.305 If each of these contributed a 
mission ready package in just the three primary emergency functions of police, fire, and 
emergency medical services, this would be a tremendous, cumulative force multiplier in 
terms of nationwide capacity.  
By having each county in the country designate a FEMA typed ambulance strike 
team (five ambulances), it would result in 15,705 ambulances and crews. A fire task force 
from each county or equivalent consisting of two engines, one truck, a rescue squad, and 
a chief officer would exponentially increase fire and rescue services to a catastrophe 
zone. Likewise, a law enforcement deployment team (LEDT) or strike team consisting of 
26 officers (a team leader—lieutenant), five supervisors (sergeants), and 20 officers from 
each county or equivalent would provide a potential surge of up to 81,666 police officers.  
While this constitutes a significant increase in capacity for any catastrophe, it is 
important to remember that these numbers of resources would be needed for 24 hours per 
day operations for a sustained period up until and into the recovery phase of a prolonged 
and complex incident. This would be a “win-win” situation for the counties or their 
equivalents and the nation. The counties would obtain these resources on a grant from the 
DHS. They would then be able to use them in their daily, day-to-day operations but 
                                                 
305 U.S. Geological Society, “How Many Counties Are There in the United States?,” April 4, 2008, 
http://gallery.usgs.gov/audios/124#.VN4Y0iyxUYs, 1.  
 132 
would be legislatively mandated to register them as MRP assets and rapidly respond with 
them when requested. However, this would require a change to the current grant 
structure.  
The comparison study of New Zealand’s Ministry of Civil Defense and 
Emergency management (MCDEM) emphasizes the need to view homeland security 
from a bottom-up perspective, while taking into consideration a holistic and strategic 
national planning framework—the end goal of which is to be able to mitigate the largest 
anticipated catastrophes that will require a coordinated national response. The next 
section proposes changes to the homeland security grant conditions that would support 
the above recommendations.  
3. Restructuring Federal Grant Funding 
The concept of restructuring DHS grant funding based on national preparedness 
needs is not new. It was advocated relatively shortly after the September 11, 2001 
attacks. The 2003 report Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously 
Unprepared, produced by an independent task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign 
Relations, concludes, “Congress should work to establish a system of distributing funds 
based less on politics and more on threat.306“ It also recommends, “States should develop 
a prioritized list of requirements in order to ensure that federal funding is allocated 
properly and quickly to achieve the best possible return on investments.307“  
However, this must be balanced with the scope of catastrophe resource response 
gaps and allocations nationally. Although states and localities frequently identify needs 
within their own communities, a more comprehensive approach based on meeting a 
nationwide catastrophic event is necessary. Also, from the national perspective, resources 
need to be distributed not only by the type and level of threat but to those locales outside 
of areas expected to be impacted by catastrophes so the necessary resources will be 
unaffected by the very catastrophes where they will be deployed. Federal grant funding 
should be incentivized and offered to each county to provide a mission ready package in 
                                                 
306 Metzl, Rudman, and Clarke, Emergency Responders, vi.  
307 Ibid., vii. 
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each of the primary emergency response disciplines as previously outlined. Currently, 
most resources funded by federal DHS grant funds are not required to provide assistance 
outside of their immediate areas.308 Under new guidelines, resources purchased with 
federal grant funds would be legislatively obligated to report as part of a mission ready 
package and would mandatorily respond to EMAC requests, similar to the New Zealand 
CDEM groups.  
Counties that could only partially commit due to staffing levels would receive 
pro-rated funding. Jurisdictions that volunteer to obtain and sustain resources beyond the 
basic police, fire, and EMS mission ready packages or agree to fill regional gaps in 
certain specialized capabilities would further be compensated through the grant process. 
However, the key is distinguishing those resources that would enhance the national 
capacity and capability shortages and not just a resource that supplants local funding or 
provides a limited advantage outside the immediate area where it is stationed. Otherwise, 
as the independent task force concluded, “Investments in enhancing emergency responder 
capabilities, therefore, will be lost if they are not integrated into a larger national strategy 
for meeting broader homeland security needs.”309 Although similar to the New Zealand 
MCDEM comparison presented, this policy recommendation balances the need for a 
legislatively mandated response of local resources while respecting states’ rights and the 
United States’ federalist system of government. 
The recommendations outlined thus far in this chapter will enhance capacity and 
capability. They are based on the extensive forecasted resource needs for each of the 
catastrophes outlined in the case studies and the positive after action reviews of the 
CDEM plan in response to the 2011 Christchurch, New Zealand earthquake. The 
following recommendation will build intergovernmental collaboration and will especially 
help in those regions where this is difficult to achieve due to limited staffing or funding. 
Not all jurisdictions have the ability to collaboratively engage and develop 
comprehensive response plans as those presented in the case studies.  
                                                 
308 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA—FY 2013 Homeland Security Grant Program 
(HSGP),” accessed May 24, 2014, https://www.fema.gov/fy-2013-homeland-security-grant-program-hsgp-
0  
309 Metzl, Rudman, and Clarke, Emergency Responders, 12.  
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4. Joint Catastrophe Planning Teams  
In order to encourage collaboration among local, state, and FEMA regions, the 
federal government can adopt a model based on the New Zealand CDEM groups and 
adapted from federally funded task forces. Law enforcement examples of these types of 
task forces include joint terrorism task forces (JTTF), and high intensity drug trafficking 
area (HIDTA) task forces. These task forces are organized by a primary federal agency 
that then requests local police departments to participate by providing officers who 
become federally deputized and work on the task forces. Some of the officers’ expenses, 
such as partial salary reimbursement, overtime, certain equipment, and vehicles, are often 
provided by the sponsoring federal law enforcement agency.310 
This allows for the paring of the resources of the federal government in terms of 
finances, technology, equipment and local law enforcement organizations’ intimate 
knowledge of their jurisdictions. FEMA funded urban search and rescue (USAR) task 
forces are perfect examples of this model outside the law enforcement realm. The USAR 
task forces receive federal funding for their extensive equipment caches and are 
reimbursed for their training hours and time while deployed to actual events.311 The local 
departments that host the task forces gain highly technical capabilities and real-life 
experience. In turn, the USAR task forces are expected to deploy when given a task order 
to assist anywhere in the country and frequently overseas when requested and arranged 
through the Department of State.  
Another example is an incident management team (IMT). IMTs are already 
established groups of homeland security and emergency management professionals from 
local departments representing multiple disciplines who are well versed in the Incident 
Command System (ICS). They often receive federal funding to regularly train and 
prepare to respond to significant large scale disasters and national catastrophes.312 Once 
                                                 
310 Drug Enforcement Agency, “DEA Programs: State & Local Task Forces,” 2014, 
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on site, the IMT structures the incident’s response utilizing the ICS framework and 
manages the resources needed to mitigate the incident.  
The IMTs are presently designed to be reactive to situations. However, because of 
the experience and make-up of their staffing, they would be the ideal group to adapt or 
recruit from to form proactive catastrophe contingency planning groups. Using the law 
enforcement task force model, FEMA would assign a permanent staff at the state level 
from the regional office to coordinate the team and represent federal strategic interests 
and perspectives.  
Similar to the CDEM groups, a core number of IMT members from across a state 
would then be assigned to these newly formed joint catastrophe planning teams (JCPT) to 
identify the likely regional hazards they will face and develop contingency plans for 
them. After the plans are developed, the JCPT will identify any gaps in resources needed 
to execute the plans. Next, they will develop coordination arrangements such as 
memorandum of agreements (MOA) or work on obtaining the needed resources in an all-
inclusive, coordinated manner, rather than disparate smaller entities vying for the same 
grant funding.  
The IMT members assigned to the JCPT would then introduce the plans back to 
the rest of the IMT members. This emulates the CDEM groups and their contribution to 
the national CDEM plan presented in the New Zealand MCDEM comparison study. The 
IMT would then gear its training and responses toward the state plan created by the 
JCPT. The JCPT’s plan would then be incorporated into the applicable FEMA region’s 
plan and eventually into the National Response Plan, thus bridging the hometown 
security and homeland security divide.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The evident gap between the federal and state and local governments in terms of 
catastrophe planning is well recognized. Although this is a complex issue, many of the 
building blocks needed to successfully create a solution already exist. Streamlining the 
EMAC system and increasing its readily deployable inventory will enhance readiness. 
Having Congress reform the current grant structure will develop incentives for state and 
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local agencies to maintain resources that enhance national capabilities and capacities at 
the county based level. Moreover, adapting the federal task force models will provide a 
vehicle for intergovernmental collaboration. Finally, continuing with the initiatives and 
partnerships the FEMA regional offices have developed to create response plans, like 
those in the case studies, are essential to bridging the gap between state and local 
governments and the hierarchy of the DHS.  
Collectively, these recommendations will increase collaboration by bolstering 
relationships across all levels of government. Grant funded resources will be able to 
rapidly deploy to catastrophes and will mutually benefit the local region on a daily basis 
and the nation in time of a catastrophe. The fusion of local and federal emergency 
management professionals that follow the criteria established earlier in this thesis will 
produce catastrophe response plans that are significant to all stakeholders’ perspectives, 
needs and requirements. As a result, these proposals will merge hometown security with 
homeland security resulting in a safer and more resilient nation. 
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